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Executive Summary 
This feasibility study covers seven major objectives according to the terms of 
references. It offers an overview of the main types of foundations in EU Member States 
(Objective 1); presents estimates of the economic scale of the European foundation 
sector, also in comparison with the United States (Objective 2); examines the main 
regulatory differences in the legal treatment of foundations across the EU (Objective 3); 
estimates cross-border activities as well as barriers and their economic relevance 
(Objective 4); analyses the importance and cost implications of these barriers (Objective 
5); explores possible modalities of eliminating existing barriers (Objective 6); and 
assesses further possible effects of a European Foundation Statute (Objective 7). 
For each objective key findings emerge, which we address in the concluding section of 
the feasibility study. Specifically: 
(1) The European foundation sector is a major economic force and makes 
significant contributions to the public good of Europe.  
(2) The public benefit foundation is the only type of foundation which is accepted 
in every Member State and in practice public benefit foundations are the most 
important foundation type. 
(3) In the 27 Member States considerable regulatory differences can be found. 
However, as regards the public benefit foundations there are also important 
similarities which overall are more substantial than the remaining differences. 
(4) There are legal barriers to cross-border activities of foundations of the Member 
States both in civil law and in tax law. As in company law, most of the barriers 
can be overcome, but this leads to compliance costs which will often be higher 
than they would be in company law, given that the legal and personal 
environments vary (foundation and tax laws of the Member States seem to have 
more legal uncertainties inter alia because of much less case law and fewer 
specialised lawyers, and because board members of foundations may be less 
experienced in legal issues). 
(5) The calculable cost of barriers against cross-border activities of European 
foundations ranges from an estimated € 90,000,000 to € 101,700,000 per year. 
Additionally, there are incalculable costs (costs of foundation seat transfer, 
costs of reduplication, psychological costs, costs of failure, etc.) which are 
certainly higher. 
(6) Five policy options emerge for addressing cross-border barriers and thereby 
stimulating foundation activities. These policy options differ substantially in 
terms of their cost effects as well as in their legislative and administrative 
implications. In comparing the various models, the European Foundation 
Statute seems to suggest itself as the preferable policy option. 
(7) Apart from the reduction of the costs for cross-border activities a possible 
European Foundation Statute would have further positive effects on the general 
governance of foundations and trusts; on the behaviour of donors and giving; 
on the corporate sector; and on the European economy, especially in the field of 
R&D. 
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Ad (1) As the empirical analysis shows, the European foundation sector is a major 
economic force and larger than has been documented by any previous research. Keeping 
differences in definition and classification in mind, Europe’s foundation sector 
substantially exceeds the economic weight of US foundations in assets (by a factor of 
almost 2) and even more so in expenditure (by the at least a factor of 2.5). Allowing for 
all data uncertainty and validity problems, we estimate that the European foundation 
sector has assets of between € 350bn and close to approx. € 1,000bn (!) and annual 
expenditures of between € 83bn and € 150bn. By contrast, US foundations have assets 
of approx. € 300bn and expenditures of € 29bn. Additionally, growth patterns suggest 
that at least a substantial number of European countries are on track for sustained 
foundation growth.  
Ad (2) The empirical analysis and the comparative legal analysis illustrate that the 
public benefit foundation is the only type of foundation which is accepted in every 
Member State, and that in almost all Member States it is the only or the most significant 
type of foundation. The only relevant exemption is the Netherlands, where numerous 
other foundations exist because of historical reasons (path dependency).  
Ad (3) The comparative legal analysis shows considerable regulatory differences in the 
27 Member States. Probably the most striking difference is that around about half of the 
Member States accept also other foundation types apart from public benefit foundations.  
If we analyse the similarities and differences, it seems to us that the similarities are 
overall more significant. The differences are often relevant only in their details and in 
specific cases. As regards the type of the public benefit foundation the most important 
different approaches regard the founding assets, the private supervisory instruments 
(i.e., auditing and disclosure) and in particular the scope of economic activities.  
Ad (4) Legal barriers do exist both in civil law and in tax law. They are of varying 
natures and magnitude.  
The highest barriers exist when a foundation considers transferring or has effectively 
transferred its seat to another Member State. Member States adhering to the real seat 
doctrine (Sitztheorie) will even require the foundation to dissolve itself in such a case. 
In the other Member States there are usually no rules which allow such a transfer. As a 
consequence, this route is either barred or at least burdened with high legal uncertainty 
and administrative efforts. Indeed, according to our findings, no such case has been 
reported yet. 
Apart from this there are other civil law barriers in some Member States (e.g., 
recognition procedures), and in tax law the vast majority of the Member States only 
grant tax benefits to resident foundations but not to non-resident foundations. In 
practice, the usual way to overcome the existing tax law barriers seems to be to establish 
one or more other foundations or non-profit organizations which comply with national 
laws of the states in which they are to engage in activities. 
Currently, there is a debate whether some or all existing barriers infringe the 
fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty, especially the freedom of establishment and 
the freedom of capital movement. As regards the civil law barriers there is no 
adjudication by the ECJ, but there are good arguments that some foundations can enjoy 
the right of establishment of Art. 43, 48  of the EC Treaty so that the existing civil law 
barriers have to be justified according to Art. 46 of the EC Treaty or pursuant to the 
four-factor test set forth in Gebhard. The future application by the member states of the 
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real seat doctrine to foundations (that are within the ambit of the freedom of 
establishment provisions of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty) will depend on 
whether or not restrictions of a foundation's freedom of establishment, if any, that result 
from the real seat doctrine can be justified on the basis of the four-factor test established 
by the ECJ in Gebhard. In this context it must be taken into account that, due to their 
special nature and purposes, foundations and other not-for-profit associations are 
necessarily subject to state supervision. In contrast, Member States may impose 
registration requirements on foreign foundations, provided these requirements are not 
contrary to the four-factor test.  
As regards the tax law barriers the analysis of the Stauffer decision confirms the 
existence of a non-discrimination rule concerning the income taxation of a non-resident 
foundation by the state of source. According to this non-discrimination rule, a non-
resident foundation is entitled to receive similar tax benefits to a resident foundation, if 
the non-resident foundation meets all the requirements of the tax law of the state of 
source. There are good arguments that such a non-discrimination rule is also applicable 
to tax benefits for donations; the ECJ will decide this question soon in the Persche case 
which is just under review.  
It seems possible that the current and future adjudications of the ECJ will facilitate the 
overcoming of the barriers in tax law: if a general non-discrimination rule were to be 
accepted by the ECJ, a new possibility to overcome existing tax barriers would be 
possible since any non-resident foundation could claim tax benefits under the condition 
that it can prove that it meets the requirements of the state of source (except its seat). 
However, such a “non-discrimination solution” is not easy to implement, because of 
several legal uncertainties stemming from the requirements of the tax laws of the 
Member States. It should also be noted that according to information from practitioners, 
ECJ case law may not give sufficient legal certainty to proceed since the ECJ can only 
interpret the law in specific cases, but not map out the more detailed legal rules that may 
be necessary for planning and carrying out complicated business transactions. 
In light of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty, comparing the 
barriers for cross-border activities of foundations with the barriers for cross-border 
activities faced by companies, we find that their nature and magnitude are rather similar. 
Nevertheless, in the foundation sector there seems to be considerably more legal 
uncertainty (e.g., in the meaning of “economic” activities, comparability of tax law 
requirements, etc.) among other things, due to the fact that much less case law exists 
here than in company law. In comparison with company law, costs may be additionally 
increased by the different personal environment (board members of foundations may 
have less legal experience than board members of companies) and the fact that there are 
much fewer professional lawyers with specific expertise in national and foreign 
foundation law and in the provisions for national and foreign tax benefits for public 
benefit institutions. All these legal uncertainties lead to compliance costs which will 
often be higher than the overcoming of such barriers in company law. 
This assumption is supported by the results of the field study which suggests that many 
foundations intend to carry out cross-border activities and that the level of perceived 
barriers is higher – especially for foundations with less experience in international 
activities – than the level of actual barriers, even though all but the largest foundations 
(probably because of their experience) report of the latter. Even if barriers could 
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basically be identified as surmountable and resolvable, this remains a costly endeavour 
which puts a high demand on the foundations’ capacity to process complex information 
of the Member State jurisdictions. 
Ad (5) The cost level is carefully assessed in differentiating calculable and incalculable 
costs. Among the least calculable are the psychological costs and the effects of 
philanthropic contributions foregone because of barriers or perceptions thereof. If 
endowment costs for affiliates, administrative costs of additional entities, as well as 
failure cases were calculable, they would certainly add substantially to the very 
conservative cost estimate which we place at a minimum of € 90m per year without and 
at a minimum of € 138m per year with endowment costs included (or, if the high end of 
our span is considered, between € 101.7m and € 178.7m per year). The growing 
potential for cross-border philanthropy in Europe suggests that these figures should be 
seen as a minimum level of costs when considering a dynamic perspective. The non-
calculable costs will certainly add another substantial component to the total transaction 
costs incurred by cross-border activities of European foundations or by foregone 
activities of European donors. The potential for further growth in the philanthropic 
sector of Europe exists; therefore, we can expect a growing relevance of these cost 
estimates.     
Ad (6) We debated the feasibility and desirability of five models for European public 
policy to address the current situation: (1) maintaining the status quo; (2) 
harmonization; (3) multilateral or bilateral treaties and the European Foundation Statute; 
(4) without tax-exempt status or (5) with tax-exempt status in all Member States (non-
discrimination rule). 
Under the status quo model some improvements, though only minor ones, are feasible. 
The ECJ will probably develop a general non-discrimination rule as regards tax law 
barriers, and some of the civil law barriers may be regarded as infringements of the EC 
Treaty in future. In addition, one could try to reduce some of the costs by information 
campaigns and/or by means of soft law (code of conduct, accreditation system). 
Nevertheless, it will be hard to reduce the current costs significantly: The very fact that 
27 Members States are involved creates a substantial level of complexity by the number 
of possible combinations. The results of any such information approach would either 
have to be a fairly comprehensive online information portal on the Internet or a 
handbook-style publication, but certainly not a collection of information brochures. So 
the main part of the costs will remain even if we follow a very optimistic approach. 
The other extreme to the implied ‘no direct legal action’ of the status quo model would 
be the harmonization of the various foundation laws and/or tax laws across Member 
States. While such harmonization could reduce the costs significantly it does not seem to be 
realistic. The same is true for the treaty model.  
The European Foundation would be an additional and optional instrument like the 
European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), the European Company (Societas 
Europaea, SE), the European Cooperative Society (Societas Cooperativa Europaea, 
SCE), and most recently and in particular the proposed European Private Company 
(Societas Privatae Europaea, SPE). 
The legal basis for a European Foundation Statute would be Art. 308 of the EC Treaty 
combined with the fundamental freedoms (i.e., freedom of establishment, freedom of 
capital movement) which seem to be applicable to most cross-border activities of 
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foundations. Existing national foundations would be entitled to transform into a 
European Foundation, if such a transformation is in line with the will of the founder. 
The Member States could provide for specific procedures allowing a transformation 
under the condition that the foundation’s statutes can remain similar after the 
transformation. 
Cost reduction is dependent on the scope of the European Foundation Statute: The more 
a European Foundation Statute is to look like the comprehensive draft of the proposed 
European Private Company (SPE) – and less like the more rudimentary statute of the 
European Company (SE) – the higher the cost reduction would be. Additionally, the 
more a national foundation is to be allowed to change into a European Foundation, the 
higher the cost reduction would be.  
As regards the civil law barriers we estimate that a European Foundation Statute could 
lead to a cost reduction of 48m to 77m euros (96.5m to 137.2m euros, if we take the 
minimum capital also into account). Apart from this, there would also be a cost 
reduction of incalculable costs (costs of transfer of the foundations’ seat, costs of 
reduplication, psychological costs, costs of failure, etc.).  
Additionally, an option would be to establish a European Foundation with a tax-exempt 
status in all Member States. Such a model would need an additional implementation of 
tax law rules. As regards the scope of such tax benefits, there are various options. 
Instead of a harmonization it seems to us that only a non-discriminatory solution is both 
realistic and reasonable. Thus, a European Foundation would receive the same tax 
benefit as a tax-exempt foundation in the same Member State. 
As regards the implementation of the additional tax law rules, there could be an 
implementation by the European Foundation Statute itself, by an additional treaty, or 
(automatically) by adopting the lowest common denominator of the national tax laws of 
the Member States. While the two first options do not seem to be very realistic, the third 
option may be worth considering: According to the new adjudication by the European 
Court of Justice in Stauffer, it is unlawful to deny tax-exempt status to a foreign 
foundation if this foundation meets all other requirements of a national tax-exempt 
foundation of the state in question. Thus, theoretically the European Foundation would 
be automatically tax-exempt in the Member States, if the European Foundation Statute 
were to combine all requirements of the tax law of the Member States (de facto lowest 
common denominator). The requirements of tax law could be mandatory for all 
European Foundations or be part of a supplementary ‘model statute’, leaving it open to 
the founder whether she/he wants the additional advantage of the status of a tax-exempt 
foundation in all Member States. At first sight, such a tax-exempt European Foundation 
may seem unrealistic, because it would be over-regulated and too ‘bureaucratic’. 
However, according to the results of the comparative legal studies of the tax law of 
foundations, the similarities in tax law seem to be much greater than in foundation law. 
Thus, it is not unimaginable that even such a European Foundation could be a viable 
proposition and the price of more bureaucracy may be worth considering tax-exemption 
in all Member States. 
As compared with the other models, such a European Foundation would mean the most 
expectable cost reduction effects (from the feasible models). Again the cost reduction is 
dependent on the details of the European Foundation Statute and the possibilities of 
transforming a national foundation into a European Foundation. The potential cost 
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reduction could add up to 91m to 101.7m euros (138m to 178.7m euros, minimum 
capital included). The approach would create the most far-reaching incentive for 
funding trans-national European causes and would have the greatest potential to foster 
science and research funding as well as other causes of European interest. It would also 
lead to a shared concept of a European public good, even though such a concept may be 
feasible for only a limited list of purposes mentioned in European Treaties, such as the 
goal to promote R&D and the competitiveness associated therewith. 
Ad (7) Apart from the cost effects, the European Foundation may have the following 
further effects: it may encourage foundations to become internationally active and so be 
seen as a good example of governance; it could encourage a larger amount of private 
giving in Europe trough much improved visibility of the legal form; it could be an 
incentive for more corporate giving and corporate social responsibility, it could attract 
more international (and extra-European) giving to foundations in the EU; and it could 
serve as an adequate vehicle to foster the special needs of the growing European 
research area. 
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Part 1: Introduction 
A. The Idea of a European Foundation 
Since the turn of the millennium there have been initiatives both in science and in practice 
to introduce a European Foundation as an additional supranational optional form.  
The starting points were two comparative publications on foundation law1 and 
empirical information about foundations, 2 each of which included country reports by 
experts from several Member States. As a result of these publications, the divergent 
wealth of European foundation law traditions became obvious. Three large foundations 
(Bertelsmann Foundation, ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius  and Compagnia di 
San Paolo) decided to finance a collaborative project on drafting a Statute for a 
European Foundation. The result of the project was a publication, including a draft for a 
European Foundation Statute, with commentaries and legal comparative views, written 
by 25 legal experts (foundation law and tax law) from 13 countries.3 In the meantime, 
the European Foundation Centre (EFC), as the European association of foundations, 
also undertook a parallel project and published its own recommendation for a European 
Statute.4  
Meanwhile, the idea of a European Foundation was also part of the considerations of the 
High Level Group of company law experts set up by the European Commission in 
September 2001 to make recommendations on a modern regulatory framework in the 
EU for company law.5 According to the final report of the High Level Group, a 
European Foundation is worth considering6 but should not take priority in the short or 
medium term, because it would not be imperative for the conduct of cross-border 
activities. Additionally, national differences in foundation law had to be borne in mind. 
The High Level Group also referred to the results of a questionnaire from their interim 
report, which, among other things, asked whether a European Foundation should be 
introduced (Question 35a) and whether harmonization of national foundation laws 
would be desirable (Question 35b). While a large majority of the respondents said no to 
both questions, deeper analysis shows that the answers stemming from the foundation 
sector supported the introduction of a European Foundation while rejecting 
harmonization.  
                                                 
1 See Hopt/Reuter (eds.), Stiftungsrecht in Europa, Köln 2001, especially the contribution of Hommelhoff, 
p. 77 et seq., which however does not discuss the possibility of a European Foundation.  
2 Schlüter/Then/Walkenhorst (eds.), Foundations in Europe, Society, Management, and Law, London 
2001. 
3 Hopt/Walz/von Hippel/Then (eds.): The European Foundation – a New Legal Instrument, Cambridge 
2003. 
4 The EFC proposal is available at www.efc.be. See also Machete/Antunes (eds.), as Fundações na Europa 
- Aspectos jurídicos (2008), discussing the two proposals for a European Foundation Statute.  
5 See the Final Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory 
Framework for Company Law in Europe (2002), p. 1. 
6 High Level Group, p. 120 et seq., especially p. 122. 
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In 2003 the European Commission took up the suggestion of a European Foundation in 
their Action Plan:7 “With respect to the possible development of a proposal for a 
Regulation for a European Foundation, before deciding to submit a proposal, the 
Commission intends to launch a study aimed at assessing in depth the feasibility of such 
a Statute. Such an assessment will have to take account of the lessons to be drawn from 
the adoption and use of the other European Statutes, so that it should best take place in 
the medium term.” 8  
From December 2005 until March 2006 the Directorate-General Internal Market 
undertook a further “Public consultation on future priorities for the Action Plan on the 
Modernisation of Company Law and Corporate Governance”,9 which also asked 
whether it would be considered useful to carry out an examination on the feasibility of a 
European Foundation Statute (Question 13). According to the published results of the 
consultation, 71 of the 217 statements (32.72 %) were issued by foundations, only 
discussing Question 13, and answering this question positively.10 
In spring 2007 a call for tenders for the feasibility study on a European Foundation 
Statute was launched.11 The Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International 
Private Law in Hamburg and the University of Heidelberg (particularly the Centre of 
Social Investment and Investigation [CSI] and the Law Faculty), Germany, decided to 
apply as a consortium for this feasibility study and eventually won the bid. 
In autumn 2007 the consortium started its work and finalised the study in November 
2008. 
B. Objectives of this Feasibility Study 
The purpose of this study is to provide the Commission with a comprehensive overview 
of the importance and of the role of the foundation sector in the European economy.  
This includes an analysis of current barriers for cross-border activities in the Internal 
Market that could make such operations as the transfer of funds, cooperation, and joint 
action between foundations and their partners abroad less attractive and more costly. 
This study will analyse potential ways and means by which these barriers could be 
reduced, if not eliminated, and the effects they might have on foundations themselves 
and the purposes they serve. 
                                                 
7 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament. Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – 
A Plan to Move forward, COM (2003), 284 final.  
8 European Commission, COM (2003), 284 final, p. 22. 
9 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/consultation/consultation_en.pdf 
10 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/consultation/index_en.htm. 
11 According to the call for tenders this feasibility study should cover seven major objectives: an overview 
of the main types of foundations and foundation forms in EU Member States (Objective 1); estimates of 
the economic scale of the European foundation sector, also in comparison with the United States 
(Objective 2); the main regulatory differences in the legal treatment of foundations across the EU 
(Objective 3); estimated cross-border activities as well as barriers and their economic relevance 
(Objective 4); the importance and cost implications of these barriers (Objective 5); possible modalities of 
elimination existing barriers (Objective 6); and assessed possible effects of a European Foundation 
Statute (Objective 7). 
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For the purposes of this study, trusts and similar legal institutions and arrangements will 
be treated as functionally comparable to foundations and, therefore, included in the 
scope of the study. 
In order to reach these objectives, the following issues will be addressed by the 
feasibility study: 
– Empirical analysis of the main types of foundations (or trusts where appropriate) 
and analysis of their economic relevance in the EU and in the US (Part 2), 
– Legal comparative analysis of the main regulatory differences as regards 
foundations (or trusts) across the EU (Part 3), 
– Barriers to cross-border activities of foundations: their legal and economic 
relevance and estimated costs (Part 4), 
– Analysis of possible modalities of elimination of these barriers (including 
introduction of a European Foundation Statute) and assessment of the possible 
effects of these modalities as regards the costs of cross-border activities and 
further effects (Part 5). 
C. The Project Team 
To meet these challenging objectives, it was necessary to combine legal expertise, 
economic know-how, and practical experience concerning foundations and the non-
profit sector.  
Due to the interdisciplinary nature of the study, the Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg, and the University of 
Heidelberg (particularly the Centre of Social Investment and Investigation [CSI] and the 
Law Faculty), Germany, decided to act as a consortium for this feasibility study. The 
acting persons of the consortium were: 
1. Professor Dr. Dr. Klaus J. Hopt, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and 
International Private Law; 
2. Priv. Doz. Dr. Thomas von Hippel, Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
and International Private Law (project coordinator); 
3. Professor Dr. Helmut Anheier, University of Heidelberg, Centre of Social 
Investment and Investigation; 
4. Dr. Volker Then, University of Heidelberg, Centre of Social Investment and 
Investigation; 
5. Professor Dr. Werner Ebke, University of Heidelberg, Institute for German 
and European Corporate and Business Law; 
6. Professor Dr. Ekkehard Reimer, University of Heidelberg, Institute for 
Finance and Tax Law; 
7. Dr. Tobias Vahlpahl, University of Heidelberg, Centre of Social Investment 
and Investigation (project coordinator for empirical parts). 
Because of the requirements for this study, an international and interdisciplinary team of 
additional experts was needed, including legal experts (with special knowledge of 
foundation law, taxation of non-profit organisations, and European law), economists 
and practitioners with practical experience in foundation matters. Thus, an expert group 
with 16 members from 12 Member States was established. This group acted as peer 
reviewer, reviewing the methodology of the different objectives and providing valuable 
 - 10 -
information about their discipline and the particular situation in the respective Member 
State.  
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Members of the core team of experts were (in alphabetical order):  
Name Institution Country Field 
Professor Gianpaolo Barbetta University of Milan IT Economy 
Paul Bater  International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation (Senior Research 
Associate) 
UK Law 
Francis Charhon  Fondation de France (Chief 
Executive Officer) 
F Practitioner 
Professor Dr. Zoltán Csehi Eötvös Loránd University HUN Law 
Greyham Dawes Horwath Clark Whitehill (Director of 
the Charity Unit) 
UK Law, 
Practitioner 
Professor Tommaso Di Tanno Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
(Chairman of the Statutory 
Auditors)  
IT Law 
Ludwig Forrest King Baudouin Foundation BEL Practitioner, 
Law 
Professor Xavier Greffe Sorbonne University Paris F Economy 
Professor Søren Friis Hansen University of Southern Denmark DK Law 
Professor Paavo Hohti Council of Finnish Foundations 
(Managing Director) 
FIN Practitioner 
Ewa Kulik-Bielinska  Stefan Batory Foundation (Director 
of Information and Development) 
PL Practitioner, 
Law 




Professor Jacques Malherbe University of Leuven BEL Law 
Ana Sastre Fundación ONCE (Policy Officer) E Practitioner, 
Law  
Professor Steen Thomsen University of Copenhagen  DK Economy 
Professor Filip Wijkström Stockholm School of Economics SWE Economy 
 
Finally, in order to receive comprehensive information about the details of foundation 
and tax law in all 27 Member States, several legal country experts were asked to 
contribute to the legal comparative analysis. Fortunately, the European Foundation 
Centre (EFC) has established a network of legal experts in every Member State, which 
was very helpful in providing the information in relatively little time. We would like to 
thank especially Dr. Victoria Athanassopoulou (Greece), Isabelle Combes (France), 
Professor Katerina Ronovska (Czech Republic) and Hanna Surmatz (EFC) for their 
valuable help.  
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Part 2: Empirical Analysis – The Economic Relevance  
and Function of Foundations in Europe and in the US 
A. Introduction 
This Part of the study offers an analysis of the economic dimension of the European 
foundation sector, including cross-border activities, relative to the United States. In 
doing so, we will focus on a series of questions: 
– What are foundations? 
– How many foundations exist? 
– What are their total assets and annual expenditures?  
– How many people are employed by foundations or volunteer for them? 
In addressing these questions, we have to be mindful that the Member States of the 
European Union reveal a highly diverse field of institutions with a great variety of 
different foundation types and foundation-like forms.  
I. Existing Material 
Throughout this work, we have made many attempts to enlist every conceivable data 
source on foundations in Europe, and combined legal and economic analyses. The 
major building blocks are: 
– Data on the economic weight of the foundation sector such as the EFC Research 
Task Force Data (2nd Survey 2005-2007), the Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-
profit Sector Project, etc.; 
– Case studies commissioned on specific foundation types; 
– A survey of the legal treatment of foundations in Member States; 
– A survey of cross-border barriers. 
The last two points consist of a self conducted survey among foundations in Europe. 
The questionnaires were sent to 630 different European foundations of which 134 
responded and participated in the survey. This led to a response rate of 21 percent. The 
result is the first field study in this area which provides individualised data of 
foundations and consists of 134 cases of foundations in 24 different countries of the 
European Union. 
The data of the feasibility study was collected by post and is based on standardised 
questionnaires existing in different language versions.  
The data used for the calculation is drawn mainly from our field study. Concerning size 
and weight, the foundations differ considerably, so that the sample covers the diversity 
of the foundation sector at least satisfactorily. However, due to the quota sample used 
for the selection of cases, it is not to be expected that distribution of attributes among 
the foundations observed will equal the distribution in the ground population. Therefore, 
a weighting factor was developed in order to get at least an impression of the sector. 
Because of its small case number and the intended selection of simply large and well-
known foundations, the survey serves more as an indicator than as a representative 
study. Therefore, the selection was not made stochastically as the standard required, but 
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when combined with the secondary data of the EFC, it is scientifically usable to 
demonstrate an impression of the sector.  
II. The Problem of Inconsistent Definitions 
A fundamental problem of the empirical analysis is the inconsistency of definitions 
used.  
1. General Remarks on the Problem of Different Legal Definitions  
The term “foundation” can have various meanings as becomes evident when one looks 
at the legal definitions of the Member States. As we have no harmonization of 
foundation law in Europe, there are more or less substantial differences in foundation 
law in the Member States, so that, for example, a Dutch “foundation” would not meet 
the stricter requirements of French foundation law. Such differences are common in the 
field of a comparative legal analysis. However, an empirical analysis needs to find a 
solution to work with the different national concepts of “foundations”. 
The different legal requirements/definitions have consequences for the empirical data. 
When we look at the two extremes, we see, on the one hand, the French traditional 
foundation12 complying with the high demands of French foundation law (pursuit of a 
public benefit purpose, minimum initial endowment of usually € 1,000,000, strong 
monitoring by the State supervisory authority). On the other hand, there are the 
Netherlands with much lower demands (pursuit of any lawful purpose, no minimum 
initial endowment required, only rudimentary control by the public attorney as the State 
supervisory authority, and with largely unconstrained economic activities). It is not very 
surprising that the number of French traditional foundations is much, much lower 
(1,226) than the number of Dutch foundations (163,000).  
Fortunately, such big differences are more the exemption rather than the rule. However, 
it was necessary to cope with several problems arising from the different concepts of 
foundation law. 
2. Solution through a Functional Definition 
Because of the great degree of variation in the way that foundations are understood, as 
well as the detailed requirements of the different European foundation laws, the project 
team agreed from the outset that only a functional approach would serve the purpose of 
this study.  This would establish common ground for the empirical analysis which could 
also be kept consistent with the legal definition used.  
According to the findings of the legal comparative report (see Part 3) the lowest 
common denominator of the legal definition of a foundation is the following: 
– an independent organization (generally with its own legal personality), 
– which has no formal membership, 
– is supervised by a State supervisory authority, and 
– serves a public benefit purpose (in some Member States: any lawful purpose), 
                                                 
12 Note that the French legislator recently (August 2008) decided to establish a new legal form of the 
“endowment fund” (fonds de dotation), which has much more liberal rules in comparison with the 
foundation law rules of many other civil law Member States. 
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– for which a founder has provided an endowment, and 
– determined the foundation’s purpose and statutes. 
This legal definition, on which we shall elaborate in detail in Part 3 of this study, is 
based on criteria which are largely also used for the empirical parts.13  
3. Special Cases – Individual Country Deviations 
As regards the empirical findings, we address a few key deviations in certain countries 
from this general legal definition elaborated in Part 3 of this study.  
a) The Dutch Case 
According to Dutch country experts, most of the numerous Dutch foundations do not 
promote public benefit purposes. The vast majority seem to act as “commercial” 
foundations and carry out functions which in other Member States less liberal than the 
Netherlands would be fulfilled by other legal persons (e.g., co-operatives). 
Unfortunately, there is no data which would allow us to distinguish between Dutch 
“commercial” foundations and other types of foundations which are also common in the 
other Member States. Thus, we finally decided to regard Dutch foundations as a 
“special” case, which is too different from the other Member States. This means that the 
data of all Dutch foundations could not be used in order to avoid an overrepresentation 
of a different type of “foundation”. 
b) The Case of the United Kingdom and other Common Law Member States 
Another problem is the common law countries (Cyprus, Ireland, Malta and the United 
Kingdom). The United Kingdom, for example, distinguishes between “charitable trusts”, 
“charitable companies” and the recently established “charitable incorporated 
organisation”. The three legal forms have some similarities with and some differences 
from a “public benefit foundation”: a foundation has no membership (like a trust) and 
legal personality (like a charitable company or a charitable incorporated organisation).  
According to the invitation of tender, we have decided to compare foundations with 
trusts. However, as regards the data, it seems to be common in the United Kingdom to 
regard all “charities” as one single category (without a distinction between charitable 
trust, charitable company and charitable incorporated organisation). The result is that 
the number of “charities” is high in comparison with the average number of 
“foundations” in civil law countries. Moreover, the assets of “charities” are significantly 
higher than the assets of “foundations” in any other Member State. 
Obviously, comparing  “charities” with “foundations” is problematic. As experience 
shows, there are usually many more associations in the Member States than 
foundations. For example, in Germany there are ca. 600,000 associations (and 15,500 
foundations). The number of German “charitable” (public benefit) associations is 
unknown, but it is probably much higher than the number of foundations – a number of 
250,000 associations has been estimated, which seems to be realistic. Thus, if all 
“charities” were qualified as “foundations” for this empirical study, there would be a 
numerical overrepresentation of the “charitable” sector of the UK (containing all 
charities) in comparison with the “charitable” sector of the civil law countries 
                                                 
13 See Annex F. 
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(containing only charitable, and a very few non-charitable, foundations, but not 
charitable associations). 
In our empirical approach we decided to follow an approach of the Charities Aid 
Foundation in its own research of the UK foundation sector. This approach counts as 
foundations those charities which make grants.14 In its dimension, this is however 
largely consistent with the charities which are audited (above a £ 500,000 threshold).15 
c) The Case of the United States 
This study also undertakes an empirical analysis of “foundations” in the US. In contrast 
to the common law Member States, where the term “foundation” has no legal meaning, 
in the US the term “foundation” does exist in the legal terminology. However, this 
meaning is different from the meaning in the civil law Member States: 
The civil law Member States follow an organisational approach. In all these countries 
there exists a specific legal form which has rather similar conceptual criteria all across 
and  which is usually called “foundation” alongside such other legal forms as the (non-
profit) association, the company and the co-operative.  
In the United States, a “foundation” is a sub-category of a tax-exempt “charity” (trust or 
non-profit corporation) defined by some functional criteria depending on the source of 
its income. The Internal Revenue Code distinguishes between “private foundations” 
(usually funded by an individual, family, or corporation) and public charities (other 
charities that raise money from the general public). Private foundations have more 
restrictions (e.g., prohibition from controlling affiliated enterprises) and fewer tax 
benefits than public charities.  
In the civil law Member States, a comparable functional categorization according to the 
sources of funding does not exist. 
Although the context of the legal definition in the civil law Member States (legal form) 
and in the US (tax law) is different, we have decided to tolerate these differences 
because of two reasons: 
There is comparably good data about “foundations” in the US, which is very helpful in 
analysing their economic relevance. For nearly fifty years, the Foundation Center in 
New York has collected statistics on foundations, and the tax records of foundations are 
publically available and accessible on the Internet (and also via search services provided 
by private firms such as Guidestar and FoundationSearch) 
In spite of the different contexts, a “foundation” in the US and a “foundation” in a civil 
law Member State can be rather comparable in practice. This is especially true as 
regards the traditional type of a granting foundation in a civil law Member State, 
financed only by its founder. Such an institution is also a “foundation” according to the 
functional definition of US tax law.  
Differences exist, however, if we look at an “operational” foundation which provides 
services for a public benefit purpose. According to the functional definition of US tax 
law, such an “operational institution” is generally not regarded as a “private 
foundation”, but as a “public charity” (which means higher tax benefits). However, in 
                                                 
14 CAF, Grant-making by UK trusts and charities, January 2007, p. 3-4. 
15 See part 2 below for this argument. 
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the civil law countries another legal form may also frequently be used in order to 
provide services for a public benefit purpose (e.g., a public benefit association or a 
charitable company).  
At the end of the day, it seems possible to compare the data of the US foundations with 
the “foundations” in the civil law Member States, as long as the remaining differences 
are taken into account. 
III. The Problem of Inconsistent Data 
Even though we will present data and venture estimates (however crudely) in the 
following pages, we should sound a strong note of caution and stress that the current 
data situation on foundations in the EU is precarious. The UN Handbook on Non-profit 
Institutions (United Nations, 2003) may well offer long-term improvement in this 
regard, provided it is incorporated in the European System of National Accounts and 
implemented across Member States. In the interim, however, only a systematic and 
coordinated effort can remedy a data situation that unfortunately prohibits reliable, 
systematic comparisons of the kind needed here. 
Clearly, the various data sources resulted from different projects, followed a range of 
purposes, and used varied definitions and approaches. While data from the EFC and its 
network of partner associations directly address foundations and are generated from 
national surveys of participating foundations, the Johns-Hopkins Comparative Non-
profit Sector data are largely the result of calculations and imputations based on national 
account aggregates for non-profit institutions serving households, or NPISH. Likewise, 
the UN Handbook data are aggregations for the non-profit sector, and offer at best a 
breakdown for foundations as a subcategory of the International Classification of Non-
profit Institutions. The Johns-Hopkins Project and the UN Handbook Project present 
data for the non-profit sector as a whole, and offer limited information on the 
foundation sector as part of this larger aggregate. They also provide data on the extent to 
which foundations fund other parts of the non-profit sector such as health or research. 
This breakdown includes the category of “philanthropy” or “giving”, which is larger 
than the foundation sector (by the volume of individual cash donations) but gives a 
maximum approximation of the weight of foundation expenditures. At the same time, 
the Johns-Hopkins Project and the UN Handbook Project identify only grant-making 
foundations as a separate category, and operating foundations are merged with the 
primary field of activity. For example, a hospital foundation would be classified as a 
hospital together with other non-profit organizations, or a research foundation as a 
research organization and not as a foundation. 
The research of Anheier and Daly is based on survey data of national origin 
complemented by analyses of available aggregate data on the sectors. To develop their 
results, they involved an international network of corresponding colleagues working 
according to shared definitions and guidelines. However, their focal interest was the 
policy level, and they addressed issues of the economic importance of a foundation as 
background information only.  
Some general remarks concerning the nature of the available data on foundations from 
EFC and partner sources need to be made. As a result of compiling data from different 
legal jurisdictions, subjecting the functional equivalent of a foundation as defined for 
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this study to different norms concerning assets, expenditures and above all accounting 
standards, means that the data presented suffer from inconsistencies which include: 
– Assets are included in the data according to different accounting standards and 
may therefore reflect nominal value, book value or fair market value. For 
example, data provided by the Association of German Foundations may include 
foundation assets according to all three valuation approaches because there 
exists no national legal norm for foundation asset valuation. The Bosch or 
Bertelsmann foundations include assets in their balance sheet that certainly 
undervalue their share in the respective corporations (Bosch: 92 % of the 
corporation are held by the foundation, book value given at € 5.05bn; 
Bertelsmann 71 % of the corporation valued at € 622m.). As a result, we can 
expect significant underestimation of the real asset value of foundations. 
– Foundation expenditures are a more reliable source, which, however, can also 
include serious challenges as to their validity. Depending on the share of 
operating foundations in a country, their expenditures can mean quite different 
things: they can refer to grant-making (and related costs thereof) in some cases. 
In other cases, they can refer to operating expenditures of foundations running 
institutions such as hospitals or care centres, and the corresponding issue is the 
sources of income of those foundations, which can consist of revenue generated 
on their assets, revenue generated (fee income, related business income), cash 
contributions by donors, or transfer payments from public budgets. Normally, 
the aggregate data from existing information sources do not differentiate among 
these categories. As a result, expenditures are not related to assets in any direct 
way. 
– As a consequence of our definition of foundations for comparative purposes, we 
may face issues in certain countries as to which foundations should be included 
and which ones should not. This is the case when private benefit institutions 
have public benefit activities, and when legally independent foundations are 
controlled by public bodies or represent public budgets. The latter involves three 
sub-cases: foundations which are formally independent but directly controlled 
by their governing bodies; foundations that depend on annual resource 
allocations from government; foundations which have an asset base which has 
resulted from a privatisation process of public property and is under legal (e.g. 
the German “public law foundations” – öffentlich-rechtliche Stiftungen) or 
practical control of a public body (governance). 
– All survey data provided by the EFC and its national partner organizations suffer 
from low response rates generally, and even lower ones when it comes to 
financial information. Usually, these surveys only have response rates of about 
one-third for financial information. Methodologically, no efforts have been 
made to date to calculate the weight and distribution of the respondents in 
relationship to the whole sector. Therefore, it is impossible to decide whether the 
survey samples were representative for the sectors in their countries and to 
extrapolate the total size of the sector from the existing data. For our own survey 
conducted for this project, however, we calculate the weight of the sample (see 
below) relative to the ‘universe’ of known foundations. 
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IV. Diversity of Types of Foundations 
As a matter of fact, there are numerous typologies of foundations both in social sciences 
and in law.16 
We have decided that for the purpose of this study a typology according to the 
foundation’s purpose is helpful, as the purpose characterises the nature and the character 
of a foundation (see infra B II). 
B. Foundations in Europe: An Empirical Portrait 
As the following pages present a rich amount of information, it is useful to state the 
main empirical findings at the outset. According to the data available, we found that: 
– The foundation sector in Europe consists of approximately 110,000 foundations. 
– By far the largest numbers of them are public benefit foundations. 
– The economic weight of the foundation sector is chronically underestimated, 
particularly with operating foundations included. 
– Assets of foundations are estimated at 1,000bn euros.17 
– Expenditures of foundations are estimated at 153bn euros. 
– European foundations employ approximately 1m FTEs staff 
– About 2.5m volunteers work for European foundations. 
I. Size and Weight 
1. Number of Foundations 
Drawn mainly from EFC data and other published sources available to us, the number 
of foundations in the EU ranges between 90,000 and 110,000, or around 400 
foundations per million inhabitants. As Table 1 shows, there is great variation in the 
number of foundations, ranging from a high of over 16,000 in Hungary, 14,000 in 
Denmark, and over 10,000 in each Germany, Spain and Sweden, to lows of 300 to 500 
(public benefit foundations) in  each Belgium, Greece and Portugal, and even lower 
numbers in the Baltic Member States. Unfortunately, not all countries are covered, as 
shown in Table 1, and we used the average ratio of number of foundations per million 
inhabitants for clusters of countries18 to estimate the number of foundations in Lithuania 




                                                 
16 See Annex G. 
17 The figures for assets, expenditures and employment are estimates, based on our own survey, a 
secondary analysis of existing data, and an additional plausibility review, as described below. 
18 The clusters are described in detail in Annex A. 
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Foundations per 1m inhabitants 
(2005) 
Austria 339020 n/a  
Belgium 665 400 63.14 
Cyprus 35 35 44.9 
Czech 
Republic 






Estonia 638 183 61.9 
Finland 2,600 2,600 490.6 
France 1,226 1,226 19.1 
Germany 12,940 12,000 156.9 
Greece 489 489 43.8 
Hungary 22,255 16,707 2,213.8 
Ireland 107 107 25.2 
Italy 4,720 4,720 79.9 
Latvia 584 145 172.5 
Lithuania 1531 1531 455 
Malta 65 65 160 
Netherlands 16300022, 23 n/a24 n/a 
Poland 6,000 6,000 157.4 
Portugal 485 485 44.3 
Romania 9,803 9,803 455 
Slovakia 338 338 62.6 
Slovenia 143 143 70.8 
Spain 10,835 10,835 240.2 
Sweden 14,495 11,501 1,579.1 
UK 8,80025 8,800 145.2 
  
                                                 
19 Based on EFC data supplemented by recent additional data sources. 
20 This figure includes 2,843 private foundations plus 550 public foundations. See Doralt-Kalss, 
Stiftungen im Österreichischen Recht (2001). In: Hopt, Reuter (Eds.) Stiftungsrecht in Europa. 
21 Including: 9,472 non-industrial foundations and 1,293 industrial foundations 
22 Because of the special character of Dutch foundations, this number is excluded from the calculation of 
the total number of foundations. 
23 See "The Politics of Foundations - a Comparative Analysis", Gouwenberg (page 242). 
24 Although the exact number of public benefit foundations is unknown, according to country experts 
many Dutch foundations have no public benefit purpose but instead have a business one, mostly in the 
area of providing services. 
25 Not included are 80,000 to 90,000 charities. These represent a special case because they are small and 
not incorporated and therefore cannot be regarded as equivalent to what would be a foundation with legal 
personality in civil law (irrespective of whether it is in the form of a limited not-for-profit corporation or a 
civil law foundation). For this argument see also Greyham Dawes on p. 21. 
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2. Assets 
Of course, while the number of foundations is a useful indicator of their absolute and 
relative frequency, it says very little about the economic weight of the sector. Therefore, 
one approach is to look at the assets foundations hold. Using estimates based on EFC 
data and other sources, we arrive at a range of asset values between 350bn (the lower 
limit of the EFC estimate) and approximately 3 trillion euros (the upper limit). 
The estimated European total of foundation assets according to our weighted estimation 
approach requires some interpretation, as it is ten times the size of the EFC figure 
(Table 2). Any approach to apply a reality or plausibility test to the data provided has to 
proceed in several steps. From the existing EFC data, we start from a low threshold of 
European foundation assets of € 347bn in 16 (surveyed) and € 373bn in all 27 Member 
States (extrapolated), or € 350bn as a safe lower end estimate.  
Since EFC data were only based on surveying a limited number of foundations in 16 
countries, we calculated our own estimates based on the survey which we did for this 
feasibility study.26 The estimation process is obviously highly dependent on the 
distribution of foundation sizes in each country. While we tried to account for that by 
creating two cohorts of the  top 15 foundations by size and all other foundations, and 
also by running the estimations with two weights, on the one hand the asset size and on 
the other the expenditure size, we may still have overestimated the sectors in certain 
countries. From existing secondary data and knowledge, we can apply two kinds of 
criteria to evaluate the validity of the estimates: by considering the prevalent type of 
foundations in each country (operating or grant-making) and by considering knowledge 
available on single or extremely large foundations included in our survey sample, which 
could have distorted any calculation based on averages, even if done in terms of cohorts. 
The latter applies to the UK, Portugal and Italy, where the Wellcome Trust, the 
Gulbenkian Foundation, and the leading Italian banking foundations are institutions far 
bigger than any of their counterparts in the sector.  
Therefore, they lead to substantially overestimated figures even among our top 15 
cohort. Knowing their absolute size helps us to downsize the estimates for these 
countries. In the UK there is no other foundation even nearing the € 16bn of the 
Wellcome Trust, in Portugal there are less than 10 large foundations with assets of 
several hundred million euros, none equalling the Gulbenkian dimension of more than 
4bn. In Italy, the foundations of banking origin represent a total of approx. € 70bn 
maximum, however, with no substantial number of the 4,700 foundations of other types 
even reaching their size.  
In addition, we considered the figures for expenditures because they allow for an 
assessment of the situation by foundation type. Operating foundations basically have 
high annual budgets based on income for services, and at the same time their assets are 
comparatively low, while it is exactly the opposite with grant-making foundations. The 
estimation process should therefore lead to sectors characterised by comparatively large 
expenditures in countries with a large share of operating institutions, while in countries 
with a large share of grant-making foundations the asset size should be larger. In this 
regard, our sample gives an indication of the figures for Germany and Spain, which 
                                                 
26 For the purpose of this summary, we cannot go into detail of the methodology applied in this paragraph 
(see Annexes A for detailed explanations). 
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have relatively high shares of operating institutions, representing the order of sizes as 
we would expect it. Since the survey results for these two countries include a number of 
different institutions, we can also see the figures as more indicative than in countries 
with a very weak response rate.  
Therefore, we assumed that countries with foundation sectors smaller by numbers than 
Germany and Spain could not range substantially above in their asset size. As a result of 
these considerations, which were in addition supported by further evidence for the UK, 
we downsized the estimates to a maximum of € 200bn for the UK, to € 200bn for Italy, 
and to € 15bn for Portugal. Additional information which we have given for Denmark in 
our excurse on Danish corporate foundations provides us with figures for the total assets 
of corporate foundations which amount to DK 258bn (approx. € 32bn). These corporate 
foundations are at the same time very substantial institutions so that we cannot assume 
that the 9,472 other Danish foundations are substantially larger, rather on the contrary. 
Even if they were of the same size, the sector could only result in a total of ca. € 150bn. 
It seems well justified however, that most of them are substantially smaller and the 
sector will therefore rank in size closer to € 75bn. 
As for the information on the UK available from the Charity Commission (provided by 
Greyham Dawes), the argument could be made in the following way: If we disregard 
the tiny (income below £10,000) charities numbering over 90,000, some 80,000 
registered charities have an aggregate gross income of nearly £46bn (€ 55bn), and we 
would guess from estimates published some years ago that the asset base would be 
about twice that figure, thus of the order of € 110bn. If we then exclude all the charities 
below the current £500,000 gross income threshold for statutory audit, we are left with 
11,000 auditable charities (75 % of them being corporate bodies, mainly charitable 
companies, thus broadly equating to foundations) with an aggregate gross income of 
£41bn (nearly € 50bn). If their asset base is of the order of € 100bn, it would seem that 
they represent 10 % of the EC population of 110,000 foundations, so that one might 
expect their asset base to be 10 % as well. That would yield a likely value of € 1,000bn 
for the assets of European foundations rather than the 300-3,000 range estimated. 
On the other hand, one cannot help wondering to what extent the as yet largely 
unregulated annual financial reporting for the European foundation sector may depress 
any estimates made on the basis of the presently available information in countries other 
than Britain. A single example here may suffice: the IKEA Foundation was the subject 
of an Economist article in recent years which highlighted the dearth of information 
about major charities on the global stage. IKEA was conservatively estimated by the 
Economist to be worth at least £60bn, thus far larger than the world's known largest: the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.  
This lends additional support to our estimate for total UK foundation assets to be in the 
range of € 200bn maximum. This is particularly important since the distortion 
introduced by the largest European foundation, the Wellcome Trust, into the UK 
estimate accounted for almost half of the total estimated assets. Since the small response 
rate of the sample does not allow us to consider further specificity for smaller countries 
(rather: countries with a smaller sector), we conclude this evaluation of our extrapolated 
estimates at an approximation for EU total foundation assets of € 1,000bn or one 
trillion. As a result, we can narrow the span of total EU foundations assets considerably 
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and assume that we have sufficiently provided for a correction of the potential over-
representation of large foundations among our survey responses.  
 
Table 2: Assets of foundations (own calculations on survey data) 
Country Value of assets27 (total) 
  Sum Mean 
Belgium 8,454,625,000 € 21,136,563 €
Cyprus 455,862,075 € 13,024,631 €
Czech 
Republic 5,163,720,984 € 4,283,824 €
Denmark 384,852,337,250 € 27,489,453 €
Estonia 614,227,548 € 6,204,319 €
Finland 25,959,730,796 € 9,984,512 €
France 33,333,920,614 € 32,547,359 €
Germany 137,168,316,887 € 17,148,183 €
Greece 2,533,258,372 € 5,180,487 €
Hungary 4,639,712,493 € 555,921 €
Ireland 294,563,530 € 4,828,910 €
Italy 527,917,140,697 € 121,979,507 €
Latvia 780,000,000 € 6,000,000 €
Lithuania 16,778,300 € 47,938 €
Malta 178,130,300 € 445,326 €
Netherlands 24,807,353,557 € 22,090,252 €
Poland 6,196,407,033 € 1,290,112 €
Portugal 22,895,641,330 € 91,582,565 €
Romania 215,167,325 € 430,335 €
Slovakia 249,265,608 € 619,140 €
Slovenia 17,433,600 € 136,200 €
Spain 261,780,990,543 € 24,160,682 €
Sweden 8,297,872,341 € 553,191,489 €
United 
Kingdom 1,299,629,615,095 € 196,801,759 €
  
Total 2,756,452,071,278 €28 41,684,320 €
                                                 
27 Data weighed for assets. Please note that it makes no sense to weigh the data for expenditures and 
calculate the assets. As described above, the correlation between these two values is high but not exactly 
one. 
28 Please note that the figures in Table 2 are a mere starting point for the calculation process described 
above and not to be seen as absolute numbers. 
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3. Expenditure 
Just as for the assessment of the asset base of European foundations, we start the line of 
argument from the existing EFC data sources. We have direct information for a sample 
of foundations from 10 countries, which we used to estimate an EU27 total based on an 
extrapolation. The sample shows a total expenditure of € 35.5bn, the extrapolation for 
the EU27 total results in € 83bn. By contrast, the comparable US figure is € 41 bn. 
It is of great interest to note that in many European countries, the concentration ratio of 
the sector is extremely high, with the top 15 foundations contributing between 30 and 
98 % of the national expenditures. If we look at the countries with a large sector 
(expenditures above € 1bn p.a.), the ratio is at approx. 40-60 % in France, Germany, 
Spain and the UK and at 30 % in Hungary (€ 1.1bn exp.). For Italy, the concentration 
ratio given by the EFC data is very low (below 10 %), which, however, results from a 
difference in the calculation approach. The top 15 data were only available for the 
foundations of banking origin, which are at the same time the Italian foundations with 
the largest assets. However, when it comes to expenditures, this approach distorts the 
picture because it ignores the very large operating foundations generating income for 
services. Only the contribution of those explains why the Italian sector can have total 
annual expenditures of € 11.5bn with the 15 largest (grant-making) foundations of 
banking origin contributing only approx. € 1bn. It can be assumed that Italy would be 
among the middle-level concentration countries if concentration data were calculated as 
for the other countries. 
As we shall see in other parts of our argument, it is important to keep in mind that the 
large sectors include operating foundations with very substantial budgets generated as 
income from services or from public transfer payments.  The data do not allow us to 
single out those budget elements, but we know from some of the largest German social 
welfare foundations, that in their cases the share of income from their endowment is as 
low as 5 %, while most of their annual budget comes from service fees. 
We can also conclude from the data that the top average for Germany (which together 
with Spain far exceeds that of any other country) is far above the level of even the 
largest grant-making foundation in the country (which would be the Volkswagen 
Foundation at € 112m). To illustrate the dimensions, we should note that the largest 
private operating foundation has an annual budget of € 518m. (SRH Holding), the 
largest public law foundation is the Georg-August-University Goettingen at 822m. 
Our own survey covers a sample total expenditure of € 1.9bn. From this basis, we 
estimate the foundation expenditures of the EU27 countries, using expenditure weights. 
The result is a total sector size of approx. € 343bn. As with our other estimates, this 
figure needs to be tested for its plausibility, especially by comparing the different 
country sizes of the sector. In commenting on individual countries, Denmark and the 
UK stand out for having far too large figures to be in a realistic ratio to the asset sizes 
on the one hand and the other countries on the other. Data already referred to above in 
the paragraph on assets for the UK and Denmark suggest that the UK has a total 
expenditure of approx. € 50bn and Denmark most likely of approx. € 4bn. In the Danish 
case, the 1,293 corporate foundations have total assets of approx. € 32bn, which can be 
assumed to yield an average of 5 % p.a., i.e., € 1.6bn. If the 9,472 non-corporate 
foundations are, on average, substantially smaller and have total assets of a similar size, 
they would generate at least another € 1.6bn. As a result, Danish expenditures can be 
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estimated at a maximum of € 4.0bn. With the two corrections for the UK and Denmark, 
total expenditures estimated are reduced to approx. € 173bn. 
We next need to consider Spain and Hungary, two other countries with a substantial 
number of foundations. If, by way of analogy, the Spanish sector cannot be estimated to 
have a higher expenditure than the German sector (keeping in mind that both countries 
have a substantial number of operating foundations), the figure needs to be reduced 
from € 53bn to approx. € 20bn. For Hungary, the data from the EFC sample were 
already based on an almost complete coverage of the sector and were therefore left out 
of the extrapolation. Instead, we have provided the EFC data because they originated 
from a full coverage of the Hungarian foundation sector according to the national 
register. In total, expenditures can now be estimated to be approx. € 153bn. In a line of 
argument similar to that for the asset base, we manage to narrow the bandwidth and the 
margin of error of our estimates and can give a realistic dimension for the total annual 
expenditures of the European foundation sector. 
Compared to the EFC data extrapolation results of € 83bn, our survey data extrapolation 
generated higher figures which certainly represent the upper end of the span. Whichever 
estimate comes closer to reality, they both indicate that the European foundation sector 
is substantially bigger than its US counterpart, whose annual figure is $ 41bn (approx. € 
29bn). This is again a result of the diversity and the different types of operating 
foundations which come into existence based on their assets but then generate 
substantial income from fees for services. 
 
Table 3: Annual foundation expenditure by country (survey data weighted for expenditures) 
Country Sum Mean 
Belgium 1,021,753,163 € 2,554,383 €
Cyprus 277,769,745 € 18,517,983 €
Czech Republic 1,309,005,958 € 1,043,033 €
Denmark 84,246,443,925 € 6,017,603 €
Estonia 417,027,984 € 3,283,685 €
Finland 7,873,599,229 € 3,028,307 €
France 6,856,677,756 € 9,019,206 €
Germany 19,026,055,684 € 2,907,728 €
Greece 202,225,636 € 413,549 €
Hungary 19,842,865,542 € 1,187,698 €
Ireland 10,699,360 € 175,399 €
Italy 11,879,432,211 € 2,516,829 €
Latvia 221,000,000 € 1,700,000 €
Lithuania 1,149,390 € 7,927 €
Malta 43,035,600 € 136,621 €
Netherlands 3,105,782,568 € 3,177,271 €
Poland 5,560,219,922 € 1,157,656 €
Portugal 6,706,111,135 € 18,247,921 €
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Country Sum Mean 
Romania 22,589,509 € 85,243 €
Slovakia 16,538,284 € 48,930 €
Slovenia 12,697,600 € 99,200 €
Spain 52,836,981,230 € 4,876,510 €
Sweden 122,872,335 € 8,191,489 €
United Kingdom 218,762,931,705 € 24,859,424 €
    
Total 440,375,465,469 € 5,887,648 €
4. Employment and Volunteering 
As with all previous calculations of assets and expenditures, we again proceed in three 
steps starting with existing EFC data from previous research for only eight countries. 
The documented 32,500 foundations in the sample of eight countries employ a total 
staff of 305,000. If that figure was extrapolated for the full sectors of those countries, 
944,000 staff would be the result. If the same approach was taken for all EU27 Member 
States, the sector would employ a total of 1.4 milion staff members. The same approach 
results in 232,000 volunteers employed in the sample and a total estimate of 1.5 million 
volunteers estimated for the EU27). 
The second step is contributed by our own survey and again provides raw data and 
estimates based on the two weighting dimensions by assets and by expenditures. 
Comparing the results yields a dimension of staff and volunteer involvement in 
European foundations of approx. 1.5 million full-time staff and 2.5 million volunteers 
(weighted by expenditure). In addition to that, foundations involve approximately half a 
million part-time staff and almost a million freelancers, consultants etc. Since it is 
impossible to identify the FTE equivalent of the part time or freelance staff, we 
concentrate our argument on full time staff and volunteers.  
Employment in European foundations is concentrated in a small number of countries 
where most of the foundation employees are involved: The United Kingdom, Germany 
and Spain account for two thirds of foundation employment in Europe, and Poland and 
Hungary also add a substantial share, so that 80 % of all European foundation 
employees work in those five countries. France, Denmark and Italy follow with 
approximately 50,000 employees in each of those countries. In all other countries 
employment in foundations is almost negligible with very low FTE numbers for 
Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia, Greece, Finland, 
Estonia, Belgium, Cyprus and the Czech Republic.  
Rather than elaborating on the analysis in greater detail, we need to focus on a 
plausibility test of the estimation against other data and the interpretation of the results. 
It is interesting to note that the weighting by assets resulted in higher totals but in a 
substantially altered distribution by countries, which allows for some conclusions 
concerning the plausibility of the results. In countries like Germany or Spain, where the 
sector includes many large operating foundations of which several very large ones were 
included in the raw data sample, the extrapolation based on asset levels leads to a 
substantial overestimation of total employment.  This is because the raw data averages 
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include the high employment levels typical for operating foundations, especially for 
those in health and care services. On the other hand, employment is more correlated to 
expenditure levels than to asset size, because operating foundations generate substantial 
income for services and do not exclusively rely on the yield of their endowment. 
Therefore, the figures given above based on weighting by expenditure are definitely a 
closer representation of reality than the even higher ones based on asset weights. 
In the German case, we have the opportunity to test the resulting data against the more 
detailed data of the German Association of Foundations from their survey of all German 
foundations done every three years. Their figures show approximately 150,000 staff, 
against which our estimate of close to 200,000 clearly overstates the field. If the same 
overestimation was probable in other large sector countries for which we do not have 
data from independent sources, we would have to correct our estimates down by at least 
25 %. This estimate is also supported by the fact that the survey respondents gave 
additional account of substantial part-time employment.  
On the other hand, weighting by expenditure clearly overrates employment in countries 
like the UK with a predominant grant-making culture and hardly any operating 
foundations. This dimension is indicated by the huge difference between the two 
weighting approaches for the UK which suggest that the real figure may be closer to 
100,000 than to the overestimated 500,000 when weighting by expenditures. It also 
seems unlikely that the substantially smaller Spanish foundation sector employs more 
people than its much larger German counterpart. We therefore have to assume that the 
Spanish figure needs to be corrected down to the dimension of the German sector at 
maximum. For Denmark, we have additional data as well, at least concerning the 
corporate foundations, which seem to suggest that the figures may have to be reduced 
by approximately 40 %. In conclusion, we can estimate the resulting full-time 
employment in foundations in Europe at between 750,000 and around one million 
people. It should be noted that this figure does not include any of the employment in 
related corporations in which foundations hold (majority) shares in certain countries. 
The figures only refer to the employment in the public benefit section of the activities. 
Estimating the level of volunteer involvement is even more difficult because levels of 
volunteering reported in the raw data are based on very limited numbers of cases and 
limited levels of involvement, with the exception of Portugal. With the weighting 
approach applied without distinction to all countries, Portuguese results are most likely 
to be highly distorted. The totals (according to both weighting approaches) for Portugal 
and Denmark seem to be grossly overstating the case. Reducing the levels of those to 
countries to a dimension similar to the other countries (by the size of the population) 
would result in a volunteer level of again approximately one million people (counted as 
FTEs). Comparative insights into the whole non-profit sector are consistent with this 
suggestion because in the non-profit sector as a whole total staff time by professionals 
and by volunteers is also in a similar dimension. The data do not allow for any more 
detailed analysis because we do not have a sufficient level of independent data from 
other sources.  
 
Table 4: Employment and volunteering in foundations, by country (based on expenditure 
approach) 


















 Sum  Mean Sum Mean Sum Mean Sum Mean
Belgium 4,263 11 2,390 6 1,085 3 743 2
Cyprus 2,420 97 0 0 0 0 1,000 40
Czech 
Republic 
7,207 6 1,992 2 5,208 4 23,560 19
Denmark 56,060 4 13,993 1 14,060 1 1,385,258 99
Estonia 6,885 38 1,358 8 37,352 210 4,480 25
Finland 7,220 3 6,639 3 128,078 49 127,958 49
France 45,183 37 37,265 30 5,310 4 55,054 45
Germany 199,695 17 73,634 6 21,016 2 123,226 10
Greece 4,171 9 1,643 3 1,959 4 3,223 7
Hungary 146,175 9 62,625 4 41,745 2 225 0
Ireland 0 0 76 1 15 0 122 1
Italy 48,558 10 4,397 1 18,490 4 855 0
Latvia 8,970 69 260 2 6,500 50 0 0
Lithuania 15 0 130 1 0 0 0 0
Malta 2,150 7 415 1 200 1 11,785 37
Netherlands 12,299 11 9,275 8 208 0 2,888 2
Poland 116,522 19 20,387 3 161,748 27 152,132 25
Portugal 50,368 104 24,910 51 12,925 27 457,193 943
Romania 915 3 30 0 165 1 0 0
Slovakia 452 1 6,977 17 1,313 3 9,735 24
Slovenia 256 2 0 0 384 3 384 3
Spain 284,234 26 8,656 1 450,112 42 36,788 3
Sweden 570 38 30 2 0 0 0 0
United 
Kingdom 
520,375 69 217,195 29 59,255 8 125,730 17
    
Total 1,524,962 19 494,276 6 967,127 12 2,522,336 31
 
5. Growth Patterns of Foundations 
In the past ten to fifteen years, the foundation sector in Europe has been experiencing a 
remarkable growth. Empirical data suggest a significant growth rate since the 1980s. 
Between 28 % and 40 % of all foundations in EU Member States such as Germany, 
Finland, France and Belgium were founded in the last decade. A recent survey of the 
European Foundation Centre (EFC) estimates that, at the turn of this century, there were 
some 16 foundations per 100,000 inhabitants in the EU. The data also show the 
colourful variety of the sector, which was further enriched by the enlargement of the 
European Union from 15 to 27 Member States.  
There are several reasons for the remarkable growth in the number and the economic 
importance of foundations: First, there is a significant amount of private wealth that is 
and will be transferred from one generation to the next. Parts of this wealth will be 
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given to public benefit purposes. One other reason may be the tendency in many 
Member States to delegate several public functions to ‘private organisations’. These 
private organisations can be for-profit organisations (e.g., limited liability companies) as 
well as non-profit organisations (e.g., foundations or trusts). Another reason for the 
growth may be that many Member States have decided to reform their national 
foundation laws, charity laws and/or tax laws in order to encourage the use of 
foundations and trusts as instruments for private actions in the public interest. In the 
past years, such reforms have taken place in Austria, Belgium, England and Wales, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Scotland, Spain as well as in almost every 
Central and East European Member State. 
II. Foundation Types 
1. Public Benefit Foundations 
What do foundations do? According to Table 1,29 public benefit foundations are the 
only or the most significant type in most Member States (except Estonia, Latvia and the 
Netherlands). 
As regards this type, two fields clearly dominate the profile of foundation activity in 
Europe: education and research, with an average of 30 % of foundation activity, and 
social service (25 %). Together, both fields account for over one-half of foundation 
activities so measured. In fact, education and research and social services are the main 
categories of foundation activity in the countries included in the present analysis and 
previous analyses (Anheier, 2001). Adding health care, with an average of 17 % of 
foundation activity, pushes the total share up to 71 %. In other words, two-thirds of 
foundations operate in just three fields, the same fields that also dominate the non-profit 
sector at large (Salamon et al., 1999). 
The field of art and culture accounts for the next largest share of foundation activities. It 
is the most important area of activity of foundations in Spain, with 44 % of all 
foundations involved in this field, and is relatively prominent in Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, the Czech Republic and Poland. Some countries show clear 
concentration in one field in particular: this is the case for healthcare foundations in 
France, housing foundations in Ireland and to a certain extent also in Estonia, 
international activities in the Netherlands, and cultural foundations in Spain. Such 
concentrations are the result of specific historical developments, e.g., urgent demand for 
affordable housing in early 20th century Ireland, or institutional effect, such as the 
prominence of large healthcare research foundations in France, e.g., the Institut Pasteur 
and Institut Curie (Archambault et al., 1999). 
2. Private Benefit Foundations 
a) General Information 
The general data in this report refer to public benefit foundations which account for the 
vast majority of all European foundations. Only about half the jurisdictions of the EU 
                                                 
29 See supra B I 1. 
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accept private benefit foundations: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
In most of these countries the number of non-public foundations is comparatively low. 
As regards the exemption of the Netherlands it can be referred to the introductory 
remarks above30.  
Generally, it is not possible to single out information on private benefit foundations as 
they were not explicitly targeted in the data available to us.31  
b) The Case of Austria 
The exemption, as regards the data situation, is Austria. Austria has somewhat more 
specific documentation on its 2,843 private benefit foundations,32 of which almost 90 % 
have been created since the Private Purpose Foundation Law passed in 1994.33 Their 
total asset base is estimated to be € 40bn.34 Higher estimates of the numbers may be 
distorted by including dissolved foundations and public benefit foundations established 
by federal or State laws.  
According to research conducted at the Vienna University of Economics and presented 
in Table 5, a number of Austrian private purpose foundations are hybrid organizations 
in that they pursue public benefit purposes as well (369 foundations, 13 %) or were 
even established for public benefit purposes only (217 foundations, 7.6 %). The 
predominant areas of activity are culture, sports and leisure, education and research, and 
health and social purposes. Almost half of all private purpose foundations in Austria 
were created in Vienna.35  
The overall economic relevance of the private purposes foundations in Austria is 
difficult to assess because we do not have information on the breakdown of their assets. 
Scattered information points out that in 79 of the 100 largest Austrian corporations 
private purpose foundations hold significant equity.36 However, such estimates may be 
too high as private purpose foundations hold a majority of equity in 23 of the top 200 
Austrian corporations – which still amounts to a substantial share of equity 
capitalisation. The total turnover of these corporations is € 19.1bn, and the total number 
                                                 
30 See above A I 3 a. 
31 In Germany, the Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen estimates that 5% or 700 of the 15,000 existing 
German foundations are private benefit foundations and a further 3% were established for both private 
and public benefit purposes. Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen, Verzeichnis Deutscher Stiftungen, 
Berlin 2005, Zahlen Daten Fakten, p. A20.  
32 Data produced by the Research Institute on Non-profit Organization, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, 
Vienna. By courtesy of Prof. Michael Meyer, to whom we are grateful for allowing us to use the research 
data of the Institute. Other data refer to 3,105 private benefit foundations, which may be including a 
number of dissolved foundations. 
33 Chancellor Gusenbauer, in: Der Standard, 12.12.2007, 
www.derStandard.at/Investor/Wirtschaft/Steuern 
34 Österreichischer Rundfunk 2008, www.orf.at; Other sources even refer to a total asset base of € 60bn., 
which could potentially be explained by different valuations depending on the accounting approach 
applied, see http://diepresse.com/home/wirtschaft/economist/350486/index.do 
35 Calculations by Research Institute for Non-profit Organizations, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Vienna, 
by coutesy of Prof. Michael Meyer.  
36 Forum Privatstiftungen, www.forum-privatstiftung.at. 
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of employees is 119,000 (See Table 7 for details, calculations by CSI Heidelberg).37 
Related to the Austrian economy (total GDP of € 268.74bn),38 the total assets of 
Austrian private purpose foundations represent approximately 15 %, and the turnover of 
the top 200 corporations controlled by private purpose foundations (equity majority) 
accounts for 7 % of the GDP. 
Since we do not have information on the annual distribution of revenue for these private 
purpose foundations, it is impossible to provide for an estimate of their contribution to 
the Austrian economy. All that can be said is that private purpose foundations in Austria 
control companies whose turnover is in the range of 10 % of GDP. In addition, it may 
be a rough guess that due to the high concentration ratio which characterises the 
foundation sector in many countries. These foundations are at the same time among the 
top ones of their sector and therefore represent the larger part of the estimated assets of 
all private purpose foundations. 
 
Table 5: Austrian hybrid private foundations by public benefit purposes and region 
Private purpose foundations in Austria with public benefit purposes (according to 
their charters) 
     
Public benefit and hybrid purposes* W B S V T K 
1 Culture, sports, leisure   46 2 9 0 1 3 
2 Education and research   48 2 14 0 4 7 
3 Health    12 0 3 1 1 0 
4 Social purposes   21 1 8 3 2 0 
5 Environment   9 0 1 0 0 0 
6 Local communities and housing  3 0 3 0 0 3 
7 Law, advocacy and politics  1 0 2 0 2 0 
8 Philanthropy, giving, volunteering  0 0 1 0 0 0 
9 International issues   9 0 2 0 0 0 
10 Religion    2 0 0 0 1 2 
11 Professional associations, unions  16 0 0 0 0 0 
12 Other    26 3 0 5 2 3 
        
     
Public benefit only* W B S V T K 
1 Culture, sports, leisure 24 1 4 0 1 2 
2 Education and research 29 1 8 0 3 6 
                                                 
37 Note that Austrian Chancellor Gusenbauer claims that approximately 500,000 employees work in 
companies which are at least partly owned by private purpose foundations. Gusenbauer in: Der Standard, 
12.12.2007  
38 www.bmwa.gv.at/BMWA/Wirtschaftsdaten/ 
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Private purpose foundations in Austria with public benefit purposes (according to 
their charters) 
3 Health  12 0 2 1 1 0 
4 Social purposes 14 0 1 2 2 0 
5 Environment 5 0 1 0 0 0 
6 Local communities and housing 3 0 2 0 0 3 
7 Law, advocacy, politics 1 0 2 0 2 0 
8 Philanthropy, giving, volunteering 0 0 1 0 0 0 
9 International issues 9 0 1 0 0 0 
10 Religion  1 0 0 0 1 2 
11 Professional Associations, Unions 10 0 0 0 0 0 
12 Other  7 1 0 3 1 2 
     
     
Private benefit purposes 
only 
W B S V T K 
  1194 27 175 104 95 118
 
Table 6: Austrian private purpose foundations by regions 
Total number of Austrian private benefit foundations (2007) 
  
Federal Länder numbers 
2007 
% - distribution 2007  
Wien 1420 49.95 %  
Oberösterreich 396 13.93 %  
Niederösterreich 217 7.63 %  
Steiermark 216 7.60 %  
Salzburg 208 7.32 %  
Kärnten 134 4.71 %  
Vorarlberg 113 3.97 %  
Tirol 107 3.76 %  
Burgenland 32 1.13 %  
Total 2843 100 %  
  
  
 *) Note: Estimates in public run between 3000 PBFs and 3200 PBFs. 
 These estimates are most likely incorrect for two reasons:  
 a) Dissolved private purpose foundations remain in the organization 
register.  
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 Without detailed analysis they tend to be included in counts. 
 b) Potentially included pure public benefit foundations established by  
 Austrian federal or state laws are likely to distort the data. 
 
Table 7: Corporations controlled by majority of private purpose foundations 
Top 200 Corporations in Austria with   
majority equity holdings by private purpose foundations (end 2006)39 
Rank Name Equity Share in % Turnover in bn. € Employees 
16 Hofer KG 87.625 3.00 6,500
31 Alpha Werke Alwin 
Lehner GmbH and 
Co.Kg 
100 1.98 8,900
41 A-Tec Industries AG 55 1.59 10,654
67 Constantia Packaging 
AG 
60-75 1.06 6,154
69 MCE AG 91.5 1.04 8,072
70 Kika-Leiner-Gruppe 100 1.03 7,800
72 MB Automobilvertriebs 
GmbH-Gruppe 
100 1.10 2,012
75 Plansee Holding AG-
Gruppe 
100 0.98 5,550
79 Prinzhorn Holding 
GmbH 
91 0.90 4,000
89 Spedition Trade Trans 
Holding GmbH 
100 0.78 1,200
97 Lidl Austria GmbH 100 0.71 1,100












138 Kapsch Group 
BeteiligungsGmbH 
66.7 0.47 2,310
139 Styvia Medien AG-
Gruppe 
98.33 0.47 2,800
                                                 
39 www.news.at/trend/index.html?/articles/0724/580/175720.shtml 
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Top 200 Corporations in Austria with   
161 DMC DECO metall Intl. 
Trading GmbH 
85.77 0.41 50
166 Kuhn Holding GmbH-
Gruppe 
100 0.40 660
184 Loacker Recycling AG 95 0.37 435
193 König Holding AG 95 0.35 875
199 Eybl Intl. AG 56.4 0.34 4,050
 Total  19.12 119,160
    
 Note: Total turnover and no. of employees of corporations controlled by private 
foundations  
3. Commercial Foundations 
a) General Information 
The definition of foundations as used in this study has established a non-distribution 
constraint for surplus generated. Yet given their grounding in the concepts of charity 
and philanthropy, to what extent can or should foundations engage in economic 
activities, irrespective of how the gains are to be used? This question is of particular 
relevance to operating, corporate and fund-raising foundations. 
At one level, there is a good understanding in the economics literature and the System 
of National Accounts on this point. According to this, the delivery of goods or services 
at economically significant prices reflecting the cost of production would be a necessary 
element of what is regarded as an economic activity. More complex is the legal 
treatment of economic activities such as trading and of activities regarding the 
administration of assets. Many Member States have different legal rules in 
organizational laws and/or tax laws for these sets of activities. However, it is not always 
easy to decide whether a specific activity constitutes ‘trading’ or ‘administration of 
assets’ (e.g., leasing, shareholding). For the purpose of this feasibility study, it is useful 
to distinguish the following ‘economic activities’ in a broader sense: 
Purpose-related trading refers to the independent delivery of goods or services in 
markets at or above cost and for revenues that serve or otherwise enhance the public 
benefit purpose of the foundation. In the US, this type of activity and the revenue yield 
associated is called related business income, and it is not subject to taxation. An art 
museum that operates an in-house cafeteria, bookstore or catalogue business would be 
an example. Non-preferred activities may increase revenue and consolidate 
organizational finances but, at the same time, they can have negative consequences: 
they may distract from the central mission. 
Unrelated trading refers to the independent delivery of goods or services in markets and 
to revenues which do not directly serve the public benefit purpose of the foundation. An 
example would be a museum running a petrol station next door. The tax laws in many 
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countries include provisions on income unrelated to the charitable or tax-exempt 
purpose of non-profit organizations. The US Internal Revenue Service defines UBI as 
income generated from activities, either directly by the non-profit organization itself or 
indirectly with other organizations or individuals that is unrelated to the exempt 
purpose, trade or business, and carried out regularly. In the US, activities must meet all 
three criteria to be treated as UBI, whereas other countries have either stricter or more 
lenient requirements. In most cases, however, engaging in UBI activities will not 
jeopardise the tax-exempt status of foundations, although some tax laws establish 
guidelines on the overall extent of UBI relative to total revenue. Tax authorities impose 
unrelated business income tax (UBIT) on non-profit organization engaged in UBI 
activities. UBIT rates tend to be similar to tax on the net income of for-profit 
corporations. 
Asset administration is normally not considered an ‘economic activity’ in a narrow 
sense, but there are prominent cases in Europe where the exact delimitation is rather 
complex, even ambiguous. Foundations tend to regard asset administration as a cost, 
and the yield of portfolio investments as a return to support stated charitable activities. 
In the US, the tax law stipulates that costs of asset administration are qualifying 
contributions toward the annual payout requirement of 5 % of the fair market value of 
all assets that have to be spent on the dedicated charitable purpose of the foundation.  
Holding Structures involve legal constructions where the foundation is major 
shareholder/partner in a company whose commercial activities are not related to the 
public benefit purpose of the foundation. This is normally not considered to constitute 
an economic trading activity, but rather regarded as asset administration (e.g., 
Bertelsmann Foundation) unless the foundation exercises ‘influence’. Such holding 
structures are not allowed in the US. 
Apart from the special case of the Dutch foundation (see above40), a further special case 
of this distinction of purpose-related and unrelated economic activities is represented by 
the Danish commercial foundations.  These constitute a separate legal form to allow for 
both public benefit and private benefit commercial activities in one legal entity using 
separate accounts but being governed by one board. 
b) The Danish Case 
A particular feature of Danish foundations is the possibility to engage in major 
commercial activities and use a special legal form to do so. The Act of 1991 on 
Commercial Foundations established the legal framework for foundations to either 
directly engage in commercial activities or hold controlling interest in commercial 
entities.41 The law also allows Danish commercial foundations to combine commercial 
and public benefit purposes and requires the charters of such foundations to include a 
regulation of distributing profits. 
Table 8 shows that the Danish foundation sector includes a substantial number of such 
commercial foundations which have a share of 12 % of the Danish foundations sector 
by their number and a share of 19 % of the equity of all companies in Denmark. 
Commercial foundations related to the number of all companies in Denmark only have a 
                                                 
40 See above A I 3 a. 
41 EFC, Foundations‘ Legal and Fiscal Environments, p. 59. 
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share of 0.75 %, which means that commercial foundations control rather larger Danish 
companies and represent highly concentrated investments. If the comparison is only 
made to limited companies, the number of commercial foundations is equivalent to 3.16 
% of all Danish limited companies. 
The sector of commercial foundations is itself highly concentrated with the 76 largest 
commercial foundations amounting to more than two thirds of the equity of all 
commercial foundations. In absolute terms, the total equity of Danish commercial 
foundations amounts to about € 34.6bn, that of the 76 largest ones to almost € 24.6bn, 
while the total equity of all companies in Denmark as of 2005 was approximately € 
183bn.42 The total equity of commercial foundations is equivalent to 16.6 % of GDP 
(2005, current prices).43 
The number of people employed by companies controlled by those 76 largest 
commercial foundations totals 294,367, which is a share of 25.8 % of all employees. 
However, the employees actually working in all foundations directly only amount to 
2.15 % of the total workforce.  
By way of a brief summary, Danish commercial foundations hold a very substantial part 
of Danish corporate equity, are a highly concentrated sector, and through the companies 
they control contribute to the employment of a quarter of all employees in private 
companies in the country. For detailed references see Table 8 on Danish foundations by 
Steen Thomsen.44  
The Danish case next to the one on Austrian private purpose foundations shows that in 
those countries which do have special legal provisions for foundations to own or control 
for-profit corporations these holdings amount to a substantial share of the whole 
economy. In the corporations controlled by those foundations, we can also identify 
substantial shares of overall employment. 
However, this situation cannot be generalised. Austria and Denmark are two special 
cases providing for such structures. The legal situation in Germany also allows for 
foundations to control the majority of a corporation, even though the number of cases in 
which this applies is small, however prominent the corporate names of the controlled 
companies may be. There are only five foundations which hold the majority of stock in 
substantial corporations (Robert Bosch GmbH, Bertelsmann AG. Körber AG, Possehl 
and Co., Fresenius AG). They have total assets of € 8.581bn of the total estimated € 
60bn. If three prominent minority holdings by foundations in large corporations (SAP 
AG, KruppThyssen AG) are included, the assets controlled by the eight cases are € 
14.5bn. In absolute terms this represents a small fraction of the economy but indicates 
that the foundation sector is highly concentrated and the top foundations account for a 
very substantial share of all assets invested.45 
                                                 
42 Exchange rate as of May 28th, 2008: 1 Kr. = 0,13405 € 
43 Statistics Denmark, Denmark in Figures, 
www.dst.dk/asp2xml/puk/udgivelser/get_file.asp?id=11111&sid=dod2 
44 Steen Thomsen kindly provided this data summary of Danish foundations, based on his own 
calculations.  
45 Calculations from annual reports and data of the German Association of Foundations, by CSI: 
Assets by: 
– Bosch Foundation    € 5.050 m 
– Bertelsmann Foundation  € 622 m 
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In this context it is important to note that the asset figures given underestimate the fair 
market value of the assets substantially, because all foundations used book values more 
or less far below market prices. We have no information for other European countries. 
 
Table 8: Commercial foundations in Denmark 
Commercial foundations in Denmark  
 Number of  2007 
Non-commercial foundations 9,472 
Commercial foundations 1,293 
Limited companies 40,932 
All companies in Denmark † 172,306 
    
Ratio   
Commercial foundations/ Limited companies 3.16 % 
Commercial foundations/ All companies 0.75 % 
Commercial foundations/ All foundations 12.01 % 
    
Total equity of all (in million DKK)   
Commercial foundations* 257,849 
76 biggest commercial foundations** 183,627 
All companies in Denmark† 1,365,700 
    
Ratio   
76 biggest commercial foundations/ companies 13.45 % 
Commercial foundations/ companies 18.88 % 
    
Estimated number of employees of all   
Non-commercial foundations*** 17,739 
Commercial foundations*** 6,751 
76 biggest commercial foundations †† 294,367 
All companies in Denmark † 1,141,132 
    
Ratio   
                                                                                                                                               
– Körber Foundation    € 300 m 
– Possehl Foundation   € 209 m 
– Else-Kröner-Fresenius Fdn. € 2.400 m 
– Klaus-Tschira Foundation  € 823 m 
– Dietmar-Hopp Foundation € 4.396 m 
– Krupp Foundation  € 703 m 
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Commercial foundations in Denmark  
Commercial foundations/ All companies 0.59 % 
76 biggest commercial foundations/ companies 25.80 % 
All foundations/ All companies 2.15 % 
† 2005. Agriculture, fishing, quarrying, public and personal services 
companies are not included 
† † The figure is consolidated, i.e., it includes 
employees in the companies controlled by the 76 
biggest commercial foundations (control implies > 33 
% of the votes).  
* Values are not always consolidated.  
** Estimated consolidated value  
*** The values are not consolidated.  
Sources: Ministry of Economics and Business; The 
Danish Statistical Office; Center for Corporate 
Governance   
 
C. Foundations in the US 
The introductory remarks above provide information on the different approaches of 
definition.46 
I. Introduction 
This section maps the US foundation sector, in particular with regard to the role of the 
foundation sector in the economy and to what extent foundations undertake economic 
activities.  
The following questions are addressed: 
– How many foundations exist? 
– How big are the total assets of foundations? 
– How big is their annual expenditure?  
– How many people are employed by foundations? 
– How many volunteers are active in foundations? 
– How important are the economic activities of foundations?  
– To what extent is this legal form used to control US corporations? 
If one compares the total assets of foundations in the USA and the EU and converts US 
$ to €, the two sectors are approximately equal in size (the EU total comes to € 347bn 
and the US total to € 302bn), while the GDP of the EU is larger than that of the USA ($ 
16,830bn viz. $ 13,844).47 If we compare the annual expenditures rather than assets, the 
                                                 
46 See above A II 3 c. 
47 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, data for 2007. 
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figures are even more striking. Total expenditures in the EU can be estimated at € 83bn 
while total USA expenditures are at $ 41bn (€ 26.3bn). These estimates for the EU 
(compared to reliably reported figures from the USA, however!) have to be treated with 
great caution but seem to indicate that the different structure of the European foundation 
sector has two consequences on which we can only formulate hypotheses but do not 
have the data to test them: First, the large share of operating foundations in Europe 
results in a substantial stream of revenue generated from those operations. And 
secondly, European foundations may receive substantial transfer payments from public 
budgets or obligatory social security systems for their services. To indicate the 
limitations of the comparative look at the USA, we need to point out that these activities 
by operating foundations are represented by different types of organizations in the USA 
such as public charities, hospitals and educational institutions or, in most cases, 
operating non-profits, which are separate categories of organizations in US tax law. If 
we are to maintain a workable definition for European purposes, we cannot include all 
these categories of institutions in the assessment because this would require us to 
include different legal forms in the EU as well. 
II. Existing Material 
The following data on the US foundation sector are available: (1) National registers and 
statistics, (2) Survey data of the US Foundation Center, (3) Survey data of other 
research projects. 
1. National Registers and Statistics 
The IRS Form 990 offers a lot of information for tax-exempt charitable organisations 
and is open to the public. 
2. Survey Data of the US Foundation Center 
The following data on the US foundation sector are available: 
– Foundation Growth and Giving Estimates: Current Outlook: The Foundation 
Center’s study “Foundation Growth and Giving Estimates: Current Outlook” is 
based on a survey of more than 875 large and mid-size foundations across the 
US, combined with year-end economic indicators. Survey respondents also 
provided information on their changing grant-making strategies and on their 
engagement in direct charitable activities. The report also presents findings on 
actual 2005 giving and assets tracked by the Foundation Center for the more 
than 71,000 independent, corporate, community, and grant-making operating 
foundations in the United States. 
– Foundation Giving Trends (2007 Edition): The Foundation Center’s publication 
“Foundation Giving Trends (2007 Edition)” provides a comprehensive analysis 
of all grants of $ 10,000 or more awarded by 1,154 of the largest private and 
community foundations in the United States in 2005 and has been tracking 
changes in funding trends since 1996. Grant dollars awarded by these funders 
totalled $ 16.4bn and represented roughly half of the overall U.S. foundation 
giving. The report examines giving by subject focus, recipient type, type of 
support, population group served, and geographic focus. It also details 
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differences in funding trends by foundation size, region, and type, and includes 
brief reports on giving in the aftermath of the Gulf Coast hurricanes and the 
Indian Ocean tsunami disaster. Foundation Giving Trends is part of the 
Foundations Today Series of annual research reports on foundation growth and 
trends in foundation giving. 
– The Foundation Center's Research Database: The Foundation Center's Research 
Database contains a wealth of foundation and grant information updated 
annually by the Center. This authoritative national data source includes financial 
and programmatic information on all active U.S. grant-making foundations as 
well as a large sample of foundation grants. 
– Foundation Yearbook: Facts and Figures on Private and Community 
Foundations: This yearbook documents the growth in number, giving and assets 
of all active U.S. foundations from 1975 to 2005. 
3. Data of Other Research Projects  
There are also several other research projects (e.g., the already stated Johns Hopkins 
Comparative Non-profit Sector Project), which usually focus on ‘non-profit 
organisations’, which also include ‘foundations’. 
III. Size and Weight 
In contrast to EU Member States, we have much better data on US foundations.  
1. Number of US Foundations 
The number of foundations in the USA nearly tripled from 22,484 foundations in 1978 
to over 71,000 foundations in 2005. The number of foundations per million inhabitants 
increased from 100 foundations in 1980 to more than 200 foundations in 2000. Ninety 
per cent of the foundations are grant-making, six percent are operating, four percent 
corporate, and one percent community foundations. While all foundation types have 
shown substantial increases in their numbers, the number of grant-making foundations 
has increased most and has nearly tripled since the late 1970s.48 Table 9 shows the 
increase in the number of foundations for that time period: 
                                                 
48 See Foundations in the United States. A quantitative overview, page 6 
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Table 9: Number of foundations by year 
Year Number of foundations 
1978  22,484 foundations49 
2003  66,398 foundations 50 
2005  71,059 foundations 51 
 
The density of the foundation sector in the US is somewhat lower than in Europe (if 
calculated for all countries). However, this comparison – as well as those for assets and 
expenditures below – has to be treated with caution, and we have to keep in mind that 
the foundation sector in the US is made up of grant-making institutions primarily, 
whereas in Europe, many operating foundations such as hospitals or nursing homes 
would be included. In other words, from a US perspective, the European foundation 
sector includes ‘non’ foundations, i.e., operating establishments of many kinds, that in 
the US would be treated as non-profit corporations. The reason for this very different 
classification is the ‘negative definition’ established in 1969 under the Tax Reform Act. 
According to this act, foundations are tax-exempt organizations under section 501(c)(3) 
of the International Revenue Code, seen as organizations that receive most of their 
resources from one source and are as such considered to be donor-controlled. 
Thus, if an endowed non-profit organization receives more than 50 % of its revenue 
from sources other than its own assets, it would not be regarded as a foundation but as a 
public charity. For example, many private universities in the US have endowments 
larger than many grant-making foundations, but such endowments and the organizations 
who own them would not be included in the American foundation sector. Harvard 
University has an endowment of over $ 30 billion, which is nearly three times the size 
of the endowment commanded by the Ford Foundation, one of the largest in the 
country. In other words, if we look at the assets of American foundations (see below), 
we need to recall that they exclude the sizable assets of many US non-profit 
organizations (i.e., public charities).  
By contrast, we have European foundations with large expenditures and revenues from 
various sources but comparatively small endowments. As a result, the relationship 
between asset size and expenditure in US foundations is positive and linear, whereas it 
is much less clear in the European case, where one has to look at the relationship 
between total revenue and expenditure to assess the current economic contribution of 
foundations. Moreover, since the 1969 Tax Reform Act, foundations are required to pay 
out annually about 5 % of the fair market value of their total assets in support of their 
charitable objectives (so-called qualifying contributions made up by grants plus 
administrative costs). 
                                                 
49 Foundation in the United States. A quantitative overview, page 6 
50 Highlights of Foundation Giving Trends – 1,263 larger foundations 
51 Facts and Figures from the Non-profit Almanac 2008 
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2. Assets of US Foundations 
U.S. foundations reported consecutive years of double-digit annual giving increases for 
period from 1996 to 2001, and multiple factors contributed to this growth. A return to 
strong gains in the stock market in 2006, following minimal increases in 2005, helped to 
boost the resources of existing foundations and raise the level of new gifts coming into 
foundations. The rate of establishment of new foundations picked up after slowing in 
the early 2000s, thereby raising the levels of foundation assets and giving. Foundations 
overall have been paying out at a higher rate relative to their assets than was true in the 
past, which in part reflects an expansion in the number of foundations being established 
by “younger” donors who pass giving through their foundations but are not yet ready to 
fully endow them.52 
Foundation assets grew 7.8 % in 2005, from $ 510.5 billion to a record $ 550.6 billion. 
This figure allows us to calculate an average of $ 7.7m  of assets per foundation. 
Despite minimal stock market gains, strong growth in gifts from donors to their 
foundations, and an increase in the number of new grant-making foundations helped to 
boost foundation asset growth several points above inflation. The latest increase in 
foundation assets followed a 7.1 % rise in 2004 and 9.5 % gain in 2003. Assets grew for 
40 of the top 50 foundations in 2005, down slightly from the 42 foundations that 
reported asset growth in the prior year. Together, assets of the 50 largest endowed 
foundations grew 4.8 %, surpassing the prior year’s 3.5 % gain for these foundations.53 
As of 2007, assets stand at $ 615 billion. Table 10 lists the largest thirty foundations and 
illustrates the high concentration of assets in a relatively small number of very large 
organizations. 
 
Table 10: Largest US foundations, 2008 
Thirty largest U.S. foundations, 200854 in US $, and year of establishment 
1999 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (WA) 38,921,022,000 
1936/ The Ford Foundation (NY) 13,798,807,066 
1954/ J. Paul Getty Trust (CA) 10,133,371,844 
1936/ The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (NJ) 10,094,684,000 
1966/ The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation (CA) 9,284,917,000 
1930 W. K. Kellogg Foundation (MI) 8,402,996,155 
1937 Lilly Endowment Inc. (IN) 7,734,860,156 
1964 The David and Lucile Packard Foundation (CA) 6,350,664,410 
1970 John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (IL) 6,178,196,933 
1969 The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (NY) 6,130,849,710 
2000 Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (CA) 5,836,161,877 
1996 The California Endowment (CA) 4,773,842,000 
1909 The Rockefeller Foundation (NY) 3,810,308,770 
1924 The Kresge Foundation (MI) 3,329,856,115 
1948 The Annie E. Casey Foundation (MD) 3,326,105,746 
1958  The Starr Foundation (NY) 3,300,622,910 
1911 Carnegie Corporation of New York (NY) 3,137,026,487 
                                                 
52 Foundation growth and giving estimates. Current outlook, p. 1 
53 Foundation growth and giving estimates. Current outlook, p. 2-3 
54 http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/topfunders/top100assets.html, viewed on 9/7/2008. 
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Thirty largest U.S. foundations, 200854 in US $, and year of establishment 
1998 Tulsa Community Foundation (OK) 3,136,698,010 
1924 The Duke Endowment (NC) 2,981,737,964 
1937 Robert W. Woodruff Foundation, Inc. (GA) 2,715,991,495 
1989 The Annenberg Foundation (PA) 2,685,286,093 
1926 Charles Stewart Mott Foundation (MI) 2,629,297,079 
1950 John S. and James L. Knight Foundation (FL) 2,618,700,006 
1966 Casey Family Programs (WA) 2,490,713,955 
1959 The Harry and Jeanette Weinberg Foundation, Inc. (MD) 2,278,259,681 
1953 The McKnight Foundation (MN) 2,213,867,840 
1947 Richard King Mellon Foundation (PA) 2,088,186,647 
1965 Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (MO) 2,067,471,575 
1923 The New York Community Trust (NY) 2,042,798,738 
1985 Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation (CA) 1,964,521,000 
3. Annual Expenditure of US Foundations 
Annual expenditures by US Foundation range around 5 % of total asset value but are 
usually somewhat higher and include loans, program-related investments, and other 
program expenses. In 2007, foundations paid out $ 43 billion in grants, which amounts 
to 6.9 % of their total assets.55 Table 11 lists the 20 largest U.S. grant-making 
foundations ranked by total giving, based on the most current audited financial data of 
the Foundation Center's database as of October 12, 2006.56  
  
Table 11: The Top 20 US Foundations ranked by Expenditure 
Rank Name (country) Total exp. in $ Year 
1. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (WA) 1,356,327,000 12/31/05 
2. Merck Patient Assistance Program, Inc. (NJ) 519,998,639 12/31/04 
3. The Ford Foundation (NY) 516,907,177 09/30/05 
4. The Bristol-Myers Squibb Patient Assistance 
Foundation, Inc. (NJ) 
506,639,972 12/31/04 
5. Lilly Endowment Inc. (IN) 427,465,199 12/31/05 
6. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (NJ) 372,500,000 12/31/05 
7. The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation (CA) 319,916,093 12/31/05 
8. Janssen Ortho Patient Assistance Foundation, 
Inc. (NJ) 
289,783,393 12/31/04 
9. The Annenberg Foundation (PA) 251,663,628 06/30/05 
                                                 
55 • Foundations are not the only sources of charitable giving. US giving as a whole (including individual 
and corporate donations) increased by 2.7% to an estimated $260.3 billion in 2005, capturing an 
estimated 2.1% of the GDP. This total includes giving by individuals, corporations and foundations. 
Individuals give most of this money: $199 billion in 2005, or 76.5% of all giving. Bequests added up to 
another $17.44 billion.  
• Corporations increased their giving in 2005, up 22.5%, to $13.77 billion.  
• A large part of individual giving goes to religious organizations, which received $93.2 billion in 2005. 
56 [http://www.un.org/partnerships/YStatTop20USFdtnExp.htm] 
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Rank Name (country) Total exp. in $ Year 
10. Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (CA) 225,986,140 12/31/04 
11. W. K. Kellogg Foundation (MI) 219,862,847 08/31/05 
12. The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (NY) 199,340,000 12/31/05 
13. John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation 
(IL) 
194,500,000 12/31/05 
14. The Roche Patient Assistance Foundation (NJ) 174,463,465 12/31/05 
15. The Annie E. Casey Foundation (MD) 171,354,926 12/31/04 
16. The Starr Foundation (NY) 168,167,773 12/31/04 
17. Wal-Mart Foundation (AR) 154,537,406 01/31/05 
18. The California Endowment (CA) 153,242,789 02/28/05 
19. The David and Lucile Packard Foundation (CA) 150,115,645 12/31/05 
20. Boehringer Ingelheim Cares Foundation, Inc. 
(CT) 
147,996,554 12/31/05 
4. Employment in US Non-Profit Organizations 
Due to the different bases used, comparisons of employment and volunteering figures 
are not very meaningful. An international study conducted in the 1990s showed that 
8,555,980 FTE employment in the US non-profit sector. This was 6.3 % of the 
economically active population.57 Comparable European figures are, on average, not 
very different and range between over 14 % for the Netherlands and just around 2-3 % 
in Scandinavian countries. 58 
 
Table 12: Number of Employees59 
Item Number As % of US economy 
Paid workers 9.4 million 7.2 % 
Volunteer workers 
(FTEs) 
4.7 million 3.9 %* 
Total workforce 14.1 million 10.5 %* 
Wages ($ billions) $321.6 billion 6.6 % 
*Volunteers added to total employment to compute percentage of total workforce. 
5. Volunteers in US Foundations 
Figures for 1995 state that the equivalent to 7,246,856 FTE was performed by 
volunteers,60 and more recent 2005 estimates state that 65 million adults volunteer. 
                                                 
57 The Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project (www.jhu.edu/cnp) 
58 Employment in America’s Charities: A profile; Lester M.Salamon and S. Wojciech Sokolowski 
59 Employment in America’s Charities: A profile; Lester M.Salamon and S. Wojciech Sokolowski 
 Sources: Data on paid employment and wages from Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
(QCEW) accessed through the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data on volunteer workers from U.S. 
Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, (http://www.census.gov/cps/). Volunteer time converted into 
full-time equivalent (FTE) workers by dividing the total number of hours volunteered by the number of 
hours in a typical work year. 
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Volunteers’ hours equivalent in full-time employees decreased from a peak of with 
8,086,000 FTEs in 2004 to 7,568,000 FTEs in 2006. The assigned value of the total 
volunteer time is worth $ 15,615,300. Broken down by activity, 20 % are administration 
and support, 18 % social service and care, 14 % travelling, 11 % meetings, conferences 
and training, and 7 % participating in performance and cultural activities. 61 
In 2006, 26.7 % of adults volunteered with an organization. These volunteers spent a 
total of 12.9 billion hours volunteering in 2006. This figure is down slightly from 2003–
2005, when volunteer rates remained steady at 28.8 %. Total hours volunteered have 
declined in each of the last two years considered (2005 and 2006). About 6.5 % of the 
population volunteered on an average day in 2006, which translates to a figure of more 
than 15 million volunteers per day. The average person who volunteered spent 2.31 
hours volunteering that day. In total, about 12.9 billion hours were volunteered in 2006. 
Assuming an ordinary full-time employee works 1,700 hours per year, these volunteer 
hours would be the equivalent of 7.6 million full-time employees. If we assume that 
these employees would have earned the average private nonfarm hourly wage, the 
volunteers’ time would be worth $ 215.6 billion in 2006. 62 
IV. Comparing the US and the EU 
If we compare the US foundation sector (based on the narrower definition described 
above63) to the European foundation sector (based on a broader definition), we have to 
keep in mind that foundation means something different in each case. In both instances, 
assets are concentrated among a small group of foundations.64 Education, health and 
social welfare attract the biggest share of total grants from all foundations. We can 
observe the same concentration phenomenon for US foundations as for European ones. 
A comparably small number of foundations hold an impressive share of the overall 
assets of the sector. 
However, looking beyond the number and limitations of empirical comparisons, it is the 
different institutional grounding of US foundations that sets them apart from Europe – a 
difference that reaches back to the 19th century.  Between the late 1880s to the 1950s, 
US foundations emerged as private institutions serving public benefit at a time when the 
capacity, if not legitimacy, of government in a relatively broad range of fields was 
underdeveloped if not absent: health care, social welfare and higher education are cases 
in point. In these fields, foundations met few other institutional actors with comparable 
flexibility, independence, resources and visions; they could operate in a relatively open 
environment. Foundations were in a position, given their relative size and the absence of 
government agencies, to engage in basic policy intervention, become institution builders 
par excellence, with the American university system, research, and arts and culture as 
the best example. 
                                                                                                                                               
60 The Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project (www.jhu.edu/cnp) 
61 Facts and Figures from the Non-profit Almanac 2008 
62 The Non-profit Sector in brief. Facts and Figures from the Non-profit Almanac 2008: 
Public Charities, Giving, and Volunteering, p.1 
63 See supra Part 2 A II 3 c. 
64 Foundation in the United States. A quantitative overview, page 3 
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Until the Great Depression and World War II, the organizational capacity to respond to 
public problems of many kinds (with the exception of fields like public order and 
security) was largely in private corporations, foundations, non-profit organizations and 
local communities. This changed dramatically with the rise of the modern state, 
especially in the fields of education, research, health care, and social welfare. Between 
the 1950s and 1990s, foundations shifted roles to focus on incremental innovations and 
policy improvements in the context of a complementary relationship to government. 
The basic model became that of leveraging limited philanthropic resources to achieve 
disproportionate impact. 
With the reorganization of welfare and the quasi-marketization of many government 
services, the role of foundations’ changed again, in part brought about by the results of 
innovations they promoted over previous decades. School voucher programs, 
community organising, health behaviour and the various social movements foundations 
supported are cases in point. Nonetheless, by the 1990s, foundations, experiencing 
renewed growth in numbers and resources, found themselves in more diversified and 
highly complex institutional environments, populated largely by other institutions that 
had grown even more in their capacity. In response, foundations now search for new 
roles in serving often specialised demands and seek greater diversity of purposes than in 
the past. Today, foundations move forward with a multitude of approaches and a 
renewed emphasis on social entrepreneurship and the capacity of civil society for self-
organisation rather than having government as a central reference point. The European 
development of foundations was very different, being included in governmental agendas 
more than in the US.  
D. Main Findings of Part 2 
The empirical analysis of the foundation sector in Europe consists of an extensive 
secondary analysis of existing data as well as the conduction of an own survey among 
foundations in Europe, carried out by the CSI Heidelberg. 
From the synthesis of these different data sources, we learn that the foundation sector in 
Europe is, in economic terms, a major force that should not be neglected by the political 
sphere. 
Because of the differences in legally defining the term “foundation”, we determined the 
following as the lowest common denominator of the legal definition of a foundation: 
– an independent organization (generally with its own legal personality), 
– which has no formal membership, 
– is supervised by a State supervisory authority, and 
– serves a public benefit purpose (in some Member States: any lawful purpose), 
– for which a founder has provided an endowment, and 
– determined the foundation’s purpose and statutes. 
This legal definition is based on criteria which are largely also used for the empirical 
part. 
The European foundation sector is a major economic force and larger than documented 
by any previous research. Keeping differences in definition and classification in mind, 
Europe’s foundation sector probably exceeds the economic weight of US foundations in 
assets and even more so in expenditure. Allowing for all the data uncertainty and 
validity problems, we suggest that the European foundation sector has assets of between 
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€ 350 and close to € 1,000bn (!) and annual expenditures of between € 83 and € 150 bn. 
By contrast, US foundations have assets of approximately € 300bn and expenditures of 
€ 29bn. 
The number of institutions in Europe’s foundation sector is around 110,000 (compared 
to 71,000 foundations in the USA). Even considering that the EU27 GNP is larger than 
that of the USA, Europe has developed a large and remarkable foundation sector in its 
own right. It is important to keep in mind that the much higher presence of operating 
foundations in Europe also points to differences in what foundations do and whom they 
serve: European foundations are much more likely to provide services of many kinds 
(e.g., research, education, welfare, health, culture), whereas US foundations 
predominantly act as grant-makers distributing funds. 
Growth patterns suggest that at least a substantial number of European countries are on 
track for sustained foundation growth. This may have been the result of recent changes 
in national foundation law towards a more favourable and encouraging framework for 
philanthropy in many Member States. It also seems to be a consequence of the 
democratization and the economic development in many countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. In addition to that, several old Member States are currently in the midst 
of a substantial transfer of economic wealth to the next generation (with unprecedented 
high levels of inherited wealth). 
The European Foundation sector employs between 750,000 and 1,000,000 million 
full-time employees. In addition, it enjoys the support of a similar number of volunteers 
(calculated as FTEs). Both this level of professional and voluntary staff involvement 
and the other figures describing the size of the European foundation sector merit some 
further qualification. Most European countries have a longstanding and strong tradition 
of operating foundations. As a consequence, we see figures for expenditures that could 
never be explained by the mere management of endowed assets in order to make grants. 
European operating foundations employ thousands of people in their larger institutions 
and run annual operating budgets of several hundred million euros, with some even 
reaching a single-digit-billion figure.  
The public benefit foundation is the only type of foundation which is accepted in 
every Member State. As regards this type, there exists a comparably high similarity 
among the Member States. In practice, in most Member States the public benefit 
foundation is the only or the most significant type of foundation. 
All Member States accept the public benefit foundation type. Although in many 
Member States “public benefit” is not defined by law according to the findings of the 
legal comparative analysis, there seems to exist a remarkable amount of similarity both 
in foundation law and in tax law. With respect to further characteristics of this 
foundation type, there are many similarities in most, if not all Member States: E.g. no 
membership, state supervision, only moderate requirements for the internal structure. 
Comparatively high divergence only exists in a few points (e.g., initial founding assets, 
requirements for registration, accounting and auditing). 
Apart from the public benefit foundation there exists a number of further foundation 
types which are much less significant in practice than the public benefit foundations and 
often only tolerated by comparatively few Member States. Examples are the family 
foundation (generally not significant), foundations for the founder (only in Austria), or 
pension funds (only in the Netherlands and Sweden). 
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Examples of such special types are the case vignettes of countries like Austria or 
Denmark which represent private purpose foundations (Austria) and foundations of a 
hybrid nature serving both private (commercial) and public benefit purposes (Denmark). 
Compared to the size of the whole European sector, these cases represent a small, rather 
marginal proportion. They have economic weight in their national economies; yet given 
their low frequency and scale, as well as concentration in only a very few Member 
States, they do not suggest a potential for general abuse of the foundation form, or 
diversion of funds for commercial or other private benefit purposes. This general 
conclusion is not altered by the fact that we can identify very prominent individual 
cases of the use of the legal form of the foundation for the establishment of corporations 
in other countries, too (See e.g. the Dutch IKEA Foundation and the German Lidl 
Foundation).  
These so-called “commercial foundations” or “corporate foundations” are significant 
and occur in several forms. We need to distinguish them according to the relationship 
between the foundation and the enterprise or the commercial activity: The enterprise 
purpose foundation is a very rare example (only in Denmark), and the same is true for 
the example of the non-public benefit, but non-profit service-providing foundation 
resembling a co-operative (only in the Netherlands). Much more frequent and accepted 
by almost all Member States are public benefit foundations which are owners or 
majority shareholders of an enterprise.  
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Part 3: Legal Comparative Analysis 
A. Introduction 
This legal comparative analysis contains a general report. This report provides an 
overview of the main characteristics of foundation law in the 27 Member States. This 
will also include a short overview of tax law, because tax questions are regarded as 
important in case of cross-border activities. The general report is supplemented by 
several comparative charts. 
I. Existing Legal Comparative Contributions about Foundation Law 
There exist several recent comparative legal studies, which are presented in 
chronological order. Please note that several parts of the older contributions are 
outdated because of later reforms in foundation laws and tax laws in the Member 
States.65 
1. Alfandari/Nardone, Associations et Fondations en Europe (1994) 
This publication contains short country reports on the older Member States.  
2. Communication of the Commission on Promoting the Role of Voluntary 
Organizations and Foundations in Europe (1997) 
The Communication of the Commission on Promoting the Role of Voluntary 
Organizations and Foundations in Europe (1997) contains country profiles of the then 
15 Member States (i.e., Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, the UK, and Spain) 
.66 The law of associations is the dominating part of the Communication’s study, and 
the law of foundations and elements of taxation are part of the country profiles. Several 
parts of the Commission’s study are outdated because of later reforms in foundation 
laws and tax laws in the Member States. 
3. Hondius/van der Ploeg: Foundations (2000) 
The publication ‘Foundations’ is a chapter of the International Encyclopaedia of 
Comparative Law. It contains no country reports, but a general report with references 
from some European countries and the US, depending on the specific topic. 
4. Hopt/Reuter: Stiftungsrecht in Europa (2001) 
The publication ‘Stiftungsrecht in Europa’,67 which contains a number of country 
reports (including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, England, France, Greece, 
Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Spain) as well as an analysis of 
                                                 
65 Apart from the contributions presented here, there are also some other publications, e.g. Council of 
Europe (ed.), Associations and Foundations (1998). 
66 See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/library/lib-social_economy/orgfd_en.pdf. 
67 Hopt/Reuter (eds.): Stiftungsrecht in Europa, Köln (2001). 
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selected foundation law topics gives a profound insight into the colourful variety of 
foundation laws. Because of recent legal reforms in various Member States, some of the 
individual country information will be outdated. The comparative analysis is considered 
a milestone for analysis and debate of European foundation law among legal scholars. 
5. Hopt/Walz/von Hippel/Then: The European Foundation (2006) 
The European Foundation publication of 200668 includes a thorough analysis of the 
rationale, the function and the reality of European foundation laws. Besides giving 
recommendations on what a European legal form for foundations could look like, the 
publication contains a profound comparative analysis of all relevant aspects of 
foundation laws and the laws on foundation taxation (but not selected country reports). 
The publication also compares the overall European approach with the legal 
environment for foundations in the US. 
6. Richter/Wachter: Handbuch des internationalen Stiftungsrechts (2007) 
The “Handbuch des internationalen Stiftungsrechts” of 200769 contains some extensive 
country reports (including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, England, France, 
Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Spain) as well as 
analyses on tax law and European law topics.  
7. EFC Country Profiles (2007) 
The most recent publication is the hard copy publication of the EFC Country Profiles 
which was published in May 2007.70 The publication contains an overview of the 
diverse legal and fiscal environments of foundations across the 27 EU Member States, 
which were drafted by national country experts. Standard sections across all profiles 
cover specific legal and tax issues for foundations across the EU Member States. The 
profiles have widened in scope since the previous EFC country profiles publication in 
2002. The structure has been redesigned by the EFC membership in co-operation with 
legal experts. The tax treatment of foundations is also discussed. 
II. Methodology 
The five studies mentioned above cover most aspects of the law of foundations. 
However, some additional research needed to be undertaken: The first four studies do 
not cover all EU Member States, the older studies could not take into account the new 
reforms, and some relevant questions are not covered by all the publications (e.g., some 
aspects of cross-border activities). 
Additionally, research is not always easy, because sometimes there is a certain amount 
of legal uncertainty (both in foundation civil law and in tax law), because in many 
Member States codified law is comparatively short, providing for ongoing discussion 
whether the few explicit rules are accompanied by some implicit rules (analogy, 
fundamental principal of law, etc.). 
                                                 
68 Hopt/Walz/von Hippel/Then (eds.): The European Foundation, Cambridge (UK) (2006). 
69 Richter/Wachter (eds.): Handbuch des internationalen Stiftungsrechts, Angelbachtal (2007). 
70 European Foundation Centre: Country Profiles (2007). 
 - 50 -
Thus, it was important to use a network of legal experts in all the countries. Because of 
the speciality of the topic, it was not easy to find experts in all Member States in a 
comparatively short time period. Some experts could be found because they have 
worked with the members of the core team in comparative legal research projects in the 
past. Fortunately, it was possible to use the contacts of the European Foundation Centre 
with foreign legal experts in order to get information from the remaining Member 
States.  
The following general report will analyse these topics: Definition and Characteristics of 
a Foundation, Governance and State Supervision, Formation, Liquidation and 
Fundamental Decisions, Activities of Foundations, and Tax Law in form of an 
overview. 
B. Definition and Characteristics of a Foundation 
I. The Different Legal Approaches of Civil Law and Common Law  
As regards the meaning of “foundation” there are different approaches in the civil law 
and common law Member States. 
1. The civil law Member States follow an organizational approach. In all these Member 
States, there exists an institutional legal form having rather similar conceptual criteria,71 
which is usually called “foundation” alongside such other legal forms as the (non-profit) 
association, the company and the co-operative. 
Some Member States have different laws or categories for “public benefit” foundations 
on the one hand and “private” foundations on the other (e.g., Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Greece). Additionally, several Member States distinguish (alternatively or 
cumulatively) between “traditional foundations” and “endowment funds” (e.g., Austria, 
Czech Republic, France), “traditional foundations” and “fundraising foundations” 
(Sweden), “commercial” foundations and “non-commercial” foundations (Denmark), 
“open” and “closed” foundations (Hungary), or between different types of foundations 
(e.g., Italian banking foundations) or, as in the French case, between several recently 
introduced foundation types (e.g., university foundations). In the Czech Republic there 
exist traditional foundations and endowment funds and an additional third legal form, 
the institution (Anstalt), which has many similarities to the foundation in the other civil 
law Member States.72  
The status of a foundation does not usually suffice to qualify it for tax benefits; the 
foundation is only tax exempt if it meets the separate requirements of tax law, which 
can also be met by other organizations (e.g., associations and companies as is the case 
in Germany and the Netherlands, for example). Some Member States, however, impose 
prerequisites on a foundation comparable to those of tax-exempt organizations (e.g., 
Spain). In these cases the foundation’s status may indicate that it will usually also have 
tax benefits. 
                                                 
71 See II infra. 
72 From a theoretical point of view such an institution is traditionally not regarded as a “foundation 
category” but as a “third category” apart from foundations and associations. From a functional point of 
view, however, the institution has no members and is significantly more similar to a foundation than to a 
membership-based association. Thus the Czech institution would be regarded as “foundation type” in the 
other civil law Member States not having the legal form of the institution. 
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2. The common law Member States (Cyprus, Ireland, United Kingdom) do not have any 
special legal form for a “foundation”.73 The approach is to focus on the “charitable” 
character of the organization. To be a charitable institution, an organization must have 
exclusively charitable purposes and it must be administered for public benefit. Charities 
may take a number of legal forms (unincorporated association, limited or unlimited 
company, declaration of trust, will trust, body incorporated by act of Parliament or 
Royal Charter, and the new Charitable Incorporated Organization). Because there is no 
special legal form for a “foundation” in the common law Member States we will discuss 
in what follows the trust as the traditional and mainly used legal form for charities. 
Their charitable status makes charities eligible for tax benefits. Registration as a charity 
is conclusive proof of charitable status, and a registered charity will therefore be 
accepted by the Inland Revenue as entitled to claim these tax privileges. While there is 
no necessary link between charitable status and tax relief, it has long been established in 
policy and practice.  
3. Some civil law Member States (Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary) also 
know foundations without a legal personality, which can have some similarities with the 
trust form. 
II. Conceptual Criteria Characterizing a Foundation 
1. The definitions in the civil law Member States given by statute or offered by legal 
scholars show that there exist a number of conceptual criteria which are rather similar. 
Thus a foundation is  
– an independent organization (generally with its own legal personality), 
– which has no formal membership, 
– and serves a specific purpose 
– for which a founder has provided an endowment, and 
– determined the foundation’s purpose and statutes. 
Furthermore, the foundation typically (but not necessarily)  
– has an unlimited duration,  
– is under the review of a State supervisory authority, and 
– must not make distributions by way of profit or gain to its founder(s) or the 
members of its organs of government.  
2. The common law approach would see such an organization as just one kind of charity 
if its purpose is “charitable”.  
III. Legal Personality 
1. In the civil law Member States, a consequence of the organizational independence is 
usually that foundations have full legal personality, which includes limited liability and 
full transactional capacity.  
                                                 
73 In the common law Member States the term “foundation” is nevertheless traditionally used when 
referring to grant-making charities (however constituted) having secure funding. 
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The only civil law Member State which has restrictions on the acting capacity of the 
legal personality is Luxembourg. In Luxembourg a foundation is only allowed to hold 
immovable property if it is necessary for the furtherance of the foundation’s (public 
benefit) purpose. The reason for this is the old fear of the “dead hand” or “mortmain”. 
Some Member States have had comparable provisions, but abolished them recently 
(e.g., Italy in 1997 and Belgium in 2002). In France the strict rules regarding the 
possession of real property for public benefit associations do not apply to foundations.  
Some Member States require approval by the State supervisory authority if a foundation 
wishes to acquire certain assets (e.g., donations, immovable property). It is arguable 
whether such rules should be regarded as a restriction on legal capacity or as a measure 
of (preventive) State supervision. We follow the latter approach, for the rationale behind 
these rules seems to be less the fear of the “dead hand” and more the wish to prevent 
abuse (which is also the rationale for other rules of preventive State supervision). 
Consequently, these rules are discussed along with the other measures for State 
supervision.74 
2. In the common law Member States (and also a few civil law jurisdictions) there are 
charitable trusts which have no legal personality. The advantage of a legal personality is 
only available if the charity is incorporated as another legal form: (1) by Act of 
Parliament or (other than the Irish Republic) Royal Charter, (2) under company law (as 
a “charitable company”), or (3) as Charitable Incorporated Organization (CIO). 
IV. Types of Foundations According to Their Purpose 
1.  Nature of the Purpose 
All Member States require that an endowment is dedicated to a specified purpose. 
However, there are differences between the Member States as to the nature of that 
purpose. 
There are three main kinds of restriction:  
(1) “public benefit” purposes (Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and 
the United Kingdom),  
(2) “useful” purposes (Finland), and  
(3) “any lawful” purposes (Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, 
Malta, the Netherlands and Sweden).  
Some Member States have different laws or categories for “public benefit” foundations 
on the one hand and “private” foundations on the other; the latter are allowed to pursue 
any lawful purpose (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece).  
 
Chart 1: Permitted Purposes 
Country What purposes are foundations legally permitted to pursue? 
Austria Public foundations: only public benefit purposes  
Private foundations: any lawful purpose 
                                                 
74 See C III 3 infra. 
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Country What purposes are foundations legally permitted to pursue? 
Belgium Public foundations: only public benefit purposes  
Private foundations: any lawful purpose 
Bulgaria Any lawful purpose 
Cyprus Any lawful purpose 
Czech Republic Public benefit only 
Denmark Any lawful purpose 
Estonia Any lawful purpose 
Finland "Useful" purposes 
France Public benefit only 
Germany Any lawful purpose 
Greece Any lawful purpose 
Hungary Public benefit only 
Ireland Public benefit only 
Italy Any lawful purpose 
Latvia Any lawful purpose 
Lithuania Public benefit only 
Luxembourg Public benefit only 
Malta Any lawful purpose 
Netherlands Any lawful purpose 
Poland Public benefit only  
Portugal Public benefit only 
Romania Public benefit only 
Slovakia Public benefit only 
Slovenia Public benefit only 
Spain Public benefit only 
Sweden Any lawful purpose 
United Kingdom Public benefit only 
 
A closer look shows that the wording of the statutory definitions can be misleading 
sometimes. On the one hand, the mere fact that foundations must pursue a public benefit 
purpose does not necessarily mean that any private distribution is prohibited.75 The 
converse is also true. Even the Member States which allow “any lawful purpose” often 
have restrictions as regards private distributions to the founder herself/himself or to 
her/his family or as regards “Enterprise Purpose Foundations”. Such restrictions are 
sometimes explicit in statutory law, but there are also examples of implicit restrictions. 
                                                 
75 See B IV 4 infra. 
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2. Public Benefit Foundations 
a) Relevance of Public Benefit Foundations 
From a legal comparative perspective, public benefit foundations are one type of 
foundation which is accepted in every country. Moreover, according to the empirical 
analysis of this study, the public benefit foundation generally seems to be the most 
relevant type of foundation in the Member States which permit every lawful purpose. 
b) Definitions of Public Benefit 
Against this background it is important to clarify whether the term “public benefit 
purpose” is comparable in the different Member States. This question is not easy to 
answer.  
At first it should be noted that the term “public benefit” can (but need not) have a 
different meaning in civil organizational law (which decides whether a foundation can 
be established) and tax law (which decides whether the established foundation will have 
tax privileges). Generally, however, a public benefit foundation (under civil law) will 
also be a tax-exempt foundation under tax law. 
As regards the legislative definition of the public benefit purpose, three different 
solutions have been adopted by Member States that have defined the promotion of a 
public benefit purpose in their civil law and/or tax law legislation: 
(1) a closed list of public benefit purposes 
(2) an open list of public benefit purposes  
(3) no definition at all  
Most Member States have no definition or an open list of public benefit purposes. One 
of the few Member States which has tried to implement a closed list of public benefit 
purposes in civil law is Hungary. According to Hungarian law, public benefit includes: 
1. health preservation, disease prevention, therapeutic and medical rehabilitation activities, 
2. social activities, family counselling, care for the elderly, 
3. scientific activities, research, 
4. school instruction and education, personal ability development, dissemination of 
knowledge, 
5. cultural activities, 
6. preservation of cultural heritage, 
7. preservation of historical monuments, 
8. nature preservation, animal protection, 
9. environmental protection, 
10. children and juvenile protection, children and juvenile advocate services, 
11. promotion of equal opportunity within society for underprivileged groups, 
12. protection of human and civil rights, 
13. activities in connection with ethnic minorities living in the state and with nationals of 
state living outside its borders, 
14. sports, not including sports activities involving professionals and those performed under 
contract within the framework of a civil law relationship, 
15. protection of public order and traffic safety, voluntary fire fighting, rescue, and disaster 
preparedness and response activities, 
16. consumer protection, 
17. rehabilitative employment, 
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18. promotion of employment and training for underprivileged groups in the labuor market, 
including placement by the hiring-out of workers, and associated services, 
19. promotion of the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration, 
20. services provided to and available solely for non-profit organizations; 
21. activities associated with flood and water damage control; and 
22. activities associated with the construction, maintenance and operation of public roads, 
bridges and tunnels.      
c) Conceptual Criteria Characterizing a Public Benefit Purpose 
In order to clarify the term “public benefit” more exactly several legal country experts 
were consulted. According to the result of that consultation there are common 
conceptual criteria characterizing a public benefit purpose.  
Thus, a public benefit purpose is 
– one of a catalogue of several purposes, which are in all or in most countries 
regarded as a public benefit purpose 
– which supports public (and not private interests) 
aa) Catalogue of Public Benefit Purposes 
The extensive catalogue of Hungarian law was give, to the country experts in order to 
find out which examples of the catalogue would be regarded as a “public benefit 
purpose” in their country. The result shows that there are many similarities both in civil 
law as well as in tax law:  
The following purposes seem to be accepted in every Member State (both in civil law 
and in tax law): 
1. health preservation, disease prevention, therapeutic and medical rehabilitation activities, 
2. social activities, family counselling, care for the elderly, 
3. scientific activities, research, 
4. school instruction and education, personal ability development, dissemination of 
knowledge, 
5. cultural activities, 
6. preservation of cultural heritage, 
7. preservation of historical monuments, 
8. nature preservation, animal protection, 
9. environmental protection, 
10. children and juvenile protection, children and juvenile advocate services,  
11. promotion of equal opportunity within society for underprivileged groups. 
The following purposes seem to be accepted in most, but not in all Member States: 
1. protection of human and civil rights (not in France, not under Irish tax law,76 and 
probably not under Belgian tax law), 
2. activities in connection with ethnic minorities living in the state and with nationals of 
your state living outside its borders (not under Italian tax law) 
3. sports, not including sports activities involving professionals and those performed under 
contract within the framework of a civil law relationship (generally not under Irish tax 
law77), 
                                                 
76 Certain internationally recognised human rights organisations qualify for the same tax reliefs as 
charities in Ireland (see section 209 Taxes Consolidation Act 1997). 
77 Non-profit amateur sporting bodies are eligible for income tax exemption under Section 235 of the 
Taxes Consolidation Act 1997. The promotion of amateur sport is not a charitable purpose per se under 
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4. protection of public order and traffic safety, voluntary fire fighting, rescue, and disaster 
preparedness and response activities (not in France and not under Belgian, Italian and 
Irish tax law), 
5. consumer protection (not in France, not under Irish, Italian, and Swedish tax law, 
probably not under Belgian tax law), 
6. rehabilitative employment (not under Italian and Swedish tax law, probably not under 
Belgian tax law), 
7. promotion of employment and training for underprivileged groups in the labor market, 
including placement by the hiring-out of workers, and associated services (not under 
Swedish tax law), 
8. promotion of the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration (not in Greece, Italy and Latvia, 
unclear in Slovakia and the United Kingdom, not under Czech, Irish, Portuguese and 
Swedish tax law, probably not under Belgian tax law), 
9. services provided to and available solely for non-profit organizations (not in France, 
Italy and Latvia, unclear in Slovakia, not under Czech, Portuguese and Swedish tax 
law, probably not under Belgian tax law), 
10. activities associated with flood and water damage control (not in the Czech Republic, 
France, Italy, not in Irish, Portuguese and Swedish tax law), 
11. activities associated with the construction, maintenance and operation of public roads, 
bridges and tunnels (not in Bulgaria, France, Italy and Latvia, unclear in Slovakia, not 
under Czech, Irish and Swedish tax law, probably not under Spanish tax law). 
The reason for the non-acceptance of these purposes in some Member States may be 
that some of the aims are regarded as the public authorities' responsibilities, which do 
not depend of private initiative. 
bb) Promotion of “the Public” 
The public has to be supported. This means that the beneficiaries must not be limited 
too narrowly. This general principle seems to be widely accepted in the Member States. 
Nevertheless, there may be some differences in detail. In order to learn more about how 
this principle is understood, the country experts were asked to tell us whether they 
would regard certain examples as “public benefit” (in civil law and/or tax law). The 
answers show that sometimes there is a comparatively high legal uncertainty.  
 
Chart 2: Limitation of Beneficiaries of Public Benefit Foundations 
Do the following purposes promote the public at large?  





































                                                                                                                                               
Irish common law but sporting activity can be a means to promote another purpose recognised as 
charitable (e.g., education or health). 
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Austria yes yes no no yes yes 
Belgium probably 
yes 
unclear78 no no yes yes 
Bulgaria yes yes no no no no 
Cyprus unclear unclear unclear unclear unclear unclear 
Czech Republic unclear unclear no no yes probably 
yes 
Denmark yes probably 
no79 
no no probably 
yes 
no 






Finland yes yes generally 
no 
no yes yes 
France yes yes no no yes80 no 
Germany yes yes no no yes yes 









Ireland yes yes no no yes no 













                                                 
78 The criterion “public at large” is not relevant to determine whether tax exemption and income tax 
deduction should be granted or not. In the above mentioned examples, the income tax exemption for gifts 
might not be granted in some of the cases, since for some types of charities enumerated by the law there 
are conditions regarding the geographical scope of activity of the foundation which might not be met 
(second line). For the first line, this criterion would be met if we take the example of Brussels, which is a 
city, but also a “region” in the sense of the Belgian law. Universities (lines 5 and 6) do not meet the 
criterion of geographical scope, but are explicitly mentioned by the law as eligible for tax benefits. 
79 According to a Guideline of the Ministry of Finance, the group of beneficiaries must not be 
geographically or otherwise limited to less than 40,000 persons. 
80 Provided it benefits also future students of the university. 
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Lithuania yes yes yes yes unclear unclear 
Luxembourg unclear unclear probably 
no  




Malta N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Netherlands N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Poland yes yes no no yes yes 
Portugal N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Romania N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Slovakia unclear unclear unclear unclear unclear unclear 
Slovenia N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 






Sweden N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
United Kingdom N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
cc) Differences exist regarding hybrid structures and split-endowment interests (see B 
IV 4 infra).  
3. Other Types 
Apart from the Public Benefit Foundation, some Member States also accept other types 
of foundations pursuing another purpose.  
 
Chart 3: Types of Foundations According to Purpose 
What types of foundations (apart from public benefit foundations) exist in your 
country? 
 
Country Family foundations Others 
Austria yes (only private Foundations) Foundation for the founder 
Belgium yes (only private Foundations) no 
Bulgaria yes (only private Foundations) no 
Cyprus no no 
Czech Republic no Specific types of public benefit 
foundations: endowment fund 
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Country Family foundations Others 
Denmark yes Enterprise purpose foundations 
Estonia yes no 
Finland yes Pension funds 
France no Specific types of public benefit 
foundations: university foundations, 
corporate foundations, foundations 




partenariales), endowment funds 
(fonds de dotation), foundations with 
no legal personality created under 
the aegis of some public benefit 
foundations duly authorised in that 
respect (fondations sous égide) 
Germany yes Public foundations, church 
foundations 
Greece yes (only private foundations) no 
Hungary no no 
Ireland yes (as private trust) no 
Italy yes Specific types of public benefit 
foundations:  




Latvia no no 
Lithuania no no 
Luxembourg no no 
Malta yes no 
Netherlands yes Enterprise purpose foundations, 
pension funds 
Poland no no 
Portugal no no 
Romania no no 
Slovakia no no 
Slovenia no no 
Spain no Religious foundations 
Sweden yes Enterprise purpose foundations, 
pension funds 
United Kingdom yes (as private trust) no 
 
In the following sections some examples of such foundations types are presented.  
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a) Family Foundations  
Several Member States accept the family foundation, which is a foundation for 
promoting the benefit of members of the family of the founder. Some Member States do 
not allow such foundations, some only with certain restrictions.  
While it is consistent that Member States which require a public benefit purpose usually 
do not permit a foundation to have the purpose of promoting the benefit of members of 
the founder’s family, even most of the Member States which in principle allow “any 
lawful” purpose have certain restrictions regarding family foundations, e.g., needy 
family members (e.g., the Netherlands, Italy), close relatives (e.g., Denmark), or is of 
limited duration (e.g., Austria, Denmark, see also Ireland and UK as regards private 
trusts). Only in a few Member States are family foundations allowed without such 
restrictions (e.g., Germany according to the prevailing view).  
b) Foundation for the Founder 
Almost every Member State seems to require a “non-distribution” constraint for 
foundations, in the sense that no private benefits (distributions made without adequate 
compensation) may be provided to the founder or to the members of the board of 
directors. Thus, a foundation for the founder is generally not accepted in the Member 
States. 
The only clear exemption from this rule is to be found in the Austrian private 
foundation, where the statutes can allow distributions to the founder (“Stiftung für den 
Stifter”).  
But even in some of the Member States which generally accept the non-distribution 
constraint, two minor exemptions are possible: split-interest endowments81 and the 
liquidation of the foundation.82 
c) “Enterprise Purpose” Foundations 
An “enterprise purpose” foundation is a foundation with the purpose to preserve and 
maintain an enterprise.  
Such a foundation is only accepted in a few Member States. In Sweden, a foundation 
can be established for the sole purpose of preserving and maintaining an enterprise.83 In 
Denmark, there are foundation with hybrid purposes (having both a public benefit 
purpose and the purpose of preserving and maintaining an enterprise).  
The German view is, in the main, that such “trade protection” foundations 
(“Unternehmensselbstzweckstiftungen”) are not allowed, because the assets of a 
foundation should be subordinate to its purpose84. The same view also holds sway in 
Austria.85 In these countries it becomes rather complicated when a foundation’s purpose 
is not only to preserve and maintain an enterprise, but also, for example, a public benefit 
                                                 
81 See B IV 4 infra. 
82 See D II 3 infra. 
83 Olsson, p. 249 et seq. 
84 See Münchener Kommentar/Reuter, Vor § 80 BGB, Rn. 17; Staudinger/Rawert, Vorbem. zu §§ 80 
BGB Rn. 9 et seq.  
85 Kalss, in: Doralt/Nowotny/Kalss, § 1 PSG, Rn. 34. 
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or the promotion of culture within the enterprise. In practice, however, the problem can 
be overcome without any great difficulty.  
Please note that almost all Member States accept foundations which are the majority 
shareholder of an enterprise.86 However, such “holding foundations”87 have to promote 
another purpose (usually a public benefit purpose) than the mere promotion of that 
enterprise. 
d) Pension Funds 
In a few Member States the legal form of a foundation can also be used as a pension 
fund (“pension foundation”), e.g. Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
e) Others 
There are several other examples of types. Such examples are saving banks (e.g., in 
Spain), church foundations, public foundations (established by the government by a 
legal act), etc.  
4. Hybrid Structures and Split-Interest Endowments 
The mere fact that foundations must pursue a public benefit purpose does not 
necessarily mean that any private distribution is prohibited. Some Member States accept 
hybrid structures and split-interest endowment in civil law and/or tax law in certain 
cases, even if they require a “public benefit” purpose. 
Thus, the Supreme Court of Portugal has decided that the founder can restrict the use of 
the endowment by specifying that the foundation is required to maintain the founder, his 
spouse and descendents.88 Such a rule would also be accepted in Estonia (civil law and 
tax law).  
In addition, a charity in England and Wales can have assets in which its interest is 
restricted in a certain way by the donor to preserve a pre-existing private benefit. The 
founder of a charity can, for example, retain a beneficial reversionary interest in the 
capital of a property or other asset given on trust to the charity to retain for its own 
continuing use or financial benefit (whether for some specific purpose or for its general 
purposes). Such a reversionary interest would also be accepted in Estonia (civil law and 
tax law), and under certain conditions also in France (civil law and tax law).89 
In England and Wales, alternatively, the gift can be of only the freehold reversion 
(residuary interest) in a residence that is subject to an existing lease (for a term of years, 
or even for life) in favour of (say) the donor as tenant. However, the rule against 
perpetuities cannot be evaded. A restriction attached to a charitable gift, constituting a 
trust in favour of non-charitable objects, as, for instance, a requirement that the charity 
must grant a lease to private individuals for 95 years, or a lease in perpetuity to the 
relatives of the founder, is void.90 However. such partgifts, unless comprising a 
                                                 
86 See E III 2 infra. 
87 Please note that the terminology regarding “Enterprise Foundations” is inconsistent.  
88 Supreme Court of Portugal, 24 October 1996, 10 Revista de Legislação e Jurisprudência, p. 111 et seq. 
89 Provided the reversionary interest is limited to a specific length of time or to the life of the founder and 
the interest reverts to the foundation at the expiration of the above referred period. 
90 See Warburton, para. 3-020, with further references. 
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separable legal interest that the donor disposes of completely, may give rise to tax 
problems. Such a provision is also possible in Spain (civil law and tax law) and under 
certain conditions in France (civil law and tax law),91 
In Germany, a restriction on the use of the endowment is possible in different ways, to 
the extent that full tax relief is given to a foundation which distributes up to one-third of 
its income to the founder or his family (§ 58, no. 5, German General Fiscal Code). 
Similarly in Denmark and probably also in the Netherlands tax authorities may tolerate 
that a tax-exempt foundation distributes a small part of its income to the founder and 
her/his family.  
However, the civil and tax laws of most Member States make no explicit reference to 
such hybrid structures or split-interest endowments. Thus, country experts are uncertain 
whether such provisions would be accepted for a public-benefit foundation (e.g., 
Greece, the Netherlands), while most country experts do not believe that such 
provisions would be tolerated (e.g., the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania 
and Slovenia). 
C. Governance and State Supervision  
In all Member States there are some general similarities as regards governance and state 
supervision: 
Regarding internal governance, all Member States as a rule accept that the founder has 
a wide freedom of scope. He can usually specify certain rules in the statutes, though this 
may be difficult to accomplish in those Member States which require the founder to 
accept a model set of statutes (France).  
A foundation is generally required to be supervised by a State supervisory authority. 
Some differences exist as regards mandatory private supervisory mechanisms, e.g., 
internal supervision (independent directors, internal supervisory boards), public 
accountability and disclosure, and monitoring by auditors or other third parties. Some 
Member States have almost no obligation of any private supervisory mechanisms. Other 
Member States (especially those states where the position of the State supervisory 
authority is comparatively weak) know more or less mandatory private supervisory 
mechanisms.  
 
Chart 4: Mandatory Requirements for the Foundation’s Internal Organs 
Country 
Minimum number of the board 
members Mandatory supervisory board 
Austria Public foundations: 1 
Private foundations: 3 
Only for large private foundations92 
Belgium 3 no 
Bulgaria 1 Only for public benefit foundations 
Cyprus 1 no 
                                                 
91 Cf. note 89. 
92 The supervisory board is mandatory if the private foundation has more than 300 employees or heads 
domestic corporations or holds shares of more than 50 % in a domestic corporation which has on average 
more than 300 employees. 
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Country 
Minimum number of the board 
members Mandatory supervisory board 
Czech Republic 3 Only for large foundations93; if there is 
no (voluntary) supervisory board a 
comptroller is mandatory. 
Denmark 3 no 
Estonia 1 yes, at least 3 members 
Finland 3 no 
France traditional foundation: 7-1294 
endowment funds: 3 
no95 
Germany 1 no 
Greece 1 no 
Hungary 1 Only for large public benefit 
foundations96 
Ireland 3 no 
Italy 1 Only for banking foundations 
Latvia 3, if there is no supervisory 
board, otherwise 1 
no 
Lithuania N/A N/A 
Luxembourg 3 (though not expressly provided 
for in the law) 
no 
Malta 3 no 
Netherlands 1 no 
Poland 1 no 
Portugal 1 yes 
Romania 3 no 
Slovakia 3 supervisory board or inspector 
Slovenia 3 no 
Spain 3 no 
Sweden 1 no 
United Kingdom 1 no 
I. Board of Directors and Other Organs 
As already mentioned, as a rule there is a wide freedom of scope for the founder to 
specify the internal governance in the foundation’s statutes. However, in some Member 
States there are minor mandatory requirements regarding the board of directors. 
                                                 
93 If the endowment exceeds CZK 5 million (approx. € 200,000), there is no mandatory supervisory board 
in the case of endowment fund. 
94 There is no official minimum under French law; it is suggested, however, that there be at least seven 
and no more than 12 board members, see Art. 3 of the new French model statutes nos. 1 & 2. 
95 Foundations can choose between a supervisory board and an executive board, or a managing board. 
96 If the annual income exceeds HUF 5 millions (approx. € 20,000). 
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1. Number of Board Members  
According to the foundation laws of about half of the Member States, one board 
member is sufficient. However, as Chart 4 shows, there seems to be a tendency in 
modern legislation to prescribe at least three members for the board of directors.  
2. Appointment 
In some Member States only natural persons are allowed to become board members 
(Austria for public foundations, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, 
Latvia) while most Member States also accept legal persons as board members (Austria 
for private foundations, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom). 
While all Member States allow the founder to be a member of the board, only a few 
Member States explicitly restrict the influence of the founder within the board: in 
Hungary, the founder and his relatives have to be the minority, and in Sweden, the 
founder must not be the sole board member. 
Other mandatory personal requirements for board members are seldom explicitly stated 
in statutory law: persons who supervise a foundation must not be its board members in 
the the Netherlands and in Austrian public foundations; beneficiaries are excluded in 
the Czech Republic and in Austrian private foundations; employees are excluded in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia; and persons guilty of particular offences are excluded in 
Malta and in the United Kingdom. 
As a general rule, in all Member States the founder is free to determine in the statutes 
how the board members are appointed. He usually appoints the initial members of the 
board of directors, and may specify whatever appointment system within the formation 
deed (or other governing document) she/he deems suitable. Thus, the power to appoint 
new directors may rest with the founder herself/himself, with another natural or legal 
person, with the supervisory board of the foundation (if existing), or with the members 
of the board of directors (co-option/self-perpetuating). Mandatory specific requirements 
regarding the procedure of appointment are rare. Only a few Member States restrict the 
influence of the founder: In Denmark, the majority of the board members must be 
persons not appointed by the founder or by other persons closely connected with the 
founder; in France, the founder is limited to the appointment of a third of the board 
members in the case of a traditional foundation;97 and in Austria, the initial members of 
the board of directors of a public foundation are appointed by the State supervisory 
authority as proposed in the foundation documents (by the founder), if these persons are 
legally capable and trustworthy. In the case of an Austrian private foundation, the 
supervisory board (if existing) can only have the power to appoint the board of directors 
if beneficiaries do not have more than 50 % of the seats on the supervisory board. 
3. Rights  
The board of directors generally have the task to manage the foundation and are legal 
representatives of it. 
                                                 
97 No limitation in the case of endowment funds. 
 - 65 -
4. Duties 
The duty of care and (to a lesser extent) the duty of loyalty are recognised in all 
Member States and are part of each country’s legal provisions. 
a) Duty of Care 
A few Member States have special rules regarding asset management98 which can be 
regarded as specifications of the general duty of care. 
b) Duty of Loyalty 
As regards the duty of loyalty, some national laws provide special rules about self- 
dealing transactions which specify the duty of loyalty.  
Most Member States accept self-dealing in cases where it is fair (“duty of fair dealing”).  
However, several Member States have additional limitations, which can be broken 
down into five distinct kinds: 
(1) The most restrictive approach can be found in the common law of trusts, which does 
not allow any “unauthorised” trustee benefits, including self-dealing transactions 
between the trust and its trustees or persons closely connected with them. Thus, in 
England and Wales such a transaction or contract is generally voidable regardless of the 
fairness of the price or of other circumstances. However, the settler can allow self-
dealing transactions in the trust document if the price is fair. The Charity Commission 
can additionally authorise certain self-dealing transactions but will do so only where 
strict requirements are met.  
(2) Other Member States prohibit only some self-dealing transactions. In the Czech 
Republic, the sale of assets or the leasing of real-estate constituting part of foundation 
property are not allowed. In Estonia, a foundation may not give credit to or provide a 
credit guarantee for its founders, board members, council members, or persons sharing 
economic interests with them. In Sweden, loans and loan guarantees to the founder or to 
the management of the foundation cannot be granted. In Germany, according to a 
general rule some self-dealing transactions are generally prohibited, if the statutes do 
not permit them. 
(3) Some Member States impose general rules to prevent bias on the part of board 
members, e.g., Greece.99 In Dutch law, it is accepted that the prohibition on dealing in a 
conflict-of-interest situation derives from the general law on representation. Moreover, 
in Germany, there is rudimentary provision in the General Part of the Civil Code100.  
(4) Sometimes there are special rules regarding the procedure of self-dealing 
transactions. One example is Estonia, where a member of the supervisory board must 
not participate in voting if she/he has a personal interest. One example is Bulgaria as 
regards public benefit foundations.  
                                                 
98 See E II 2 infra. 
99 Art. 61-77, Greek Civil Code, contain general provisions for all private legal persons; see further 
Georgiadis/Stathopoulos, Art. 109, Greek Civil Code, p. 170. 
100 § 181, German Civil Code.  
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(5) In some countries the consent of the State supervisory authority is needed in cases of 
self-dealing, e.g., Spain and some German provinces.101 These checks can be seen as 
one example of preventive State supervision.102 
5.  Liability and Standard of Diligence 
The general rule is that board members can be held liable for damages suffered by the 
foundation where a loss is deemed to have been caused by a breach of duty. This is 
generally also true, if the board member is a volunteer. Some German Provinces restrict 
the liability to gross negligence, but it is controversial whether the Provincial legislator 
has the competence to establish such rules. 
6. Remuneration 
The existing solutions may be categorised as follows: 
(1) Most Member States accept that an adequate level of financial compensation is 
allowed if there is no contrary provision in the statutes of the foundation. Examples are 
the Austrian private foundation, Estonia, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Slovenia.  
(2) Other Member States generally prohibit remuneration. Consequently, in France in 
the case of traditional foundations,103 and generally also in Spain, the members of the 
board must be unpaid. Similarly in England and Wales, the general legal principle is 
that charity trustees are not entitled to retain any direct or indirect personal benefit they 
may derive from their trusteeship unless specially authorised. Charity trustees can be 
paid for their service as trustees where this is authorised by the court, the Charity 
Commission, or the charity’s constitution; authorisation will generally be given where 
this is in the best interests of the charity.  
(3) In Denmark, the State supervisory authority may check whether the remuneration is 
appropriate, and can reduce any remuneration deemed excessive. 
(4) In the other Member States there is no explicit regulation in civil law or tax law. 
However, it is likely that at least in the case of a public benefit foundation (which 
usually has additionally the status of a tax-exempt organization) there exists an implicit 
restriction that only a reasonable remuneration is allowed.  
 
Chart 5: Remuneration and Administration Costs 
Country 
Is remuneration of board 
members allowed in civil law and 
in tax law? If remuneration is 
allowed, are there any limits in 
civil law or/and in tax law? 
Is there a maximum amount that 
can be spent on 
office/administration costs in 
civil law and in tax law? 
                                                 
101 See, e.g., Art. 22, Bavarian Foundation Law 2001, which generally requires the consent of the State 
supervisory authority. Since 2001 the general rule has been liberalised to the extent that the foundation’s 
statute can allow (some) self-dealing transactions. 
102 See also C III 1 infra. 
103 Such a prohibition does not exist for endowment funds. However, tax law provides for a general 
limitation to ¾ of the legal minimum salary, otherwise the tax-exempt status of the funds would be 
challenged.  
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Country 
Is remuneration of board 
members allowed in civil law and 
in tax law? If remuneration is 
allowed, are there any limits in 
civil law or/and in tax law? 
Is there a maximum amount that 
can be spent on 
office/administration costs in 
civil law and in tax law? 
Austria Public foundations and tax law: the 
remuneration must be reasonable. 
Private foundations: no explicit 
restriction. 
no explicit restriction 
Belgium The remuneration must be 
reasonable. 
tax law: 20 % of the resources  
Bulgaria no explicit restriction no explicit restriction 
Cyprus no explicit restriction no explicit restriction 
Czech Republic General rules for administration 
costs (see right) 
The foundations’ statutes must 
contain an explicit maximum limit 
for administration costs.  
Denmark The remuneration must be 
reasonable. 
According to a ministerial decree, 
the administration costs (including 
the remuneration for the board 
members) for non-commercial 
foundations must be approved by 
the foundation authorities if they 
exceed 12 % of the yearly gross 
income of the foundation. 
Estonia The remuneration must be 
reasonable. 
no explicit restriction 
Finland The remuneration must be 
reasonable. 
no explicit restriction 
France Traditional foundation: prohibited by 
model statute. 
Endowment fund: no prohibition in 
the legal provisions; under tax laws, 
the remuneration must be limited to 
¾ of the legal minimum salary, 
otherwise the tax-exempt status of 
the fund will be challenged. 
no explicit restriction 
Germany Tax law: the remuneration must be 
reasonable. 
no explicit restriction 
Greece prohibited by foundation law no explicit restriction 
Hungary no explicit restriction no explicit restriction 
Ireland no explicit restriction no explicit restriction 
Italy no explicit restriction no explicit restriction 
Latvia The remuneration must be 
reasonable. 
Public benefit organizations must 
not spend on administration more 
than 25 % of general donations. 
Lithuania no explicit restriction Such limitations have been 
abolished. 
Luxembourg no explicit restriction no explicit restriction 
Malta N/A N/A 
Netherlands no explicit restriction no explicit restriction 
Poland The members of a foundation’s 
audit and supervision body may, for 
the performance of duties in such a 
body, be reimbursed for any 
reasonably incurred costs, or be 
no explicit restriction 
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Country 
Is remuneration of board 
members allowed in civil law and 
in tax law? If remuneration is 
allowed, are there any limits in 
civil law or/and in tax law? 
Is there a maximum amount that 
can be spent on 
office/administration costs in 
civil law and in tax law? 
remunerated at a rate not 
exceeding that specified in Article 8, 
Clause 8 of the Act of Law of March 
3rd 2000, on the remuneration of 
individuals managing certain 
corporate entities 
Portugal N/A N/A 
Romania N/A N/A 
Slovakia Membership in the board shall be 
an honorary position; board 
members are entitled to 
reimbursement of costs and 
expenses incurred by them in the 
course of performance of their 
tasks. 
no explicit restriction 
Slovenia N/A N/A 
Spain 
The board members/trustees 
cannot be paid for being part of the 
governing board. They can be 
remunerated for any other 
professional services provided to 
the foundation. 
The Foundations Regulation (Real 
Decreto 1337/2005) Article 33, 
establishes that “administration 
cost” should not exceed the higher 
of the two following figures: either 
5 % of the foundation equity or 20 
% of the net income of the 
foundation. 
Sweden N/A N/A 
United Kingdom 
Generally no, only under certain 
conditions no explicit restriction 
7.  Administration Costs 
As Chart 5 shows, we can again distinguish between five approaches: 
(1) A few Member States have explicit maximum limits for administration costs in the 
civil law or tax law (Belgium, Latvia, Spain). 
(2) Some Member States have a general clause that the administration cost should be 
“reasonable”, which is more flexible than a maximum limit (e.g., German tax law). 
(3) In the Czech Republic one finds the formal approach, where the statutes must 
contain an explicit maximum limit for administration costs.  
(3) In Denmark there exists a specific procedural requirement: According to a 
ministerial decree, the administration costs (including the remuneration of the board 
members) for non-commercial foundations must be approved by the foundation 
authorities if they exceed 12 % of the yearly gross income of the foundation. 
(4) The majority of the Member States do not have any explicit restriction (e.g., Austria, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Slovakia and the United Kingdom). However, as in the case of remuneration, at 
least in the case of a public benefit foundation, the courts will hardly accept 
unreasonably high administration costs. 
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8.  Removal 
Again the rule seems to be that the founder is free to determine in the statutes in what 
circumstances a board member may be dismissed. Explicit restrictions of that rule are 
rare. In the Netherlands, because of general rules of company law, a special reason 
(good cause) is necessary. A comparable rule exists in Denmark. In Austria and 
Germany, which do not have an explicit restriction, it is a controversial point as to 
whether a special reason (good cause) is needed (in order to protect the autonomy of the 
foundation), or whether the statutes can allow full discretion.  
Note that in certain cases the State supervisory authority has the right to remove a 
member of the board. These rights can be seen as part of State supervision.104  
9.  Supervisory Board and Other Organs of the Foundation 
As Chart 4 shows, most Member States leave it to the founder whether a supervisory 
board is to be established. Only Estonia and Portugal require a supervisory board for all 
foundations, whereas some Member States require a supervisory board only for some 
foundations: greater foundations (Austria, Hungary), public benefit foundations 
(Bulgaria), and banking foundations (Italy). 
10.  No “Formal” Membership 
In the civil law countries, the doctrine is that a foundation does not have a membership. 
This distinguishes a foundation from the legal forms of an association (cf. the traditional 
separation under Roman law between universitas personae and universitas bonorum). 
However, some civil law countries (e.g. Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Denmark) regard the formal distinction between foundations (without members) and 
associations (with members) as a fine one in practice. One reason for this blurring in 
such countries may be that the liberal foundation law allows foundation structures in 
which the founder or the directors have a position more or less comparable to 
membership of a non-profit association (no “formal” membership, but a “quasi-
membership”).  
Rather more complex is the situation in Italy. It is often said that an Italian foundation 
can have “members”. There are basically two different types of foundations that could 
be considered to have such member-like participants: (1) participatory foundations and 
(2) banking foundations. In the first case, these participants can be called “members”, 
“supporters”, or “adherents” of the participatory foundation and normally may take part 
in an assembly of participants that has the right to elect a minority of the members of 
the governing body of the foundation. Concerning the members or associates of 
“foundations of banking origin”, it is noteworthy that their existence is due to the fact 
that some of the entities transformed by the Italian legislation into foundations had 
originally been organised as associations. These foundations are allowed to retain the 
assembly of “members”,105 however, the power of those membership assemblies is 
restricted. For instance, the members in general assembly can elect part of the 
foundation’s governing body – but only a minority. As the comparative view shows, in 
                                                 
104 See C III 4 infra. 
105 Art. 4(1)(d), Legislative Decree no. 153 of 17 May 1999.  
 - 70 -
other countries those rights could also be given to the board of directors or to an 
additional board. Therefore, from a comparative viewpoint, the difference between 
Italian “foundation-members” and board-members in other civil law countries, where a 
foundation cannot have “formal” foundation members, seems to be more conceptual 
than substantive. 
In the common law countries, there is no comparable distinction between “non-profit” 
foundations and associations. Thus in England and Wales a charitable trust as such does 
not have a membership.  
II. Rights of the Founder, Beneficiaries and Third Persons 
1.  Founder 
Most Member States accept that the founder has the possibility of reserving a wide 
range of rights in the statutes (e.g., membership of the Board of Directors, election and 
dismissal of board members, amendment of the statutes).  
However, legally binding information and enforcement rights specifically for founders 
as such (or for subsequent substantial donors) are very rare, and the courts seem to be 
reluctant to uphold them.  
In the UK, the settler of a trust may have enforceable rights. If, because of the charitable 
nature of the trust, what is at issue is the enforcement of a public right, the settler could 
petition the Attorney General to intervene as the guardian of the public interest; 
alternatively, he could apply to the court, provided that the court is satisfied that either 
the Attorney-General has consented to the action or that the petitioner has established 
some special interest beyond that possessed by the public generally. Where the 
enforcement of a private right is at issue, the founder need only persuade the court that 
she/he has a legitimate interest.106 
2. Beneficiaries 
In general, the position of beneficiaries of a public benefit foundation is rather weak in 
all Member States. They are usually not entitled with enforcement rights. 
3. Third Parties 
In most Member States, the legislation on foundations contains no provision for third-
party rights. Usually, third parties are unable to claim any specific rights, because the 
state supervisory authority must act ex officio if there is justification in the form of 
suspicious facts.  
However, in a few Member States (where there is little State supervision) there are also 
provisions concerning “interested” third parties. This is true in the Netherlands, where a 
person with a justified interest (e.g., employee, creditor) is also entitled to invoke State 
supervisory action against the members of the board of directors of the foundation. 
Comparable rules exist in the Czech Republic, Poland, and England and Wales. In 
                                                 
106 Following Re Hampton Fuel Allotment Charity [1988] 2 All E.R. 761 (C.A.) 
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Sweden, a director can be sued by a third party who has suffered a loss caused by the 
director who contravened the foundation act or the foundation deed. 
III. State Supervision 
In all Member States there is a State supervisory authority for foundations. As a rule, 
State supervision is mandatory.  
Usually the State supervisory authority is only allowed to check whether the duties 
imposed by foundation law and/or the statutes are being fulfilled. Consequently, the 
extent of supervision also depends on the extent of these duties. 
Some Member States have two different supervisory systems for different types of 
foundations (e.g., Austria, Sweden). Supervision of foundations established for public 
benefit purposes is generally more extensive in all Member States (extent, degree of 
strictness, competent bodies, etc.).  
Note that tax-exempt foundations are supervised by the tax authorities as regards their 
status as a tax-exempt organization. 
1.  State Supervisory Authority 
A State supervisory authority means a body which monitors foundations and also has 
the necessary competence to protect the foundation by means of preventive supervision 
(e.g., consent for any amendment of the statutes), by enforcing compliance (e.g., legal 
behaviour), or by taking specific measures (e.g., dismissal of a director).  
We can distinguish between three main types of supervision by a State supervisory 
authority: 
(1) Public administrative bodies (e.g., ministries or regional bodies) which have the 
right to monitor the foundation and the power to enforce compliance with the rules 
without the help of a court (i.e., having to apply for a court order). 
(2) Public independent bodies which stand outside the hierarchy of public 
administration and have all necessary competence. This is the solution adopted for 
England and Wales, where the main charity regulator is the Charity Commission. 
(3) Combined supervision by a public administrative body and the court. The 
administrative body monitors, but is not allowed to encroach on, the foundation. 
The court takes any decisions on preventive supervision and enforcement 
measures. However, such a procedure needs first to be applied for by the 
foundation (e.g., for any amendment of the statutes), the monitoring body or some 
other party with an interest in the matter. 
 
Chart 6: State Supervisory Authority 
Country What public body acts as a state supervisory authority? 
Austria 
Public foundation: public administrative body 
Private foundation: court 
Belgium 
Public foundation: ministry and court 
Private foundation: court 
Bulgaria 
Public administrative body (central registry in the ministry of Justice) and 
court 
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Country What public body acts as a state supervisory authority? 
Cyprus Public administrative body (registrar) and court 
Czech 
Republic Registration court 
Denmark Public administrative body (ministry) 
Estonia Combination of a governmental body (ministry) and a court 
Finland Public administrative body (National Board of Patent and Registration) 
France 
Public administrative body (Ministry of Interior for foundations, and 
regional body –préfet- for endowment funds) 
Germany Public administrative body (regional) 
Greece Public administrative body (ministry) 
Hungary Combination of a state prosecutor and a court 
Ireland Public administrative body (ministry)
107 
Italy Public administrative body (regional or ministry) 
Latvia Public administrative body (registrar) 
Lithuania N/A 
Luxembourg Public administrative body (ministry) 
Malta Public administrative body (commissionaire) 
Netherlands Combination of a governmental body (Public Prosecutor) and a court 
Poland Combination of a governmental body (ministry or regional) and a court 
Portugal Combination of a governmental body (ministry or regional) and a court 
Romania Public administrative body (ministry) 
Slovakia Public administrative body (ministry) 
Slovenia Public administrative body (ministry) 
Spain Combination of a governmental body (regional body) and a court 
Sweden Public administrative body (regional) 
United 
Kingdom Public independent body (Charity Commission) 
2. Information and Inquiries 
One part of State supervision is the right to obtain information and to start inquiries. 
a) Provision of Annual Reports and Annual Accounts 
In almost all Member States, the Board of the foundation must send annual reports 
(summarising the nature and purpose of the foundation and the progress of its work) and 
annual accounts (financial statements) to the State supervisory authority as a means of 
preventive supervision. The only exception seems to be the Netherlands. 
                                                 
107 The Charities Bill 2007 currently before the Irish Parliament proposes to establish an independent 
regulator, the Charities Regulatory Authority. 
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b) Special Inquiries 
In some places, we also find the right of the competent public authority to information 
and to inspection of legal acts and documents of the foundation. Supervision is also 
carried out in such a way that the public authority responsible for supervision can 
appoint an auditor (e.g., Slovenia) or a so-called “compulsory manager” (e.g., Poland). 
In certain cases Dutch law has a similar inquiry procedure by which one or more 
external auditors may investigate a foundation and report to the court.108  In the UK, the 
Charity Commission has the power to initiate an inquiry of a charity and generally 
publishes the results of its inquiries on its website. The Commission has a range of 
protective powers often used in inquiries, including the freezing of bank accounts, the 
appointment of an interim manager to run the charity, and the suspension, removal and 
replacement of charity trustees.  
c) Right to Attend at Board Meetings 
In most Member States the representatives of the state supervisory authority do not have 
the right to attend board meeting of a foundation. The exceptions are the traditional 
foundation in France109 (but not the new endowment fund) and Greece.  
3.  Approval for Certain Decisions of the Board of Directors  
Supervision can also be of a preventive nature. Legislation thus specifies that in some 
cases only the approval of the competent public authority is required for certain 
decisions of the governing bodies of the foundation.  
Typical cases are (1) important decisions concerning asset management, (2) conflicts of 
interest, and (3) amendment of the foundation’s statutes - especially its purpose - or the 
liquidation of the foundation.  
4. Enforcement Measures 
In all Member States, there are enforcement rules to ensure that the foundation will 
indeed be able to further its purposes. However, there are different legal and procedural 
requirements. 
IV. Reporting, Transparency and Disclosure 
1.  Annual Reports and Accounts 
Almost all Member States require each foundation to prepare an annual report on its 
activities and annual accounts (sometimes in two separate documents, sometimes 
combined).  
 
                                                 
108 This procedure applies only to foundations that, pursuant to the law on works councils, are obliged to 
have a works council.  
109 Until 2003 at least one-third of the members of the board of directors of a french foundation were 
government officials. Under the revised model statutes, government officials still have the right to attend 
board meetings. 
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Chart 7: Reporting and Accountability 
Country What are the requirements regarding reporting and accountability?  
Austria 
Public foundations: Annual accounts filed with foundation authority.  
Private foundations: Annual accounts reviewed by accountant. Annual 
accounting report to be audited by a certified auditor appointed by the 
court, which has the right to initiate a special investigation. 
Belgium 
Small private foundations, small public utility foundations and large public 
utility foundations: Accounts and annual budgets filed with the commercial 
court.  
Large private foundations: Accounts filed with the National Bank of 
Belgium/Banque Nationale de Belgique. Public utility foundations and 
large private foundations must keep yearly accounts and they must be 
reviewed by statutory auditors.  
Bulgaria 
Annual Activity Report and Accounts submitted to Central Registry at 
Ministry of Justice. 
Large public benefit organizations are subject to an independent audit. 
Annual financial reports to the National Revenue Agency and National 
Statistical Institute. 
Cyprus 
Accounts are fully audited and reports are filed with the relevant 
government departments. 
Czech Republic 
Traditional foundations: Annual report including financial information must 
be filed with the Register Court, and  to supervisory (local tax ) authorities 
upon request. Annual statements have to be verified by an auditor.  
Endowment funds: Annual report and financial information must be filed 
with the Register Court, and to supervisory (local tax) authorities upon 
request. An auditor must be appointed if the annual resources exceed 
3mil. CZK or if endowment fund assets exceed 3mil.CZK 
Denmark 
Non-commercial foundations: Annual reports filed with local tax 
authorities, large foundations need an independent auditor.  
Commercial foundations: Annual accounts using the same principles that 
apply to joint-stock companies.  
Estonia 
A report of financial activities and an auditor’s statement is filed with the 
Registry of Non-Profit Organizations and Foundations.  
Finland 
Accounts and annual reports submitted annually to the registration 
authority.  
Annual income tax returns filed with the taxation authorities, who decide 
on the non-profit status on an annual basis.  
France 
Traditional foundation: Annual report and financial statements filed with 
the administrative authorities. An auditor and a substitute must be 
appointed.  
Endowment funds: Annual report and financial statements filed with the 
administrative authorities. An auditor and a substitute must be appointed if 
the annual resources exceed € 10,000 euros. 
Germany 
Foundations must present annual reports to the relevant state authorities 
or, if they wish to receive tax privileges, to the relevant financial 
authorities.  
Greece 
Financial records are filed, the budget is approved by the Ministry of 
Finance in advance. Annual reports of revenues and expenses are filed 
with the Ministry of Finance and published in local daily press. 
Hungary 
Activity reports need to be filed only by tax-exempt public benefit 
foundations 
Ireland 
Audited accounts must be provided to Revenue Commissioners if annual 
income exceeds € 100,000. 
Italy 
Annual and financial reports must be filed.  
Onlus and banking foundations have to file them with the Onlus 
 - 75 -
Country What are the requirements regarding reporting and accountability?  
Supervision Authority.  
Latvia 
An annual report must be submitted to the tax administration office and to 
the State Register.  
Public benefit foundations also have to submit annual and financial 
reports to the Ministry of Finance. 
Lithuania Activity and financial reports are filed and accounts are audited.  
Luxembourg 
Budgets and annual accounts have to be filed annually with the Ministry of 
Justice. 
Malta Accounts must be kept; no new regulations are expected soon. 
Netherlands Financial records are filed. 
Poland Annual and financial reports are filed with relevant ministries.  
Portugal 
Annual report and accounts must be filed with the government and have 
to be available for review by the tax authorities.  
Romania Annual balance sheet must be submitted to the authorities. 
Slovakia 
Annual report including financial information must be submitted to the 
authorities. 
Slovenia 
Annual report and accounts must be filed with the body competent for 
foundations, which may demand an audit.  
Spain 
Activity reports need to be filed with the relevant authorities. 
An external audit is required for large foundations.  
Sweden 
Larger business foundations: Annual report must be filed. Accounts must 
be audited and sent to the foundation authority.  
Non-business and smaller business foundations: Simple accounts, but 
must also be audited. Reports do not need to be made publicly available. 
United Kingdom 
Annual return filed with the Charity Commission, including annual 
accounts and an annual report. For larger charities a professional audit is 
required. 
2. Disclosure 
Most Member States require disclosure (to the general public) of the annual accounts 
and a report (sometimes in two documents, sometimes combined). In the remaining 
Member States, public disclosure is generally not required by civil law regulations. 
 
Chart 8: Disclosure 
Country What kind of information is made publicly available? 
Austria No obligation to make documents publicly available. 
Belgium 
Original statutes, modification of statutes, decisions of dissolution and 
liquidation, conversion of private foundation into public benefit 
foundation, decision of appointment or revocation of directors or 
modification of their powers should be published in the Belgian official 
Gazette. These documents can be consulted on the web. 
Bulgaria Documents are published and open to the public. 
Cyprus N/A 
Czech Republic Documents are published and open to the public. 
Denmark 
Non-commercial foundations: Reports do not need to be made publicly 
available.  
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Country What kind of information is made publicly available? 
Commercial foundations: Annual accounts are made publicly available. 
Estonia Reports are made publicly available upon request. 
Finland Reports and accounts are publicly available upon request. 
France 
Traditional foundations receiving annual gifts of at least € 153,000 or 
receiving financial support from public authorities have to make their 
annual reports and financial reports publicly available.  
Endowment funds have to make their annual reports and financial 
reports publicly available.  
Germany Reports do not need to be made publicly available. 
Greece 
Annual reports of revenues and expenses are published in local daily 
press. 
Hungary 
Activity reports need to be made publicly available only by tax-exempt 
public benefit foundations. 
Ireland 
Accounts information is available to the public through the Companies 
Registration Office. Foundations set up as trusts do not file annual 
returns and their accounts are not available to the public.  
Italy Reports do not need to be made publicly available. 
Latvia 
No general obligation for foundations to publicise their reports. 
Reports of public benefit foundations are published on website of the 
Ministry of Finance. 
Lithuania Reports are available to the public. 
Luxembourg Budgets and accounts are published in the Mémorial (official gazette). 
Malta N/A 
Netherlands Larger commercial foundations have to publish their records. 
Poland Annual and financial reports are made available to the public. 
Portugal Reports do not need to be made publicly available. 
Romania N/A 
Slovakia The auditor's report is published in the official Commercial Journal. 
Slovenia Annual report and accounts do not need to be made publicly available. 
Spain Documents have to be made available to the public. 
Sweden 
Larger business foundations: Annual report must be made available to 
the public. 
Non-business and smaller business foundations: Reports do not need to 
be made publicly available. 
United Kingdom Annual accounts and annual report  
3.  Auditor 
In some Member States an external auditor is generally necessary (Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden.  
In other Member States, an audit is necessary only for larger foundations (Belgium110, 
Czech Republic111 Bulgaria112, Hungary113, Spain114, United Kingdom115 and France as 
                                                 
110 Subjection to auditing depends, in particular, on whether two out of three criteria are met: 50 
employees, € 6,250,000 total receipts, € 3,125,000 total balance sheet. 
111 An auditor must be appointed if the annual resources exceed CZK 3,000,000.  
112 See Art. 39, §.3, Bulgarian Act on non-Profit Legal Entities 2000: “Any non-profit legal entity 
pursuing activities for public benefit, and which is registered with the Central Registry at the Ministry of 
Justice, shall be subject to an independent audit under the Accountancy Law if it exceeds at least one of 
the following thresholds: (a) balance sheet assets total from the preceding year – BGN 500,000; (b) total 
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regards endowment funds116), or for certain kinds of foundations (Austrian private 
foundations, Danish commercial foundations and French traditional foundations). In 
Romania, an auditor or an auditing committee is needed. 
In the remaining twelve Member States an auditor is not required. 
D. Formation, Liquidation and Fundamental Decisions 
I. Formation 
There are different approaches as to how to establish a foundation, and in some Member 
States there are different procedures for different types of foundation (e.g., Austria, 
Belgium).  
Usually three requirements have to be fulfilled in all Member States:  
(1) The creation of a foundation deed,  
(2) The creation of a draft of the foundation’s statutes, and  
(3) Founding assets.  
In order to establish the foundation as a separate legal entity, usually at least a certain 
public act is required and in many Member States the foundation will be registered. 
1. Foundation Deed 
a) If the foundation is established inter vivos, several Member States require the 
foundation deed of a specific form. We distinguish three different solutions: 
(1) Most Member States require the form of a public deed by a notary public 
(Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain).  
(2) Several other Member States only require a written declaration (Finland,117 
France,118 Germany, Hungary). 
(3) In England and Wales and Ireland making the declaration in writing is not 
always required in order to create a charitable trust.  
b) If the foundation is established mortis causa, the legally required form for a “last will 
and testament” is usually accepted in all Member States. An exception is Dutch law and 
Belgian law, which only accept a testament in the form of a public deed. This unusual 
                                                                                                                                               
of the revenue for the activity and the net revenue from sales, together with that of the preceding year – 
BGN 1,000,000.” (BGN 1,000,000 equal approx. € 510,000) 
113 If the annual income exceeds HUF 60 million (approx. € 200.000). 
114 Subjection to auditing depends, in particular, on whether two out of three criteria are met: (1) the value 
of assets exceeds € 2,400,000; (2) the total gross income of a financial year stemming from all activities, 
including the economic ones, exceeds € 2,400,000, (3) the average number of employees of the 
foundation exceeds 50.  
115 Subject to size exemptions in the Charities Act 1993, s.43, and Companies Act 1985, ss.249A-249E. 
116 Subjection to auditing depends on whether the total resources of a financial year exceeds € 10,000. 
117 The signature of the founder must be attested by two persons. 
118 Under certain conditions, a notarial act for the initial donation is necessary because of the general 
rules for donations. 
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restriction is a logical consequence of the fact that only the notary controls the 
establishment of the foundation.119 
2. Foundation Statutes 
Typically, all laws have minimum requirements for the statutes of a foundation, which 
are rather similar. All Member States require the distinctive characteristics of the 
foundation, such as the name, the purpose and the address, to be set out.  
3. Founding Assets  
Greater differences exist regarding the question of whether a certain minimum of 
founding assets is necessary. 
There are three main solutions: 
(1) In a few Member States, law imposes a specific amount (e.g., the Czech traditional 
foundation120 and the Austrian private foundation121).  
(2) In other Member States, the law does not require a specific initial amount, but 
requires the capital to be adequate for the fulfilment of the purpose. In some Member 
States, the competent State authority will only accept that the assets of the foundation 
are adequate if amounting to a specified value.122 Sometimes administrative practice 
can be comparably strict (e.g., France as regards traditional foundations).  
                                                
(3) In a third group of Member States, founding assets are not required (e.g., Estonia, 
the Netherlands and Poland, or only in a symbolic form (e.g., in the common law 
Member States a trust can be established with £1). Also the newly introduced French 
endowment fund seems to be possible without founding assets.123 However, even in the 
Member States of this group a foundation may be dissolved by court order if it lacks the 
means to achieve its purpose and there are no prospects of means in the future.  
Please note that several Member States have different rules for different types of 
foundations (e.g., Austria, Czech Republic,124 Denmark,125 France,126 Malta, 
Romania,127 Hungary,128 Sweden129).  
 
119 See D I 4 infra. 
120 CZK 500,000 (ca. € 20,000). 
121 € 70,000. 
122 A compromise between solution (1) and (2) can be found in Spanish law: foundations require an initial 
endowment that may consist of any type of assets but must be adequate and sufficient to fulfil the 
foundation’s purpose. The law presumes that an endowment of € 30,000 is sufficient. If the endowment is 
of smaller value, the founders have to justify that it is adequate and sufficient by presenting a program of 
activities and an economic report that provides evidence that the foundation can be operationally viable 
with these resources. 
123 The wording of the law does not provide for any minimum for founding assets. However, there might 
be additional legislation in future. 
124 A Czech endowment fund only needs a symbolic initial endowment. 
125 DKK 250,000 (ca. € 33,500) for a non-commercial foundation, and DKK 300,000 (ca. € 40,000) for a 
commercial foundation. 
126 Traditional foundations and endowment funds. 
127 According to Art. 15, §. 2, Romanian Ordinance on Associations and Foundations 2000, the value of 
the initial endowment of the foundation should be at least 100 times the minimum gross salary specified 
for the national economy as at the date when the foundation is established. According to Art. 15, §. 3, 
Romanian Ordinance on Associations and Foundations 2000, a foundation that raises funds for another 
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Chart 9: Founding Assets 
Country Does the law stipulate 
a minimum capital 
requirement for the 
establishment of a 
foundation?  
Do the founding assets 
have to be sufficient to 
fulfil the purposes of 
the foundation?  
In practice, do the 
competent public 
authorities require a 
minimum amount as 
capital for the 
establishment of a 
foundation?  





Private foundations: no 
no 
Belgium no Public foundations: yes 
Private foundations: no 
Public foundations: 
€ 25,000  
Private foundations: 
no 
Bulgaria no no no 
Cyprus no no no 
Czech Republic Traditional foundations: 
CZK 500,000 (ca. € 
20,000)131  




250,000 (ca. € 33,500). 
Commercial 
foundations: DKK 
300,000 (ca. € 40,000) 
no no 
Estonia no no no 
Finland € 25,000  yes no 




Only for traditional 
foundations: 
€ 1,000,000  
Germany no yes € 50,000  
Greece no yes no 
Hungary no yes ca. € 400- € 2,000  
                                                                                                                                               
foundation or association need only have an initial endowment of 20 times the minimum gross salary 
specified for the national economy. 
128 Thus, foundations can be either "open" foundations, where the founder has permitted other donors to 
contribute to the assets of the foundation by joining the foundation, or "closed" foundations where the 
founder has prohibited this possibility in the foundation’s statutes. A “closed” foundation needs enough 
assets to achieve its aims (see § 74/A, para. 1, clause 3, Hungarian Civil Code: “A foundation shall 
provide sufficient assets for achieving its objectives”), while an “open” foundation should have assets to 
at least a value sufficient for the commencement of its operations (§ 74/B, para. 4, Hungarian Civil Code). 
129 A foundation normally also needs sufficient assets to promote the foundation’s purpose. However, 
there also exists a special type of fundraising foundation which does not require initial capital and for 
which special provision is made in the Foundation Act. 
130 For an endowment fund a minimum capital is not required. 
131 For an endowment fund the founding assets do not have to be sufficient. 
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Country Does the law stipulate 
a minimum capital 
requirement for the 
establishment of a 
foundation?  
Do the founding assets 
have to be sufficient to 
fulfil the purposes of 
the foundation?  
In practice, do the 
competent public 
authorities require a 
minimum amount as 
capital for the 
establishment of a 
foundation?  
Ireland no no no 
Italy no yes € 100,000  
Latvia no no no 
Lithuania no N/A N/A 
Luxembourg no yes ca. € 100,000 (also 
depends on the aim of 
the foundation) 
Malta ca. € 240 for social 
purpose foundations 
and € 1,200 for other 
foundations 
no no 
Netherlands no no no 
Poland no  N/A If foundation is 
planning economic 
activities ca. € 265 is 
required. 
Portugal no yes € 250,000 
Romania At least 100 times the 
minimum gross salary 
in the national economy 
on the date of creation 
no no 
Slovakia SKK 200,000 (ca. € 
6,600) 
no no 
Slovenia no N/A N/A 
Spain € 30,000 is normally 
presumed sufficient. 
yes no 
Sweden no yes, unless it is an 
fundraising foundation 
no 
United Kingdom no no no 
4. Formation Procedure  
With respect to the formation procedure, the participation of a public authority usually 
is necessary.  
We distinguish between five different solutions: 
(1) The traditional way of establishing a foundation was discretionary State approval. 
Meanwhile only a few Member States still have this solution (France for traditional 
foundations, Greece and Luxembourg).  
(2) In a number of Member States, official approval is not discretionary, but the State 
supervisory body must approve the formation if the legal requirements are met (State 
approval without discretion). Examples of this solution are Germany and Spain.  
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(3) What is intrinsic to official approval without discretion is a registration system to 
enable the registration authority (usually a court) to check that the legal requirements 
are met.132 However, a frequent difference between approval by an administrative body 
without discretion and the registration system is that the administrative body is often 
also involved in the ongoing supervision of the foundation, whereas the registration 
authority is not. This solution can be found in a relative majority of the Member States 
(e.g., Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania).  
(4) Less often there is no monitoring by a court or an administrative body, but the form 
of a public deed is necessary. The notary public must ensure that the legal requirements 
are met. Examples of this solution are Belgium and the Netherlands.133 
(5) In a few Member States it is possible to establish a foundation as a legal entity 
without any formal public act (e.g., Sweden134). In England and Wales and Ireland, 
charitable trusts can come into existence without any kind of State action. However, the 
trust as such is not a separate legal entity.135 
The nature of State authorisation is very different. Examples are Germany, where the 
law of the Province in which the foundation is to be domiciled determines the 
competent public authority. In Slovenia, it is the ministry most closely connected with 
the foundation’s purpose. In Finland, approval is needed from the National Board of 
Patents and Registration, which also maintains the register. 
 
Chart 10: Formation Procedure 
Country Is State approval 
required for the 
establishment of a 
foundation? 
Is registration with a 
public authority required 
for the establishment of 
a foundation? 
Discretion of the 
public authority 
Austria Public foundations: yes. 
Private foundations: no 
yes no 
Belgium Public benefit 
foundations: yes. 
Private foundations: no 
yes, court registration no 
Bulgaria no yes, court registration no 
Cyprus yes yes yes 
Czech Republic no yes, court registration no 
Denmark no yes, State registration no 
Estonia no yes, State registration no 
Finland yes yes, State registration no 
                                                 
132 There is a traditional distinction between a concession system, where State approval is required, and a 
normative system, where a public body enters the organisation in a register if the legal requirements are 
met. However, the concession system is only functionally the opposite of the normative system where the 
State authority has discretion. 
133 Note that in some Member States a notarial deed (as an additional form requirement) is necessary in 
order to create a separate legal entity. 
134 Some foundations have to register, but the registration is a consequence of the existence of a 
foundation. 
135 Note also that in England and Wales most charities are required to register with the Charity 
Commission; however, this registration is not a prerequisite for the existence of the institution itself. 
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Country Is State approval 
required for the 
establishment of a 
foundation? 
Is registration with a 
public authority required 
for the establishment of 
a foundation? 
Discretion of the 
public authority 
France Traditional foundation: 
yes 
Endowment fund: no 
Traditional foundation: 
yes, State registration 
Endowment fund: yes, 






Germany yes no, only informal lists no 
Greece yes yes, state registration yes 
Hungary no yes, court registration no 
Ireland no no136 no 
Italy yes yes, State registration no 
Latvia no yes, State registration no 
Lithuania no yes, court registration no 
Luxembourg yes yes, State registration yes; with judicial 
review 
Malta Only if the foundation is 
to be registered as a 
voluntary organization 
Only if the foundation is to 
be registered as a 
voluntary organization 
N/A 
Netherlands no yes, registration in the 
Register of Commerce  
no 
Poland no yes, court registration no 
Portugal yes yes,  N/A 
Romania no yes, court registration no 
Slovakia no yes, State registration no 
Slovenia yes yes, State registration no 
Spain yes yes, State registration no 
Sweden no generally no137 no 
United Kingdom Charity Commission 
approval is required. 
Most foundations have to 




As Chart 10 shows, most Member States require foundations to be registered. Note that 
registration is sometimes independent of the acquisition of legal personality. 
II. Amendment of a Foundation’s Purpose and Statutes 
In company law, general meetings of the members (who effectively retain ongoing 
founders’ rights, being the ultimate owners) decide all fundamental questions of their 
company, thus counterbalancing the power of the board of directors. As a foundation 
                                                 
136 If a charity number is required for tax purposes, the foundation must register with the Revenue 
Commissioners. 
137 Some foundations must register with the supervision authority, but registration is not a prerequisite for 
establishment. 
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does not have this facility, some other body with the competence to be able to decide 
fundamental questions of the foundation needs to be found. 
1. Procedure of Amendment 
In all Member States, amendment of the purpose of a foundation, and of its statutes in 
other respects, is possible under prescribed conditions.  
Four different ways can be distinguished. Please note that these procedures can be 
alternative or cumulative in the different Member States. 
(1) In many Member States, amendment or modification of the statutes is possible if a 
majority of the board of directors of the foundation votes for it and the State supervisory 
authority approves the modification as being in line with the founder’s intentions (e.g., 
Germany, Latvia, Luxembourg, Austria and Belgium as regards public foundations, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland and  France as regards traditional foundations,). In 
Lithuania a notary approval is necessary. 
In some Member States, an amendment of the purpose is permitted only under qualified 
conditions. Examples are Portugal, where the purpose must not be amended 
substantially, and Finland, where an amendment of the purpose is only possible if the 
statutory purpose is (a) impossible, (b) very difficult, (c) totally or essentially useless 
because of the low value of the assets or another reason, or (d) against the law or good 
practice.  
(2) Some Member States also allow in some cases an amendment by the board of 
directors without an approval of the State supervisory authority (e.g., Bulgaria, Italy, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Poland).  
(3) A few Member States permit the founder herself/himself to be authorised in the 
statutes to amend those statutes without public intervention (Austria as regards private 
foundations, Hungary in certain cases,138 Ireland, United Kingdom139). In Bulgaria the 
reservation of a veto right is possible. 
(4) Where there is fundamental cause for doing so, some Member States empower the 
State supervisory authority to amend the purpose or administrative statutes of a 
foundation without the consent of the foundation’s governing body, although sometimes 
the intervention of the court is required (e.g., Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland), while other Member 
States do not empower the State supervisory authority (e.g., Finland, France, Hungary, 
Luxembourg).  
Please note that in several Member States there seems to be legal uncertainty whether 
the founder may be authorised in the statutes to amend those statutes, whether the 
founder may amend the conditions for an amendment of a competent organ, and/or 
whether the founder may authorise other organs or third persons to amend the statutes 
(e.g., Estonia, Germany, Slovakia, Spain). 
                                                 
138 Aim and assets cannot be amended. 
139 The prior consent of the Charity Commission is required for any alteration of the purposes of a charity 
or of the provisions in its constitution concerning the application of assets on its dissolution or the 
provision of benefit to any trustees or members. 
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2. Particularity of the Purpose 
Related to the amendment of the purpose is the particularity of the purpose. An 
amendment of the purpose becomes more important, the more the purpose is/has to be 
described in a particular way.  
Some Member States leave it to the founder whether the foundation should have a broad 
purpose or a narrow purpose (e.g., United Kingdom). In other Member States, the law 
requires a more particular description (e.g., Denmark). The justification for that is 
usually that too broad a discretion given to the board of directors as regards the 
fulfilment of the foundation’s purpose would conflict with the concept of the foundation 
as a “servant” of the founder’s will.  
3. Liquidation 
Three different solutions are to be found. 
(1) Some Member States require the assets of the terminated foundation to be 
transferred to a foundation with similar purposes in compliance with the original 
intentions of the founder (the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovenia, 
Austria for public benefit foundations, and Belgium and Bulgaria for public benefit 
foundations,). This accords with the established principle under common law for the 
variation of charitable trusts, the so-called cy-près rule or doctrine – an obscure 
Norman-French term meaning “the next best thing” (Cyprus, United Kingdom).  
(2) In other Member States the remaining assets must be transferred to another public 
benefit institution for a public benefit purpose (Denmark, France, Lithuania, Slovakia, 
Spain). 
(3) A third group of Member States leave it to the founder to determine in the statutes 
what is to be done with the residual assets. In some Member States, the founder may 
even stipulate that the remaining endowment of a (non-tax-exempt) foundation is to 
revert back to herself/himself. This is especially important in Member States where the 
founder can reserve the right to dissolve the foundation without showing any special 
cause (e.g., Austria for private foundations, Bulgaria for private foundations, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia for private foundations, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal). But note that in these Member States tax-exemption will generally 
only be granted if the statutes provide that on termination of the foundation the 
remaining assets will be used for another tax-exempt purpose and that the transfer may 
be taxed according to the gift tax laws. 
E. Activities of the Foundation 
I. Activities for the Promotion of the Foundation’s Purpose – Timely Disbursement 
The question of adequate distribution for public benefit activities is usually regarded as 
a matter of tax law. For foundations that are not tax-exempt, only rather vague rules 
normally seem to apply, thus specifying ultimate distribution, but not the precise point 
in time. 
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1. Foundation Law Rules 
European civil law governing foundations is rarely explicit on distribution rules.  
The only Member State which seems to have a strict rule under foundation law is 
Spain,140 where a foundation must pay out at least 70 % of its net annual income for the 
furtherance of the foundation’s public benefit purpose. The law makes the pay-out 
requirement somewhat flexible by allowing up to four years for the distribution, starting 
from the end of the financial year in which the income is obtained.  
Another restriction is on the accumulation of income, the reason being to promote 
distributions. While in tax law some Member States have such rules, in civil law there 
are usually no - or only very vague - rules. For example, some Member States allow a 
foundation (as regards civil law) to accumulate capital as long as that is not its very 
purpose (“Verbot der Selbstzweckstiftung”) (see, e.g., Austria, Germany).  
2. Tax Law Rules 
In tax law there are different approaches. 
(1) Only in comparatively few Member States are there explicit limits for what is 
deemed an adequate distribution. In Finland, Germany and in Spain, generally 70 % of 
the annual net income has to be distributed.141 In Lithuania, donations should be 
used/spent during period of three years, otherwise they will be treated as taxable 
income. 
(2) Most Member States do not have explicit rules. Again the lack of explicit rules does 
not necessarily mean that the tax authorities and the courts would accept any 
accumulation. Unreasonably excessive accumulations may be regarded as an 
infringement of the general rule that a tax-exempt foundation has to promote its public 
benefit purpose. 
In order to exemplify the different approaches, the country experts were asked whether 
they believe that the civil law/tax law of their country would accept that a foundation 
accumulates its income for five years and only makes distributions on the sixth towards 
its public benefit purpose.. The country experts of the Member States where no explicit 
rules exist believe that such an accumulation for a limited period may generally be 
tolerated by state supervision authorities and tax authorities. 
II. Administration of Assets 
Apart from the distribution rules some Member States also have other rules concerning 
the administration of the foundation’s assets.  
1. Rule of Capital Maintenance 
It is generally accepted that the founder can prescribe capital maintenance in the 
statutes.  
                                                 
140 An explanation for this is probably that a Spanish foundation will usually receive tax benefits, and it is 
noteworthy that in a tax law context such rules can be found more frequently. 
141 The tax authorities may accept an accumulation, if there is a specific justification, e.g., in order to 
finance a specific capital project (e.g., the construction or improvement of a building) in due time.  
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Another question is whether the foundation’s statutes require such a rule. In most 
Member States this is not seen to be the case as the founder is entitled to prescribe that 
the foundation may spend down its capital in due time. Only in Slovakia, for Austrian 
public foundations, and Czech traditional foundations does legislation require the 
foundation to maintain a prescribed minimum capital which is comparatively low.142 
2. Investment Rules 
Most foundation laws of the Member States do not contain specific investment rules.  
If there are such rules at all they are usually very general and vague. Examples of such 
general rules can be found in Finland and Germany, where the law states that there 
should be a secure and profitable investment of the foundation’s assets. 
More detailed rules can only be found for Czech traditional foundations and for Italian 
banking foundations, and are issued by decree for French endowment funds. In 
Lithuania, the assets of the foundation must be maintained in credit institutions. 
Again the lack of specific investment rules in most countries does not mean that the 
board members have total discretion in how to invest the assets of the foundation. In all 
Member States, a visit to the gambling house will very probably be regarded as a 
violation of a general investment rule, even if there is no explicit prohibition to invest in 
this way.  
3. Approval of Certain Transactions by the State Supervisory Authority 
Apart from the capital preservation rule (but often related to it), some jurisdictions 
restrict the acquisition, investment or disposition of assets by requiring administrative 
approval.143 
4. Administration Costs 
See supra C I 7. 
5. Restrictions on the Ownership of Corporations 
See infra E III 2. 
III. Economic Activities (Trading) 
A permanent trading activity is one where the trader provides goods or services on a 
continuing basis in return for valuable consideration on an economic basis. 
A foundation could have various reasons for wishing to undertake such economic 
activities. 
– The economic activity may be a means of furthering the public benefit purpose 
(related economic activity). 
                                                 
142 Czech Republic: CZK 500,000 (ca. € 20,000), Slovakia: SKK 200,000 (ca. € 6,600), Austria: 
“sufficient” assets, see D I 3 supra. 
143 See C III 3 supra. 
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– The economic activity may be merely a source of profit that can be used to 
further the public benefit purpose of the foundation (unrelated economic 
activity). 
– The founder may wish to use the legal form of the foundation as a shelter to 
preserve and maintain control over an enterprise for the future.144  
The question of trading by foundations is resolved in different ways. We should 
distinguish between (1) the scope of the permitted trading and (2) the conditions 
imposed on the foundation involved in it (e.g. registration in the commercial register, 
accounting, etc.). 
1. Scope of the Permitted Economic Activities by Foundations 
a) In civil law, some Member States allow a foundation to trade without special 
restriction, whereas other Member States restrict its economic activities in one way or 
another. The reasons for restrictions are sometimes creditor protection, sometimes 
protection of the assets of the foundation, because such economic activity is inherently 
more risky than investment. 
We find three main solutions:  
(1) In some Member States there is no restriction at all. One example is the 
Netherlands where one can find many foundations expressly carrying on trading 
activities. The traditional view is that the creditors are protected sufficiently by the 
non-distribution constraint. However, there is a tendency in modern legislation to 
make general provision for all organizations undertaking economic activities. 
(2) In other Member States, any trading must be subordinated to the foundation’s 
public benefit purpose, in the sense that trade is allowed only when it directly 
furthers or facilitates that purpose and when any profit is not the foundation’s main 
aim in undertaking the activity (Nebenzweckprivileg). One example of this are 
Spanish foundations which may only develop economic activities of their own if 
these activities directly further the foundation’s purpose or are complementary or 
ancillary to it, provided in both cases that the rules on fair trading are respected. 
This rule, therefore, permits trading not only as a subordinated or ancillary activity, 
but also as its main activity, provided that its object in doing so can be considered 
to be the promotion of a public benefit purpose (e.g., economic activities in the 
culture or health sectors). 
(3) Two Member States are even stricter. Malta, as a rule, prohibits a foundation 
from any direct trading, permitting only a few trading activities in the context of 
fundraising. In addition, in the Czech Republic neither a Foundation nor an 
Endowment Fund is allowed to carry out direct trading. But note that the Czech 
public benefit institution (which is very similar to a foundation) is allowed to carry 
out ancillary trading. 
                                                 
144 As already stated, only a few Member States permit the establishment of a foundation which has as its 
only purpose to preserve and maintain control over an enterprise (“enterprise purpose foundation”)., see B 
IV 3 c supra. 
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Denmark has different rules for different types of foundations: In a non-commercial 
foundation only ancillary trading is allowed, whereas for commercial foundations there 
is no restriction. 
b) As regards tax law, the profits of unrelated economic activities are usually subject to 
income tax in order to avoid an unfair advantage in competition with taxable 
enterprises. 
 
Chart 11: Economic Activities 
Country Are economic activities 
permitted if the profits are used 
for the foundation’s purpose? 
Is income from economic 
activities145 taxed? 
Austria Public foundations: yes, if within 
the objectives of the public benefit 
foundation.  
Private foundations: yes, if they 
are purpose-related and ancillary.
yes 
Belgium yes, even unrelated activities, if 
they have a non-profit purpose. 
no, as long as they remain ancillary 
Bulgaria yes, if they are purpose-related 
and ancillary 
yes 
Cyprus yes, even unrelated no, if related to the purpose 
Czech Republic Generally no, but some 
exceptions exist (real estate 
leases and organizing lotteries, 
raffles, public collections, cultural, 
social, sport and educational 
events) 
No, but only up to CZK 300,000 (€ 
12,000) and economic activities are 
only allowed in a few cases. 
Denmark Yes, even non-commercial 
foundations may have small -
scale economic activities, at a 
larger scale they are considered 
commercial foundations. 
yes 
Estonia yes, even unrelated  No, unless it is being distributed 
outside the foundation. 
Finland Yes, but only if it is stipulated in 
foundation statutes/bylaws and 
this activity is ancillary and 
purpose-related. 
No, but unrelated economic activities 
are taxed. 
France Yes, provided they support the 
public benefit purpose of the 
foundation. 
Yes, if not ancillary (i.e., 
corresponding income is less than € 
60,000). 
Germany yes, even unrelated No, but unrelated economic activities 
are taxed if they exceed € 35,000.  
Greece Yes, if they are purpose-related. No, but net real property rental 
income and net income from 
securities is taxed. 
Hungary Yes, if they are purpose-related. Yes, tax free only up to HUF 10 
million (approximately € 41,000). For 
priority public benefit foundations, 
the threshold is 20 million HUF 
(approximately € 82,000). 
                                                 
145 An economic activity is one where the trader provides goods or services on a continuing basis in return 
for valuable consideration on an economic basis 
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Country Are economic activities 
permitted if the profits are used 
for the foundation’s purpose? 
Is income from economic 
activities145 taxed? 
Ireland Yes, if they are purpose-related 
or carried out by beneficiaries. 
(Charities are allowed to engage 
in economic activity so long as 
this is directly in pursuance of 
their objectives, or provided the 
activity is carried out by people 
who are the intended 
beneficiaries of the foundation.) 
No, as long as they support 
charitable purposes. 
Italy Yes, if ancillary and not in conflict 
with foundation's objectives. 
Onlus: only specific institutional 
activities, banking foundations: 
related activities only 
yes, except for some tax exemptions 
received by Onlus foundations 
Latvia yes, even unrelated no 
Lithuania Yes, profits have to be used for 
the foundation's purpose. 
no, but only up to an annual profit of 
€ 300,000 
Luxembourg Yes, but this must not be the 
primary goal of the foundation. 
yes 
Malta Generally no, only limited trading 
activities in the context of 
fundraising are allowed. However, 
foundations may hold commercial 
property in a passive manner, 
receive rents, dividends and 
royalties. 
yes 
Netherlands yes, if they are related to the 
purpose. 
yes 
Poland Yes, even unrelated yes 
Portugal yes, even unrelated. No, but unrelated economic activities 
are taxed. 
Romania Yes, if they are ancillary and 
purpose-related. 
Yes, if it exceeds € 15,000. 
Slovakia No, but some exceptions exist 
(leasing out real estate and 
organizing cultural, educational, 
social or sports events) . 
Yes, but only limited activities in line 
with the purpose are allowed and 
exempt. 
Slovenia Yes, but income from them must 
be limited to less than 30 % of all 
income. 
yes 
Spain Yes, if they are purpose-related 
or ancillary. Any other type of 
economic activity has to be 
carried out through a 
shareholding/holding structure. 
No, if they support foundation's 
purpose and are ancillary and 
complementary in nature. 
Sweden yes yes 
United Kingdom Yes, if purpose-related; unrelated 
activities only at small scale. 
Otherwise they have to establish 
a for-profit subsidiary trading 
company. 
No, if income for related economic 
activity and ancillary economic 
activity 
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2. Subsidiary Trading Companies 
Most Member States allow that a foundation establishes a subsidiary trading company. 
A prohibition only exists in Lithuania, Slovenia, and (with certain exceptions) in the 
Czech Republic. 
In the Member States which restrict direct trading activities by a foundation establishing 
a trading subsidiary company in order to conduct economic activities can often be an 
alternative. Examples are England and Wales, Malta and Greece, where a foundation 
can in principle undertake direct economic activities where this is in accordance with its 
statutes, but because of the strict budget rules for foundations a foundation itself does 
not usually undertake any trading in practice but does so through a subsidiary 
company146. 
 
Chart 12: Shareholding 
Country 
Is majority shareholding by 
public benefit foundations in 
companies permitted? 
Is majority shareholding by public 
benefit foundations in companies 
taxed? 
Austria Public foundations: no 
Private foundations: yes, if they 
are not extensively involved in the 
management of the company. 
No. If the foundation invests its 
assets in resident company shares 
or participation, the dividends are not 
taxed. 
Belgium yes Dividends are taxed with the tax on 
legal entities (25 % or 15 %). 
Bulgaria yes yes 
Cyprus yes no 
Czech Republic probably no (but few exceptions) N/A 
Denmark Yes, but then they are governed 
under a separate act as a 
commercial foundation. 
No, dividends from Danish 
companies in which the foundation 
holds at least 15 % of the shares are 
exempt. If the foundation holds a 
substantial majority of shares, the 
income of the company for tax 
purposes is treated as income of the 
foundation. 
Estonia yes no 
Finland yes No, major shareholding is not 
considered to be economic activity 
and is tax-exempt. 
France Yes, if it is in line with the 
foundation's purpose 
 
No, but "influential" shareholding is. 
Germany yes no, but "influential" shareholding is. 
Greece yes no 
Hungary yes no 
Ireland yes No, as long as it is in support of 
charitable purposes. 
Italy Yes, but foundations of banking 
origin: only for instrumental 
enterprises. Onlus: only in 
companies active in certain fields.
yes 
                                                 
146 Georgakopoulos, in Hopt/ Reuter (eds.), Stiftungsrecht in Europa, p. 359, 362. 
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Country 
Is majority shareholding by 
public benefit foundations in 
companies permitted? 
Is majority shareholding by public 
benefit foundations in companies 
taxed? 
Latvia yes no 
Lithuania No. Foundations' assets must be 
maintained in credit institutions. 
N/A 
Luxembourg Yes, if related to the main 
objectives of the foundation. 
Yes, if qualifying as 
commercial/industrial activity (which 
is unlikely). 
Malta yes yes 
Netherlands yes No, but "influential" shareholding is. 
Poland yes no 
Portugal yes no 
Romania yes yes 
Slovakia yes yes 
Slovenia no N/A 
Spain yes no 
Sweden yes yes 
United Kingdom yes no 
3. Regulation of Permitted Economic Activities 
Some Member States apply some or all of the standards for business corporations to 
foundations whose dominant activities are economic. There are several solutions: 
(a) A few Member States have special rules for foundations undertaking economic 
activities (including standards comparable to those of a business organization). The 
clearest example of this solution is the Danish approach of having two acts for 
foundations: For those qualifying as commercial foundations,147 a number of 
special rules apply with regard to, for example, the capital of the foundation, the 
governance of the foundation, and employee representation. A commercial 
foundation is subject to the same rules with respect to accounting and auditing that 
apply to small and medium-sized public and private limited companies. If a 
commercial foundation ceases its business activities, it can change its status so that 
it comes under the rules for non-commercial foundations. Some of the other 
Member States also make special provision in their foundation law to cover 
Commercial Foundations (e.g., Sweden).  
                                                 
147 According to § 1, para. 2, Act on Enterprise Foundations 1985, a foundation is considered to be an 
enterprise foundation if it (1) provides goods or intangible rights, services or the like for which the 
undertaking normally receives consideration, or (2) carries on business by selling real property or letting 
out real property for rent, or (3) has control of a public or private limited company as set out in § 2, para. 
2 of the Companies Act (see paras. 4 and 5 thereof) or of another undertaking carrying on business as in 
(1) or (2) above (parent foundation), or (4) exercises a dominant influence over another undertaking 
pursuant to its statutes, bylaws or articles or by agreement with it and has a substantial share in its 
operating profit or loss without having control as in (3) above. The foundation is not, however, considered 
to be an enterprise foundation if the activities of the subsidiary company are of limited scope or if the 
holding that comprises a controlling interest only constitutes a minor part of the net assets of the 
foundation. 
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(b) In other Member States, the rules of commercial law are applicable to 
foundations involved in economic activities. A clear example of this approach is in 
the Netherlands. Modern legislation has developed different legal rules, regulating 
economic activities regardless of the legal form. Examples are registration in the 
commercial register, special inquiries and accounting matters.  
IV. Cross-Border Activities 
See infra Part 4 B. 
F. Overview: Basic Features of Tax Law 
I. Introduction 
Tax aspects are crucial for both the evaluation of the current financial situation of 
foundations in Europe and for any further development on the EC level. According to 
the design of the feasibility study as required by the Commission, however, tax aspects 
shall be covered only in connection with the analysis of the present situation. Taking 
into consideration the requirement of unanimity of all members of the ECOFIN Council 
(Art. 94 EC, read in connection with Art. 95 (2) EC), there is but a minimal chance to 
enact uniform tax rules for European foundations and/or their donors. 
Tax law functions both as an incentive and a disincentive for (potential) donors, but it 
has also a significant impact on the investments of the foundations as such. This is 
mainly true for income taxation on both levels (foundation, donor) but it also applies to 
other types of taxes. Most types of taxes (including income tax on both levels) are not 
subject to much harmonization. An important exception applies to Value-Added Tax 
(VAT) which has been fully harmonised. 
The following overview collects a set of basic tax rules which can be found, in one way 
or the other, in most Member States.148 
Although the domestic tax systems of all 27 Member States vary considerably, some 
common features may well be identified. All states have introduced income taxes which 
apply both to corporations (including foundations) and individuals (including donors). 
In most Member States, privileges on both levels are provided for non-profit activities 
of a charitable character. Most, but not all, Member States levy inheritance and/or estate 
taxes which, too, are of tremendous relevance for foundations. 
II. Income Taxation  
Most Member States impose separate income taxes on individuals (personal income tax) 
and on corporations (corporate income tax). The following analysis reflects this 
fundamental dichotomy and departs from the taxation on the level of the foundation 
before the “persons behind”, i.e., the benefactors (donors) and/or the beneficiaries, come 
into play. 
                                                 
148 This is the starting point for a detailed analysis of existing deficits in this area of law, particularly with 
regard to cross-border activities within the EU. It should be noted, however, that issues of taxation have 
already appeared in other sections of this study as well (see e.g. supra B IV 1 as regards some aspects of 
the public benefit purpose and infra part 4, B II as regards barriers to cross-border activities). 
 - 93 -
1. Taxation on the Level of the Foundation(s) 
As foundations are usually treated as corporate bodies, the burden of tax depends on the 
design of the national corporate income tax act. In the absence of full harmonization, the 
most visible difference is the ordinary level of corporate income tax which varies 
significantly among the 27 Member States.  
The comparison gains much more complexity because of tremendous differences with 
regard to tax privileges, even in purely domestic situations.149  
Some countries grant far-reaching privileges including full personal exemptions while 
others offer selective benefits only like, e.g., reduced tax rates. Likewise, the substantive 
preconditions vary. This is true with regard to the range of qualifying public-benefit 
purposes but also with regard to a number of further substantive requirements. Any of 
these requirements may affect the by-laws of a foundation, its actual management, or 
both. Lastly, many jurisdictions require multi-step tests which include exemption from 
privileges for profitable entrepreneurial branches under the umbrella of public benefit. 
a) Types of Tax Privileges Granted 
aa) Full Personal Exemption 
The most comprehensive tax privilege granted to public benefit foundations is its full 
exemption from corporate income taxation. As a rule, this privilege can be found in the 
vast majority of EU Member States today.  
bb) Exemption of Certain Items of Income 
An alternative is partial exemptions for those items of income which are effectively 
connected to the public benefit purpose. Equivalently, some Member States provide re-
exceptions to the full-exemption rule which apply to income derived by entrepreneurial 
activities of a public benefit foundation.  
States which have adopted the system of a dual income tax (DIT) may restrict the tax 
exemption to assessed income but maintain withholding taxation at source. This 
approach has tremendous relevance for capital yields (interest, royalties) and in some 
instances also for capital gains from the alienation of assets. 
cc) Thresholds and Tax-Free Allowances 
Independent from certain items of income, tax legislators have often offered ceilings for 
non-taxation. These ceilings come in two types. Type 1 provides for non-taxation of the 
entire foundation if its income remains within the limits fixed in the respective 
provision. If it exceeds the threshold, the entire income will be taxable. In contrast, 
Type 2 provides for a tax-free allowance which will be granted unconditionally, i.e., a 
fixed amount of the income is tax free, even if the income is high. 
dd) Reduced Rates 
To the extent that states do not grant exemptions on the level of the tax base, they may 
offer reduced tax rates for all or certain items of income. 
                                                 
149 The following analysis confines itself to such purely domestic situations. The particularities of cross-
border constellations (domestic foundations in outbound cases; foreign foundations in inbound cases) will 
be analysed separately in part 4, B II. 
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ee) Indirect Benefits 
Eventually, there may be indirect benefits. They are labelled as “indirect” because they 
do not affect the tax treatment of the foundation itself but stem from a deduction of 
grants, donations or sponsorship money on the level of the donor. 
b) Substantive Requirements 
In all European jurisdictions, a crucial precondition for tax privileges is the type of 
purpose which the foundation pursues. In addition to the definition of such qualifying 
purposes,150 however, the different national tax regimes contain a wide range of further 
substantive requirements. These additional requirements can be categorised into two 
main groups, i.e., requirements relating to the running activities, and requirements 
relating to the dissolution of the foundation. Even though there is a considerable 
overlap, a third group of requirements should be dealt with separately, i.e., requirements 
focusing on the relationship between the foundation on the one hand and the founder(s) 
or manager(s) on the other. 
aa) Regarding the Purpose of a Foundation 
(i) Technical Design of Purpose-Related Rules 
The scopes of national non-profit definitions are hardly comparable, given that some 
countries use blanket clauses (France, United Kingdom) and leave a determination up to 
the tax authorities and the courts, while other countries have introduced clear-cut 
catalogues into their legislation. These catalogues might be exclusive (Hungary). In 
most cases, however, they are non-exclusive (e.g., Germany, Netherlands, Spain). Even 
if there is a clear-cut catalogue, some countries have entitled the tax authorities to 
extend these catalogues and to extend the tax benefits to further (i.e., unnamed and 
unlisted) purposes (Germany). 
(ii) Comparison in Substance 
In spite of the great variety of technical approaches, the actual results differ less than 
one would have expected. In recent years, a strong tendency of spontaneous 
approximation and partial convergence can be observed. Unlike the past when many 
states had restricted the range of privileged activities to a small core of charitable aims, 
most countries favour all types of third-sector foundations today. 
bb) Regarding a Foundation’s Activities 
While a rather strict restraint is required in all EU jurisdictions as to the qualifying 
purposes of the foundation (regarding mixed activities), a large set of further 
requirements appears in some, but not all EU Member States. This is particularly true 
with regard to the foundation’s day-to-day activities (as opposed to its final dissolution 
or other singular restructuring measures).  
Some countries make a distinction in their tax legislation between endowment 
contributions (i.e., addenda to the stock of the foundation) and other contributions (i.e., 
donations or gifts which have not been given as endowment contributions). If so, such 
contributions are subject to the requirement of speedy use. If the foundation retains such 
                                                 
150 See supra B IV 1. 
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contributions rather than spending them, it may forfeit its tax benefits (e.g.,  Austria, 
Germany). 
Many domestic tax systems require a proper corporate governance of the foundation. 
Such requirements include the full observance of the by-laws of the foundation as well 
as efficient measures against defalcation, fraud, bribery and corruption. In all, 
foundations have to meet substantive standards of compliance. 
Moreover, there are a number of formal requirements. They include, but are not 
restricted to, certain notification requirements, book-keeping duties (including 
requirements as to the place where the books should be kept and stored), and other 
documentation requirements. 
cc) Regarding the Relationship between a Foundation and its Founders/Donors 
While some states are rather restrictive in assigning tax privileges to entities of the third 
sector, others grant full personal exemptions or impose taxes only on business-like 
activities of the entity. In any case, the crucial criterion is the type of activity and the 
degree of altruistic investment of the respective entity. It goes without saying that there 
is a great variety in practice, ranging  
– from business foundations (i.e., situations where a senior entrepreneur pursues 
immortality of his enterprise by transferring all shares into a private, but fully 
profit-oriented foundation) 
– via mixed foundations (oriented towards a charitable aim, but also obliged to 
distribute a certain portion of its profits to the donor and/or his heirs)  
– up to entirely altruistic foundations which pursue a charitable purpose 
exclusively. 
In accordance with the overall design of this feasibility study, the tax treatment of 
profit-oriented business foundations will be ignore in the following survey. Mixed 
foundations are taken into account, however. 
c) By-Laws and/or Actual Management of the Foundation as Checkpoints 
In addition, many domestic tax systems require proper corporate governance of the 
foundation. Such requirements include the full observance of the by-laws of the 
foundation as well as efficient measures against breach of trust including defalcation, 
bribery and corruption. 
2. Taxation of Persons behind a Foundation 
The second arena of income taxation is the tax treatment of the persons (or body of 
persons) behind the foundation. Here, a basic distinction is required between two 
constellations in which these persons might be affected. The first constellation concerns 
the contribution to the foundation which a person might make either as a (co-)founder 
or as a sponsor. This category is referred to as the tax treatment of donations. The 
second constellation is inverse. It concerns any situation where a person (usually the 
donor, but possibly a third person) receives actual or potential benefits from the 
foundation. 
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a) Treatment of Donors 
At the time when a donation of any kind has been made, he who has given money or 
non-cash assets to the foundation (the donor/benefactor) might be able to deduct this 
donation, or parts thereof, from his income tax base or even from the tax itself. 
At the same time, two basic types of donations need to be distinguished here. The 
donation might be made in the form of an endowment contribution or in the form of a 
non-specific contribution. 
aa) Point of Deduction 
Most EU countries offer a deduction of qualifying donations from the tax base. Under 
progressive tax rates, this approach implies that the effective tax benefit differs – the 
more the taxpayer earns, the lower is his net contribution to the respective donation. 
This interdependence is a mere reflection of a flexible marginal tax rate. Nevertheless, it 
has sometimes (in the authors’ view, in a highly questionable way) been criticised as 
unfair.  
For this reason, some states (e.g., Hungary) have designed their tax law in a way that 
donations are not deductible from the tax base. Rather, a certain percentage (in Hungary 
30 per cent) of the donation is treated like a pre-payment on income tax, i.e., it can be 
credited against the income tax, as it would have been assessed otherwise. 
bb) Distinction Between Different Types of Contributions 
Where the donation is made in the form of an endowment contribution, it functions as 
an addendum to the stock of the foundation. The foundation must not spend this 
amount. By contrast, other (non-specific) contributions are donations or gifts which 
have not been given as endowment contributions. The use of these donations is at the 
discretion of the foundation which might spend the money immediately, at a later date, 
or feed it to the capital stock. 
Most EU states grant deductions for both types of donations. However, the percentage 
amounts as well as the ceilings (maximum deductions) differ in many countries. 
Usually, endowment contributions are privileged while there are lower limits for 
ordinary (non-specific) contributions. 
b) Treatment of Distributions Made to Affiliated Beneficiaries 
A much more intricate aspect concerns the question if, and in how far, profits of a 
foundation may be taxable on the level of its beneficiaries. As a rule, a beneficiary is 
every person, or body of persons, who receives benefits in money or in kind from the 
foundation. In the context of the present study, however, we will ignore the tax 
treatment of beneficiaries who are not affiliated or related to the benefactors (e.g., of 
people in need) and focus on beneficiaries who are personally affiliated or associated 
with, or related or even identical to, the donors.  
The tax treatment of those “affiliated beneficiaries” plays an enormous role in the 
context of foundations which pursue any private benefit purpose, such as family 
foundations. Although the general focus of this study is restricted to public purpose 
foundations, the tax treatment of private purpose foundations and its related 
beneficiaries deserves to be mentioned here, given that it might gain high relevance in 
 - 97 -
cross-border situations where some of the states concerned may not agree on the 
characterization of a foundation as “public purpose” rather than “private purpose”. 
Similarly, some states, like Denmark and Germany and probably also the Netherlands, 
have no objections and continue to grant comprehensive tax benefits, if a public purpose 
foundation distributes a minor part of its yields (e.g., up to one third) in the private 
interest of the donor and/or his family. These distributions to the donor and/or his 
family, either in cash or in kind, may be subject to income taxation on an accrual basis. 
Taxation on an accrual basis means that benefits are taxed only if, and not earlier than, 
the beneficiary has actually derived them. Such restriction can be found where a state 
provides for comprehensive corporate income taxation on the level of the (private 
purpose) foundation. This constellation is similar to the ordinary dichotomy of company 
taxation. Therefore, the applicable tax schemes are usually identical to the schemes that 
relate to company taxation.  
This means that most states, in one way or another, aim at mitigating the double burden 
which would arise in case of a full imposition of tax both on the level of the corporation 
(foundation, company) and on the level of its beneficiaries (founders, shareholders, 
etc.). The different EU Member States use highly different mechanisms in this respect, 
including 
– the exemption of corporate profits, combined with exclusive (but full) taxation 
of the shareholders on distribution (e.g., Estonia), 
– a moderate taxation of corporate profits, combined with a moderate taxation of 
the shareholders upon distribution (e.g., Germany, Ireland), 
– a full taxation on both levels, combined with a pro-rata credit of corporate 
income tax against the individual income tax of the respective shareholder. 
c) Potential Benefits  
Alternatively, states might even go further and ignore the existence of the foundation 
under tax law completely, i.e., treat the foundation as a transparent entity and, 
consequently, tax the entire income of the foundation’s profits on the level of the 
beneficiaries behind the foundation This concept does not require any distribution of 
benefits to the persons behind the foundation. Rather, all items of income which have 
been derived by the foundation are assigned directly to the person(s) behind the 
foundation as so-called “deemed income”. From a private law viewpoint, such 
assignment of income to the beneficiaries is mere fiction. From a tax law perspective, 
national legislators (particularly in capital-exporting countries with relatively high 
income tax rates) have frequently used such concepts, often motivated by cross-border 
tax planning schemes where the investor transfers assets to a non-resident private 
foundation in a low-tax jurisdiction like, e.g., Liechtenstein. 
In order to combat such schemes, the state where the beneficiary resides may 
– consider the transfer of assets to the foundation as an abuse de droit on the basis 
of a general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR), or 
– insert an explicit clause into its domestic tax legislation, providing for a 
treatment of the foundation as a transparent entity. 
It should be stressed, however, that the concept of transparency (and its consequence, 
the taxation of deemed income on the level of the beneficiary) cannot be found in all 
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Member States. And even in the states which do employ such a concept, it remains a 
rare exception. 
III. Inheritance Taxation 
Many European states have introduced gift, inheritance and/or estate taxes, imposing a 
burden on either the recipient (heir, beneficiary) or the donor/the estate of the deceased 
as such.  
In general, however, these types of taxes (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
inheritance taxes) are in decline at the moment, since a considerable number of EU 
Member States have abolished, or are considering abolition of, their inheritance taxes. 
1. Taxation on the Level of the Foundation(s) 
And even where inheritance taxes exist, tax benefits (including full personal 
exemptions) are often available in cases where the recipient is a non-profit foundation. 
In fact, these benefits constitute a cornerstone within the set of incentives for charitable 
giving.  
An intricate problem is the interaction between gift and inheritance taxation (on the side 
of the recipient foundation) on the one hand, and corporate income taxation on the 
other, provided that foundations are basically subject to both of these taxes at all. Most 
countries avoid the double burden in one way or the other – either by exempting the 
respective assets from the corporate income tax or from the inheritance tax (Sweden), or 
by granting a credit of one type of tax against the other. There are, however, a few cases 
where a state (e.g., Germany) does levy both corporate income tax and inheritance tax if 
a non-tax-exempt corporation (e.g., a business foundation) obtains an asset causa 
mortis. 
2. Taxation of Donors 
As regards the donors, almost all Member States have privileges for donations to public 
benefit foundations as regards inheritance tax. In Member States that impose gift and 
inheritance taxes solely on the recipient foundation there may be no effect on the donor 
at all (but on the foundation). 
G. Main Findings of Part 3 
I. General Characteristics and Tendencies 
1. Legal Uncertainty 
One characteristic feature (both in foundation civil law and in tax law) is a certain legal 
uncertainty, because in many Member States the written law is comparatively short, 
creating an atmosphere of debate whether the few explicit rules are accompanied by 
some implicit rules (analogy, fundamental principal of law, etc.). 
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2. Tendency of Liberalization 
There seems to be a tendency in Member States with traditionally comparatively strict 
foundation law to liberalise their rules (especially by implementing new foundation 
types) in order to increase the possibilities to establish foundations. Examples are the 
reforms in Austria (1995), Belgium (2000) and most recently France (2008) and the 
current proposal in the Czech Republic (2008). As a result of this tendency there is a 
certain convergence of foundation law as well as tax benefits. 
II. Evaluation of the Similarities and Differences 
1. Types of Differences According to their Significance 
If you compare 27 Member States, it is not surprising that you will find several 
differences. But not all differences have the same weight. You can distinguish between 
certain kinds of differences: 
– Some differences are of a structural nature: At first sight they seem to be 
substantial, but if you look at them through the functional approach, the 
differences can be mainly explained as a consequence of a different structure. 
Whether such differences are significant depends on the question whether it is 
possible to reach a relatively comparable result by using certain means of the 
different structure (‘purely’ structural difference with low significance), or 
whether the different structure really will lead to different results (‘substantial’ 
structural difference with high significance).151  
– Some differences are particular differences and only relevant in very specific 
cases. Such differences are only highly significant, if this particular question 
plays an important role in practice, otherwise the significance is comparatively 
low. 
– Some differences are only of terminological nature, if you compare them via a 
functional approach they are not significant at all.152  
Thus a difference is only significant, if it is relevant in practice (no particular 
difference) and relevant via a functional approach (no terminological difference or 
purely structural difference). 
It is necessary, therefore, to evaluate how significant the existing differences are. 
2. Definition and Characteristics 
What is common to all Member States is that a foundation153 is defined by all of them 
as an independent organization (generally with its own legal personality154), which has 
                                                 
151 An example of such a structural difference is the different approach of the civil law (foundations and 
associations) and the common law (trusts and other charitable forms). As the comparative analysis has 
shown this difference is of relatively low significance, because the legal forms of the charities are so 
flexible that they create organisations which are always similar to a ‘typical’ civil law foundation. 
152 A good example of such a purely terminological difference is the term “membership”, see supra C I 
10.  
153 The common law member states do not have the legal form of a foundation, but other ‘foundation-like’ 
organisational forms (the trust, the charitable company, etc.).  
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no formal membership,155 is supervised by a State supervisory authority, and serves a 
specific purpose, for which a founder has determined the foundation’s purpose and 
statutes and usually provided an endowment.156 
As regards the eligible purpose, we can find both similarities and differences: What is 
similar is that all Member States accept public benefit purposes. Although the wording 
of the law often does not specify what purposes are regarded as “public benefit”, 
according to our results it is observed that there exist a surprisingly high number of 
purposes which are traditionally regarded as “public benefit” in every Member State. 
Apart from this common core of “public benefit foundations”, we can find purposes 
which are regarded as public benefit only in most Member States, whereas about half of 
the Member States also accept other types of foundations apart from public benefit 
foundations, which is a significant difference. However, as the empirical analysis 
shows, in reality the public benefit foundation is the dominant type even in most of the 
Member States which allow any lawful purpose. 
3. Governance and State Supervision 
If we look at the governance and the state supervision of foundations, we find both 
similarities and differences. 
As regards internal governance, we find that in almost all Member States there exist, as 
a rule, comparatively moderate requirements for the internal structure in leaving the 
founder a certain discretion (e.g., as regards the appointment or dismissal of board 
members, necessity of a supervisory board) and there are no mandatory substantial 
rights for founders, beneficiaries or third parties.  
Of course, as already described, one can find a number of exceptions to this general 
rule, but most of the differences are only of relatively low significance. Some of them 
are very particular (e.g., a few Member States have certain personal requirements for 
board members, still leaving the founder a very broad discretion so that the similarities 
are still much more significant than this difference157). 
At first sight, perhaps the most ‘significant’ difference seems to be the French model 
where foundations are much more regulated by ‘factual binding’ model statutes with 
comparatively strict requirements for internal governance than in the other Member 
States. However, these differences are less significant, too, if you take into account two 
structural differences: First, the French foundation is a very ‘exclusive’ legal form, to be 
used only by a few hundred organisations with a remarkable endowment (founding 
assets of at least € 1,000,000). While such strict rules may be explainable for ‘big’ 
foundations, it is not very surprising, that the other Member States, which usually also 
accept much ‘smaller’ foundations (and thus have a much higher number of 
foundations) will not have comparatively strict rules. Second, the French legislator has 
                                                                                                                                               
154 The trust has no legal personality, but it is possible to establish other legal forms which have legal 
personality (e.g., the charitable company). So this difference is of low significance. 
155 Bute note that the term “membership” can be understood differently (terminological difference), see 
supra C I 10. 
156 Note that some Member States do not require any founding assets. However, also in this Member 
States the foundation is usually believed to have an endowment sooner or later. In some Member States a 
foundation without any assets may be deleted from the register after a certain period of time.  
157 See supra C I 2. 
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recently discovered that his strict approach means an ‘entrance barrier’ for ‘smaller’ 
public benefit initiatives. Thus, the new Endowment Fund has recently been introduced 
which is apparently used for such ‘smaller’ initiatives and will thus probably only 
require symbolic founding assets and consequently leave much more discretion to the 
founder as regards the foundation’s internal governance. Consequently, after the 
introduction of the new Endowment Fund, the French foundation law has become much 
more similar to the other Member States than it was before, making the structural 
differences of comparatively low significance. 
Other clear differences exist with respect to minimum requirements for governance: A 
mandatory number of at least three board members are necessary in about half of the 
Member States, about half of the Member States also require mandatory external 
auditors (sometimes only for ‘big’ foundations) and/or mandatory disclosure, a few 
Member States even require a mandatory supervisory board. However, this differences 
are explainable as well: most Member States which require such stricter private 
supervisory mechanisms often have comparatively little monitoring by state supervisory 
authorities in practice, while other Member States have more extensive monitoring by 
the state supervisory authorities, but (almost) no mandatory rules as regards private 
supervisory mechanisms. Thus, although different governance philosophies exist, the 
results are comparable since all Member States have a certain minimum level of 
governance by using different instruments. Therefore, the significance of the structural 
differences is lower than might seem at first sight.  
As regards remuneration and administration costs, the usual rule of most Member States 
for public benefit foundations seems to be that the expenses have to be reasonable. 
However, a few Member States prohibit remuneration for board members (but not for 
executive officers and other employers!) or have certain limits. 
4. Formation, Liquidation and Fundamental Decisions 
When it comes to formation, there exist varying procedures, but there are several 
common basic elements to the Member States: As a matter of fact a foundation deed 
will usually be necessary. In addition, a certain participation of a public authority is 
necessary in all Member States except for Sweden, and in almost all Member States the 
public authority has no discretion on whether it permits the formation of a foundation 
provided that the requirements of the foundation law are fulfilled (right of 
establishment). 
As regards the requirements of establishment, the most apparent difference (apart from 
the already presented differences with respect to the eligible purpose of the foundation) 
can be found in the requirement of founding assets. Although all Member States expect 
that a foundation may possess assets, a foundation can be established in several Member 
States without any foundation assets while in other Member States one needs an initial 
minimum endowment of up to at least 250,000 euros, as is the case in Portugal.158  
With respect to liquidation, some Member States require the assets of the terminated 
foundation to be transferred to another foundation or other public benefit organization 
                                                 
158 The strictest requirement seems to be for French traditional foundations (1,000,000 euros), but a 
French founder can also establish the alternative foundation type of the endowment fund, which probably 
only needs a symbolic initial endowment. 
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with similar purposes in compliance with the original intentions of the founder, or at 
least for another public benefit purpose.  Other Member States leave it to the founder to 
determine in the statutes what is to be done with residual assets. Note, however, that if 
the liquidated assets were used for non-public benefit purposes in these Member States, 
this may easily lead to harmful tax effects,,so that in practice all public benefit 
foundations probably require that the assets of a terminated foundation still be used for 
a public benefit purpose. 
As regards fundamental decisions, all Member States have rules for  amendments to a 
foundation’s statutes. Most Member States accept an amendment or modification of the 
statutes if a majority of the board of directors of a foundation votes in favour of it and 
the State supervisory authority approves the modification as being in line with the 
founder’s intentions. Apart from this, there exist alternative or additional procedures in 
some Member States, while in others there seems to be legal uncertainty whether the 
founder is authorised in the statutes to amend those statutes, whether the founder may 
amend the conditions for a modification of a competent organ, and/or whether the 
founder may authorise other organs or third persons to amend the statutes. 
5. Activities of the Foundation 
With reference to the administration of assets, there are surprisingly few differences. 
The rule is that there are no strict obligations. So, there is no strict obligation to 
maintain the foundation’s capital in almost all Member States (except the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and for Austrian Public Foundations). Nor is there a rule of timely 
disbursement in the foundation laws of the Member States (except Spain) and there are 
usually no detailed rules on the investment of the foundation’s assets (except the Czech 
Republic, Lithuania and in some cases in France and Italy).  
As regards economic activities we find some similarities and some differences. 
The similarity is that all Member States, except the Czech Republic, allow economic 
activities by a foundation and/or a subsidiary company of the foundation in at least 
certain cases.  
The special case of the Czech Republic is explainable: Obviously, the Czech legislator 
was afraid that the assets of the foundation could be diminished because of losses 
caused by unsuccessful, ‘risky’ economic activities. Thus, a foundation has to be 
entirely separated from any institution which carries out economic activities. However, 
several public benefit purposes are necessarily connected with the provision of services 
and/or goods (e.g., hospitals, schools, etc.). Consequently, there are some ways in 
practice to ensure that a foundation/endowment fund may also promote such purposes 
(requiring ‘economic’ activities) by a ‘network’ of ‘joint institutions’, including 
foundations, endowment funds and associations, public benefit institutions or even (in a 
few cases) for-profit institutions. 
Example 1: A foundation (but not an endowment fund) may be the founder of a public 
benefit institution. This concept is often used in practice, e.g., if the foundation is a 
founder of hospital, which has a legal form of a public benefit institution, and the 
foundation is one of the main sources of financing for such a subject. 
Example 2: The endowment fund is often founded by commercial companies to support 
their various public benefit activities. 
 - 103 -
The examples show that the main reason for the restriction in Czech law seems to be the 
protection of the foundation from losses from economic activities and not the protection 
of the potential creditors of a foundation which carries out such economic activities. 
Apart from this similarity there are differences as regards the nature of the economic 
activities:159 Some Member States allow economic activities without any direct 
restriction. Other Member States allow a foundation to carry out purpose-related 
economic activities and ancillary purpose-unrelated economic activities. Almost all 
Member States allow a foundation to have an affiliated company which carries out the 
economic activities.  
6. Tax Law 
As regards tax law, the parallels seem to be even stronger as in the case of civil 
foundation law. This is especially true with respect to the requirements for tax benefits 
and the benefits in the field of income taxation and inheritance taxation, while certain 
differences remain vis-à-vis the amount of tax benefits for donors.  
III. Overall Evaluation 
If we look closer at the public benefit foundation type, however, we find a lot of 
similarities at least as regards general structure. The following points are similar in all 
or almost all Member States: (1) A foundation160 has legal personality,161 (2) it has no 
formal membership,162 (3) it is supervised by a state supervisory authority, (4) the 
founder determines the foundation’s purpose and statutes, (5) there is a common core of 
purposes regarded as “public benefit”, (6) there is an establishment procedure consisting 
of a private act (foundation deed) and the participation of a public authority (usually 
without discretionary power), (7) there is a certain level of governance assured by a 
combination of private supervisory means and state supervision, (8) there usually exist 
comparatively moderate requirements in leaving the founder a certain discretion for the 
internal structure (e.g., as regards the appointment or dismissal of board members, 
necessity of a supervisory board), (9) there are no mandatory substantial rights for 
founders, beneficiaries or third parties, (10) there are no detailed mandatory rules on 
investment of assets in almost all Member States, (11) a foundation is entitled to carry 
out at least ancillary economic activities in almost all Member States, (12) a foundation 
can be the major shareholder of a business company in almost all Member States. 
On the other hand, we can find the following differences even in the case of public 
benefit foundations: (1) The nature of the involved State supervisory authority varies 
(governmental body, charity commission court, notary public), (2) there are some 
purposes which are regarded as “public benefit” only in certain Member States, (3) in a 
few Member States the State supervisory authority has discretion whether a foundation 
                                                 
159 See supra E III. 
160 The common law Member States do not have the legal form of a foundation, but other ‘foundation-
like’ organisational forms (the trust, the charitable company, etc.).  
161 In the common law Member States  the trust has no legal personality, but it is possible to establish 
other legal forms which do (e.g., the charitable company). Therefore, this difference is of low 
significance. 
162 The term “membership” can be understood in various ways, but these differences are purely 
terminological. 
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can be established, (4) some Member States require a certain amount of founding assets, 
(5) a few Member States do not accept any remuneration for board members, (6) some 
Member States require a certain minimum of (comparatively moderate) private 
supervisory means, e.g., at least 3 board members (about half of the Member States), 
mandatory personal requirements for board members (seldom), a mandatory 
supervisory board (very seldom), auditing (sometimes only for larger foundations), 
disclosure (about half of the Member States), and there are different approaches as 
regards the standards of accountancy, (7) the competence of the State supervisory 
authorities differs in details (e.g., specific approval procedures for certain fundamental 
acts in some Member States as a means of preventive supervision), (8) some Member 
States generally allow economic activities, other Member States only ancillary 
economic activities.  
If we analyse the similarities and differences, it seems to us that the similarities are 
overall more significant in the case of the public benefit foundation. The differences are 
often relevant in the detail and in specific cases. Probably the most important difference 
for public benefit foundations can be found in the different approaches regarding the 
founding assets, the private supervisory instruments (i.e., auditing and disclosure), and 
the scope of economic activities.  
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Part 4: Cross-Border Activities – Barriers and their Economic 
Relevance 
A. Introduction 
I. Reasons for Cross-Border Activities 
Although foundations traditionally have often only been active regionally, the 
globalisation of the economy has had some influence on the foundation sector as well. 
The number of foundations, founders and donors already engaged in cross-border 
activities or who want to develop transnational cooperation has grown significantly over 
the last decade. 
First, more and more (potential) founders (natural persons or corporations, respectively) 
have assets in several countries which may become part of a foundation’s endowment. 
Foundations themselves often have a diversified and international asset administration 
in several countries and fund-raising may be undertaken in several countries. Second, 
foundations have reported increased cross-border activities in their grant-making and 
operational activities. Some foundations concentrate on pursuing transnational issues 
(e.g., environmental protection, foreign aid) or specifically intend to contribute to the 
European public good. In addition, some foundations solicit activities in many countries 
(e.g., alumni organizations or foundations promoting a single purpose of cultural value). 
Some foundations undertake economic activities (usually in the health or social services 
sector) in several countries. Third, foundations connected with a transnational enterprise 
are often part of the corporate identity of the company. Therefore, such a foundation 
will often operate in every country in which the enterprise is present. Such tendencies 
can be especially observed in the case of US enterprises because the concept of 
‘corporate citizenship’ is popular in the United States, but also within European 
enterprises. Fourth, foundations and funders have stated their willingness to create more 
synergies by collaborative efforts and joint initiatives.  
II. Types of Barriers 
A foundation which conducts cross-border activities has to face several barriers, which 
may lead to transaction costs. We distinguish three types of such barriers. 
1. Legal barriers, e.g. recognition procedures, discrimination as regards tax benefits. 
2. Psychological barriers e.g. lower acceptance by foreign donors because of the 
unknown legal form. 
3. Other barriers, e.g. different languages. 
A European Foundation cannot overcome all these barriers. As a legal instrument it 
focuses on the overcoming of legal barriers. Apart from this, as a kind of side effect, it 
may be helpful in order to overcome also psychological barriers. 
At first, this part will provide a legal comparative overview of the main legal and 
administrative barriers (infra B) and analyse whether the existing national legal barriers 
infringe the EC Treaty (infra C). Furthermore, we give insights of the economic 
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relevance of international activities of foundations (infra D) and estimate the costs of 
barriers against those activities by introducing a model calculation (infra E). 
B. Legal Comparative Overview about the Main Legal and Administrative 
Barriers 
Two kinds of legal barriers can be identified: 
(a)  civil law barriers, i.e., cross-border recognition and establishment of foundations 
and trusts (e.g. recognition of legal personality, recognition of public benefit 
purposes, establishment of branches, etc.). 
(b)  tax law barriers, e.g., transfer of funds across borders; investments in other EU 
Member States. 
It is conceivable that at least some of these barriers may infringe upon the fundamental 
freedoms of the EC Treaty.163 
I. Civil Law Barriers 
1. Cross-Border Activities  
One central question is whether the civil law of a Member State allows a domestic 
foundation to engage in activities abroad. As a general rule, all Member States allow 
such activities164.  
Theoretically, foundations have several options to structure and organise their cross-
border activities. A foundation can  
– operate in a state other than its state of formation (i.e., home state) as a foreign 
foundation; 
– operate in a state other than its home state through independent subsidiaries 
(e.g., a foundation); 
– operate in a state other than its home state through representatives, agents or 
branches; 
– transfer its center of administration (centre d’administration, siège reel or 
effektiver Verwaltungssitz) from their home state to another state; 
– transfer its statutory seat from its home state to another state. 
2. Recognition of Foreign Foundations  
As a general rule, all Member States recognise a foundation that has been validly 
formed in accordance with the laws of one Member State as a foundation. If the state of 
formation grants a foundation the status of a legal entity (juristische Person), the status 
will also be recognised by all other Member States. As a legal person, a foundation 
may, as a general rule, enter into contracts, and it may sue and be sued. In principle, it is 
                                                 
163 See infra C. 
164 The only explicit “restriction” seems to exist in the Czech Republic: According to the Act on Public 
Benefit Collections, the organizations (including foundations) carrying out public benefit collections to 
support activities abroad need to have an approval by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The aim of the rule 
is probably to ensure that the activities are consonant with the ordre public of the Czech Republic. 
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for the foundation to determine to what extent, if any, it wishes to engage in activities 
outside of its home state and, if so, how it wishes to structure and organise its cross-
border activities. 
In the Czech Repubic, however, a registration by the foreign foundation with local 
authorities is required. The right of the foreign foundation to operate in the territory of 
the Czech Republic commences on the date of the registration of its branch established 
in the territory of the Czech Republic in the official register, and ceases to exist when 
the branch is struck off the official register. Additionally, a foreign foundation may 
evolve its activities in the territory of the Czech Republic under identical conditions and 
in the identical scope as foundations or endowment funds established in accordance 
with the Czech Act on Foundations. 
Other Member States apply a special recognition proceeding, which is the case, for 
instance, in Estonia, Italy, and Spain. According to the Spanish Foundation Act, 
recognition is given to all foundations legally constituted in another country, and 
occasional activities are allowed without any additional requirements, but permission to 
operate regularly in Spain requires165: (1), establishing a formal delegation in Spain, (2) 
registration with the competent public body, and (3) purposes of general interest and 
accomplishment of legal requirements for foundation according to Spanish law. When 
the foreign foundation’s sole activity in Spain is fundraising, civil law does not allow 
formal registration.  
In Poland and in Bulgaria, foreign foundations are required to comply with special 
recognition proceedings and to establish a representative office in the country, if they 
want to carry out activities in these Member States. Thus, according to Article 38, par. 2 
of the Bulgarian Non-profit Legal Entities Act “[F]oreign non-profit legal entities may 
perform public benefit activities through their branches in the country under the 
conditions of this Act”. 
 
Chart 13: Recognition of Foreign Foundations 
Country Do you recognise the legal personality of a foreign foundation in 
your country?  
Austria yes 
Belgium 
Yes, but foreign foundations which have a physical presence in Belgium 
(office) are subject to registration rules. 
Bulgaria Yes, but it is necessary to establish a branch office.  
Cyprus yes 
Czech Republic Yes, but registration requirements. 
Denmark yes 







                                                 
165 Art. 7 Spanish Foundation Law 50/2002. 
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Country Do you recognise the legal personality of a foreign foundation in 
your country?  







If the foundations carries out activities in Poland, a representative office 





Spain generally special recognition procedure necessary 
Sweden yes 
United Kingdom yes 
 
3. Recognition of Trusts 
Difficult problems arise if a foreign Trust wishes to operate in a civil law country. As a 
Trust generally has no legal personality under the laws of its home Member State, the 
host Member State cannot recognise the existence of such a legal personality. A more 
fundamental issue exists in those Member States that do not recognise the Trust form as 
such. The Hague Convention of 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their 
Recognition was ratified by only few Member States (e.g., Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, 
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom) whereas the majority of Member States has 
not ratified the Convention. 
4. Cross-Border Transfer of the Real Seat 
Problems can arise in Member States that apply a conflict-of-laws principle commonly 
referred to as the “real seat doctrine” (Sitztheorie or siège réel doctrine), or a variation 
thereof, for purposes of determining whether a foundation is to be characterised as a 
domestic entity or a foreign entity. If the foreign activities of a foundation in a Member 
State other than its home Member State become so dominant that the principal place of 
business or “real seat” of such a foundation is effectively abroad, the foundation may be 
legally considered as having in fact transferred its seat which, under the real seat 
doctrine, will usually give rise to certain legal issues166.  
Most Member States apply, with or without variations, general principles of conflict-of-
corporate-laws to determine the legal status and the nationality of a foundation (lex 
societatis). While they are codified in some Member States, the conflict-of-corporate-
laws principles are based on case law in most Member States. Member states have 
traditionally differed as to what law governs the internal affairs and the nationality of a 
corporate entity or foundation. As a general rule, two fundamentally different 
                                                 
166 See infra B I 4. a) 
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approaches can be observed in the EU: the “real seat doctrine” and the “state of 
incorporation doctrine” (which sometimes is also referred to as “internal affairs 
doctrine”). 
 
Chart 14: Conflict of Laws 
Country How are conflicts of laws relating to foundations decided by 
reference to the law applicable? 
Austria real seat theory 
Belgium real seat theory 
Bulgaria incorporation theory 
Cyprus incorporation theory 
Czech Republic N/A 
Denmark incorporation theory 
Estonia Incorporation theory 
Finland real seat theory 
France real seat theory 
Germany real seat theory, but reform proposal (incorporation theory) 
Greece real seat theory 
Hungary incorporation theory 
Ireland incorporation theory 
Italy real seat theory, if the real seat is in Italy 
Latvia real seat theory 
Lithuania real seat theory 
Luxembourg 
incorporation theory (due to governmental approval requirement) but not 
provided for by the law 
Malta N/A 
Netherlands incorporation theory 
Poland real seat theory 
Portugal real seat theory 
Romania real seat theory 
Slovakia real seat theory 
Slovenia incorporation theory 
Spain real seat theory 
Sweden incorporation theory 
United Kingdom incorporation theory 
a) Real Seat Doctrine 
The real seat doctrine had a long tradition in several Member States (e.g., Belgium, 
France, Germany, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Spain). The real seat doctrine, 
recognises that only one state should have the authority to regulate a foundation’s 
internal affairs, while the most plausible state to supply that law is the state in which the 
foundation has its real seat (effektiver Verwaltungssitz or siège réel). The term “real 
seat” is commonly understood as referring to the place where the fundamental decisions 
by the foundation’s management are being implemented effectively into day-to-day 
activities. Thus, the term real seat refers to the principal place of business (centre 
d’exploitation) of an entity.  
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The real seat doctrine is based upon the assumption that the state in which an entity has 
its real seat is typically the state that is most strongly affected by the activities of the 
entity, and therefore should have the power to govern the internal affairs of that entity. 
The real seat doctrine stresses the importance of uniform treatment by requiring that all 
foundations having their real seat in a particular state be formed under that state’s law. 
Thereby, the real seat doctrine creates a level playing field and prevents foundations 
from evading that state’s legal controls through formation in a jurisdiction that has less 
stringent laws. As a result, under the real seat doctrine all foundations concerned are 
subject to the same rules and principles of the law of foundations and related laws.  
Most Member States that apply the real seat doctrine typically require a foundation not 
only to have its registered seat (Satzungssitz or siège social) in the state of formation but 
also its principal place of business or real seat (effektiver Verwaltungssitz or siège réel). 
Under the real seat doctrine, the transfer of the principal place of activities (centre 
d’exploitation) or real seat across state borders from the state of formation (Member 
State A) to another Member State (Member State B) results, as a general rule, in the loss 
of the foundation’s legal status granted by the state of formation (“emigration” or “exit” 
case). In such a case, the foundation would be required to reincorporate itself in 
Member State B in accordance with that Member State’s laws. Similarly, from the 
perspective of Member State A, a foundation that has been formed in accordance with 
the law of Member State B and has moved its real seat from Member State B to 
Member State A (“immigration” or “entry” case) is considered to have lost its legal 
status as a foundation in Member State A; provided, both Member State A and Member 
State B apply the real seat doctrine.167  
b) State-of-Incorporation Doctrine 
Obviously, the approach of the real seat doctrine is fundamentally different from the 
conflict-of-corporate-laws principles employed by courts in Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and, of 
course, by courts in the United States of America. Thus, for example, under the laws of 
Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom the founders of a corporate entity 
are free to choose the state of incorporation. According to the choice-of-corporate-law 
principles of these countries, the existence of a foundation, as well as its subsequent 
dissolution, are governed by the law of the state of incorporation (“state-of-
incorporation doctrine” or Gründungstheorie). The importance of the law of the state of 
incorporation is greatly enhanced by the fact that the law of the state of incorporation 
also applies, with rare exceptions, to the internal affairs of the entity. Obviously, the 
state-of-incorporation doctrine emphasises, as a general rule, the founders’ freedom to 
choose the proper law of foundation. Thus, the lex societatis, or in the language of 
English law the lex domicilii, is the result of the founders’ own volition. Moreover, the 
state-of-incorporation doctor real seat across state borders without any effect on their 
legal status as a corporate entity under the law of the state of incorporation; provided, 
the registered office (Satzungssitz) remains in the state of incorporation. 
                                                 
167 If the two countries involved apply different conflict-of-laws principles (e.g., the real seat principle 
and the state-of-incorporation doctrine), courts are likely to apply the principle of renvoi. 
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c) Policy Considerations 
Clearly, Member States that apply the real seat doctrine aim at effectuating material 
legal, economic, and social values of the country having the most significant 
relationship with a particular company. States that recognise a political, or even a 
constitutional, need to protect certain (local) interests will favour the real seat doctrine. 
In contrast, states that support the idea of party autonomy in corporate and foundation 
law matters will, at least in principle, be in favour of the state-of-incorporation rule or 
similar choice-of-corporate-law principles. If viewed from this perspective, conflict-of-
laws rules are, to some extent, a reflection of the general attitude of a legal culture 
towards the socio-economic role of corporations and foundations and the function of 
complementary substantive and procedural rules of the pertinent laws for purposes of 
protecting and furthering the multifarious, and sometimes hard to reconcile, interests of 
all those affected by a legal entity. 
It is important to keep in mind that conflict-of-laws rules, like other legal institutions of 
all legal systems, are shaped not only by efficiency considerations, but also by history 
and politics. Initial conditions, determined by the accident of history or the design of 
politics, influence the path that a conflict-of-laws rule will take. In the EU, path 
dependency, or institutional persistence, is, however, not the only force influencing the 
direction and objectives of a Member State’s conflict-of-laws rules. Rather, the conflict-
of-laws principles of a Member State, like complementary legal institutions that aim at 
enhancing the pre-existing conflict-of-laws rules, need to be in compliance with the 
supreme law of the EU, especially with the freedom of establishment guaranteed by 
Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.  
Thus far, however, the ECJ has not had an opportunity to rule on a foundation’s right of 
establishment, and there is no evidence that such cases have arisen in practice. 
5. Cross-Border Transfer of a Foundation’s Registered Seat 
It is unclear what the legal situation is if a foundation wants to transfer its registered 
seat (Satzungssitz or siège social) from one Member State to another. The national laws 
of the Member States do not regulate these cases. In practice, these cases do not seem to 
exist. Consequently, there is a lack of court decisions or administrative practices 
concerning this question.  
According to some country experts, a transfer of the registered seat of the foundation 
may constitute massive barriers in several Member States. Thus, in Germany most 
commentators suggest that a foundation needs to be liquidated and reincorporated if it 
wants to transfer its registered seat to another Member State.  
At first glance, the barriers mentioned do not seem to be very relevant in practice: There 
are no public complaints or even discussions regarding the problems of the transfer of a 
foundation’s registered seat. The reasons for the lack of interest in the subject are not 
entirely clear. There may be a lack of effective control by the competent authorities in 
the case of a “factual” transfer of the foundation’s real seat, or foundations may find 
ways to avoid such a transfer (e.g., by establishing a subsidiary or another foundation in 
the other Member State). 
It is not inconceivable, however, that some foundations may be interested in a transfer 
of their registered seat and/or their real seat.  
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Example: According to the foundation’s statutes its purpose is to support students 
of a particular African or Asian country168. The support shall be implemented by 
employees of the foundation. The foundation was established in EU Member State 
A where most students lived at that time. Some years later, because of changes in 
the factual or legal environment, only few students continue to live in Member 
State A whereas most students live in Member State B.  
Given the foundation’s purpose, there would be good reasons for transferring the 
registered seat of the foundation to Member State B.  
Another possibility is to leave the formal main office in Member State A and to 
establish a branch in Member State B which carries out most of the activities of 
the foundation. Even in the latter scenario, some Member States, applying the 
“real seat doctrine”, may regard the fact that the main activities of the foundation 
are carried out by the branch office in Member State B as a transfer of the 
foundation’s real seat.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The preceding chapter illustrates that cross-border activities may be subject to various 
civil law barriers of a different nature and magnitude. If a foundation engages in 
activities in another country without transferring its seat to that country, it very often 
faces national measures and prerequisites that go beyond the requirements imposed by 
its home country. Thus, it is not uncommon for member states to impose national 
recognition procedures on out-of-state foundations. If, however, a foundation decides to 
transfer, or has effectively transfers, its siège réel or effektiven Verwaltungssitz to 
another member state, member states applying the real seat doctrine (Sitztheorie) will 
require the foundation to dissolve itself and to reconstitute itself in the other member 
state; provided, of course, the dissolution is permitted in the first place or approved by 
the competent government authority. As the dissolution and liquidation of a foundation 
effectively terminates the will of the original benefactor or trustor, the board’s decision 
to dissolve and liquidate the foundation will, as a general rule, require government 
approval. Formation of a new foundation in another member state, in turn, will be 
subject to a set of entirely new and different laws that may be based on a totally 
different perception and conception of non-profit organizations and foundations.  The 
same is true with regard to the formation of a subsidiary organization in another 
member state if a foundation decides not to dissolve itself in its home state and 
reconstitute itself in another member state but rather form a subsidiary organization in 
the other member state in which its wants to engage in activities. 
 
II. Tax Law Barriers 
Starting from the basic features on the current tax treatment of foundations and its 
donors, the present chapter focuses on critical tax issues which arise in cross-border 
cases. 
There are two kinds of barriers: 
                                                 
168 Other examples would be the support of refugees or workers from a specific country in Europe. 
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– Barriers on the level of substantive tax law, amount to a higher level of taxes  
– Barriers on the bureaucratic increase compliance costs in order to avoid a higher 
level of taxation.  
In both cases, two constellations of cross-border transactions ought to be distinguished:  
– In the inbound constellation, a Member State restricts or discriminates against 
certain activities of non-resident foundations within its territory.  
– The outbound constellation concerns the treatment of a foundation by its state of 
residence which might hinder the foundation to collect, invest, or spend its 
money out of area.  
At first this section analyses barriers on the level of substantive tax law, including (1) 
income taxation, (2) gift and inheritance taxation, and (3) other taxes. Afterwards 
barriers on the bureaucratic level are analysed (4). 
1. Income Taxation 
a) Tax Treatment of Foundations 
aa) Tax Treatment of Non-Resident Foundations by the State of Source (inbound 
constellation) 
The first group of discriminatory rules are rules which provide that non-resident 
foundations be denied all or some tax benefits which domestic legislators have granted 
to resident foundations169. Such rules or equivalent administrative practice seem to exist 
in most Member States (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).  
Other countries are less strict but still maintain different sets of rules for resident and 
non-resident foundations. Spain, for example, has an explicit provision in its domestic 
law according to which a local representative office of a non-resident foundation is 
placed on equal footing with a resident foundation. Similar rules can be found in 
Bulgaria, Ireland, Lithuania, and Poland. In France a foreign foundation will be 
entitled to receive similar tax privileges if it performs its activities on French territory 
and is regarded as having a public benefit purpose in France.  
 
Chart 15: Tax Treatment of Inbound Constellations 
Country Is accordance with the wording of your tax law a foreign foundation 
entitled to receive the same tax benefits as a tax-exempt national 
foundation, if the foreign foundation fulfils all (other) requirements 
of your national tax law? 
Austria no 
Belgium 
As far as corporate tax exemption is concerned the answer is yes, but 
only on one legal basis. The Belgian branch of a foreign foundation can 
be exempted from non-resident corporate tax in case it performs only 
incidentally economic activities (art 182 of the Belgian ITC, but it cannot 
be exempted if the reason for exemption is solely based on art 181 of 
the Belgian ITC (non-profit activities that belong to the so-called 
                                                 
169  On this constellation, see von Hippel & Walz, General Report, in: Walz & von Auer & von Hippel 
(eds.), Spenden- und Gemeinnützigkeitsrecht in Europa (2007), p. 112. 
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Country Is accordance with the wording of your tax law a foreign foundation 
entitled to receive the same tax benefits as a tax-exempt national 
foundation, if the foreign foundation fulfils all (other) requirements 
of your national tax law? 
“privileged sector”, listed by the income tax code). This restriction might 
be in conflict with the Treaty of Rome (based on the argumentation in 
the Stauffer case). 
Bulgaria 
generally no, only if the foundation sets up a local branch according to 
national law 
Cyprus no 





generally no, only if the foreign foundation performs its activities on the 






generally no, only if the foundation sets up a local branch according to 










generally no, but the operations of a representative office of the foreign 
foundation is treated similarly as the national foundation in regard to 
taxes. However, if it runs economic activity, it is subject to separate 
regulations governing the conduct of economic activity on the territory of 






generally no, but a foundation will receive the same tax benefits if it 
establishes a formal delegation in Spain, which is registered by the 
competent public body, promotes purposes of general interest and 
accomplishes the legal requirements for foundation according to the 
Spanish law. If the foreign foundation sole activity in Spain is 
fundraising, civil law does not allow formal registration therefore not 
special tax regime will be applicable. 
Sweden no 
United Kingdom no 
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In either case, such rules constitute inbound discriminations. This is particularly true 
where they create higher tax burdens for incoming non-resident foundations, as 
compared to resident foundations in a ceteris paribus situation.  
It also applies, however, where an equal level of taxes is available but where this equal 
treatment in substance is subject to significant bureaucratic efforts (e.g. establishment of 
a local representative office). 
Many foundations have experienced barriers which do not arise from substantive law 
but from procedural law – in other words, the barriers do not (or not necessarily) consist 
of a burden to pay taxes but of too extensive compliance requirements.  
bb) Tax Treatment of Resident Foundations Acting out of Area (outbound constellation) 
In the second constellation, the critical issue is in how far the Member State where a 
foundation has been established, and/or where the foundation has its place of actual 
management, might discriminate any out-of-area activities of the foundation (and 
income derived in connection with such activities) vis-à-vis purely domestic activities 
of the same type.  
The majority of the Member States seem to not have any restriction to activities abroad 
(Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, the United Kingdom). 
In the other Member States, there exists a more or less intensive discrimination for 
activities abroad170. Such discrimination can be twofold: 
– The state of residence might still grant benefits to the foundation with regard to 
its domestic items of income, but refuse to extend these benefits to foreign-
sourced income (Latvia, and, under certain conditions, France as regards tax 
benefits for donors). 
– In other Member States, however, the foreign activities can even bring the state 
of residence to revoke all tax benefits of the respective foundation. This is, under 
certain conditions, true for Austria, Germany, Portugal, Sweden and Belgium 
as regards tax benefits for donors. 
 
Chart 16: Tax Treatment of Outbound Constellations 
Country 
Do activities abroad put the tax-exempt status of public benefit 
foundations at risk? 
Austria yes, but only if foundations are operating mainly abroad 
Belgium 
Activities performed abroad do not put the Belgian corporate tax 
exemption at risk. However for some of the categories of organizations 
mentioned in the Belgian income tax code (scientific research, protection 
of monuments…) the eligibility to receive tax deductible gifts could be 
put at risk if these organizations carry out their activities, even partially 
or incidentally, outside Belgium. 
Bulgaria no 
Cyprus no 
Czech Republic no 
                                                 
170 These negative sanctions might be triggered merely on the basis of the by-laws of the foundation or, 
alternatively, on the basis of factual activities of the foundation out of area. 
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Country 
Do activities abroad put the tax-exempt status of public benefit 




no, if the purpose of these activities is in the public interest and such 
activities are of a non-profit nature 
France 
generally no, but tax benefits for donors are not granted, if the 
foundations do not conduct the main part of their activities in France. As 
an exception to that principle, French foundations collecting funds and 
organizing humanitarian missions abroad, as well as French foundations 
collecting funds to promote French language, culture and scientific 
knowledge outside France are deemed to be performing their activities 
in France in that sense 









Netherlands no, if the activities are charitable 
Poland no 






yes, a foundation pursuing activities wholly outside Sweden might 
lose/not obtain special tax status 
United Kingdom no 
 
A closer look shows, that the conditions, under which the tax benefits may be not 
granted seem to differ:  
– Some Member States seem to follow a “territorial test”: According to this 
approach a foundation will not receive tax benefits, if it operates “wholly 
abroad” (Sweden) “mainly abroad” (Austria, France), or even “incidentally 
abroad” (Belgium, Latvia). 
– Other Member States seem to follow a more “personal test”, which means that 
not only foreigners may be beneficiars (Portugal) or that there should be a 
positive impact for the national public (Germany). 
– As a matter of fact, there is a lot of legal uncertainty to perform such a test in a 
concrete case. Apart from this it is questionable whether a strict territory 
approach is/would be an infringement of the fundamental freedoms of the EC 
Treaty171. 
                                                 
171 See infra C II 2 a bb.. 
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b) Tax Treatment of Donors 
aa) Resident Donors of Non-Resident Foundations 
While almost all Member States (exemptions are Slovakia and Sweden) provide far-
reaching benefits for resident individuals who donate money to resident foundations, 
donations to non-resident foundations have traditionally often been excluded from these 
benefits. This is still true in most Member States (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Romania, Spain, United Kingdom). 
However there is a recent tendency in some Member States to allow deductions also for 
donations to non-resident public-benefit foundations, if they fulfil the requirements of a 
national tax-exempt foundation. Examples are Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, and 
Slovenia. Also in Finland, there will be a tax-exemption, if the donation is made by 
corporations, if the recipient organization is approved by Ministry of Finance to be a 
public benefit organization by similar criteria to national foundations. In some other 
Member States, similar tax benefits seem to be possible under additional conditions. 
(Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal).  
 
Chart 17: Cross-Border Donations 
Country Are donations to foreign-based public benefit organizations income 
tax deductible for the donor? 
Austria no 
Belgium 
no, but it should be noted that the European Commission is challenging 
the Belgian legislation on this point. Belgium accepted this statement but 
did not yet amend its legislation 
Bulgaria no 
Cyprus no, but some exceptions 
Czech Republic no 
Denmark Yes (act recently amended) 
Estonia no 
Finland 
Generally no, but exemptions for donations made by corporations, if the 
recipient organization is approved by Ministry of Finance to be a public 
benefit organization by similar criteria to national foundations 
France no 
Germany no 
Greece no, but some specific exceptions 
Hungary no 
Ireland no 






yes, as long as the recipient is recognised as charitable (implementing 
rules still to be approved) 
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Country Are donations to foreign-based public benefit organizations income 
tax deductible for the donor? 
Poland yes 
Portugal no, but exceptions possible 
Romania no 
Slovakia N/A no tax incentives at all 
Slovenia yes 
Spain no 
Sweden N/A no tax incentives at all for individuals 
United Kingdom no 
 
bb) Non-Resident Donors of Resident Foundations 
The opposite case (i.e., a situation where a local foundation receives donations from 
abroad) has usually been conceived as less problematic. Unless the donor does not earn 
any income in the state where the foundation has its seat or place of actual management, 
she/he will hardly try to obtain any tax privileges (e.g., a positive refund payment) in 
this state – simply because she/he will not have to pay any taxes there anyway. 
However, as soon as the non-resident donor does earn local income (e.g. because he is 
employed there, yields dividend income there, or rents out real property situated in this 
country), he may be taxable there on a territorial basis. If so, she/he may try to obtain 
tax benefits for donations made to local foundations but will usually be frustrated as 
most states do not offer the deduction of personal expenses (including donations to 
public-benefit foundations, but also deductions for the costs of living, family allowances 
etc.) but leave it up to the state of taxpayer’s residence to take these personal expenses 
into account (which, in turn, might deny any deduction172).  
The ability of the donor to obtain effective tax relief for such a donation may be 
constrained by the interaction of the tax systems of the two states where the donor’s 
state of residence taxes its residents on their worldwide income using the credit method 
of relieving double taxation. In such cases, where the donation is deductible in the state 
where the foundation resides (State F) but not in the donor’s residence state (State D) 
the deduction will reduce the amount of income tax paid by the donor in State F that can 
be credited against his or her income tax liability in State D. The net result is that the 
increase in the donor’s total income tax liability in State D cancels part or all of the tax 
relief in State F for the donation.  
cc) Non-Resident Donors of Non-Resident Foundations 
Lastly, it should be noted that the two constellations just mentioned might even 
coincide. A Member State can affect non-resident donors of non-resident foundations if, 
and to the extent that, these donors are subject to domestic income tax because they 
derive income from sources within this State. This constellation may obtain relevance in 
cases where the world-wide income of the taxpayer (which is usually the basis for his 
income tax due, or at least the tax rate, in his state of residence) is zero or negative (so 
                                                 
172 See supra II 1 b aa. 
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that the state of residence will not impose income tax on him) but where there is 
positive local income of the taxpayer in another Member State. In this situation, this 
Member State will often deny that it has a substitutional obligation to allow the 
donation for deduction which, eventually, brings the taxpayer to the result that the 
donation is deductible in neither state. Here, he has to pay taxes simply because of the 
fact that his income stems from more than one jurisdiction – while no tax would have 
been due had he earned his entire income within one state173. 
c) Treatment of Affiliated Beneficiaries 
As already shown, Member States which do not acknowledge a given foundation as a 
qualified public-benefit foundation for tax purposes might impose income taxes on the 
level of the foundation. Alternatively, they might collect taxes from a person whom they 
regard as a (legal or factual) “affiliated” beneficiary of the foundation. This does not 
only apply with regard to actual yields or benefits which have been distributed to this 
person. Rather, taxation may occur even with regard to deemed income of this person, 
i.e., based on the fiction that (from a tax perspective) the foundation is transparent and 
all income derived by the foundation shall be assigned immediately to the beneficiary, 
irrespective of whether or not this person has actually received it under private law. 
While such taxation may be legitimate and reasonable if the foundation is a “foundation 
for the founder” or (legally or factually) comparable to such a foundation, it constitutes 
a significant risk wherever the states disagree on the categorization of the foundation as 
public purpose-related or private purpose-related.  
2. Inheritance Taxation 
Rather similar to the barriers which exist for the treatment of cross-border cases under 
income tax rules, cross-border donations are made difficult also by virtue of gift and 
inheritance taxation. However, the burden of inheritance tax may depend on much more 
jurisdictions, including 
– the state(s) where the testator (donor) resides or resided last, 
– the state(s) where the foundation resides (has its seat and/or actual place of 
management), 
– the state(s) where the assets transferred are located. This might be the state(s) 
where real property is situated, but also the state(s) where a company resides of 
which the testator (donor) held shares or bonds. 
The interplay of these jurisdictions gives rise to a complex number of constellations and 
problems which often result in the imposition of gift or inheritance taxes even though 
the assets are being transferred to a public benefit foundation. Furthermore, such 
gift/inheritance taxation can be levied in more than one state. Unlike under income tax 
law where bilateral (or in the case of the Nordic countries, a multilateral) conventions 
on the avoidance of double taxation remedy, the network of gift/inheritance tax treaties 
is highly fragmentary and incomplete. 
According to the country experts, only a minority of the Member States (where a gift 
and inheritance tax exist) accepts a inheritance tax exemption for donations to non-
resident public-benefit foundations of another Member State (Belgium, Ireland, Italy, 
                                                 
173 For solutions on the basis of the fundamental freedoms, see infra 
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Slovenia) while the majority refuses a general tax-exemption (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, United Kingdom).  
 
Chart 18: Cross-Border Donations 
Country Is there a Gift and inheritance tax exemption for donations to non-
resident public-benefit foundations (apart from specific reciprocity 
agreements and double tax treaties)? 
Austria N/A no such tax 
Belgium 
yes, if donation is given to a comparable non-profit entity in another EU 
country 
Bulgaria no 
Cyprus N/A. no such tax. 
Czech 
Republic 
no, in this case donor is tax liable, but exemptions exist for lifetime donations 
to humanitarian and charitable NGOs (local tax authorities decide) 
Denmark no 
Estonia N/A. no such tax. 
Finland no, the beneficiary is tax liable according to Finnish law 
France no 
Germany no 
Greece only as far as reciprocity exists 
Hungary no, the beneficiary is liable 
Ireland 






no, only informal gifts are exempt but if donor dies within one year, 
inheritance tax is due 
Malta N/A. no such tax. 
Netherlands yes, for foreign qualifying organizations (not yet in force) 
Poland N/A. Gift and inheritance tax only applies to individuals 
Portugal 
no, beneficiary is liable for a substitute tax (stamp duty) but some 
exemptions are foreseen 
Romania no 
Slovakia N/A. no such tax. 
Slovenia 
yes, if given to a charity organization that is registered in a EU Member State 
to conduct charitable activity 
Spain N/A. Gift and inheritance tax only applies to individuals. 




In particular where a donor has assets which are widespread over several countries, the 
transfer of his estate (or parts thereof) to a public-benefit foundation deserves diligent 
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tax consulting, which is a challenging occupation and triggers high costs to the parties 
involved. 
3. Further Taxes 
a) Capital Taxation 
In contrast, there are no extra barriers which stem from capital taxation. With regard to 
specific property taxes which are confined to certain types of assets (like, e.g., real 
property), its taxation usually follows a strict territoriality principle.  
But even the (few) Member States which still maintain comprehensive net wealth taxes, 
will grant border tax adjustments, either unilaterally (laid down in their respective 
domestic tax law) or on a bilateral basis (in a convention on the avoidance of double 
taxation). Any remaining problems and barriers are similar to the ones analysed in the 
context of income taxation. 
b) Transfer taxes 
Most states levy taxes on the transfer of specified assets, in particular real estate located 
in the state concerned and shares. Such taxes are generally called transfer taxes, 
registration taxes or stamp duties. It is common for states to exempt gifts of such assets 
to resident foundations without extending the exemption to non-resident foundations. 
The problems and barriers are similar to those analysed in the context of income 
taxation. 
c) VAT 
On the field of VAT, there are fewer barriers than on the area of direct taxes. VAT law 
is subject to comprehensive harmonization. This is mainly due to the lack of a formal 
distinction between resident and non-resident taxpayers (entrepreneurs). Under VAT 
law, the decisive factor in a cross-border case is the place where a transaction has been 
performed. In doing so, the Council has basically avoided any discrimination of non-
resident suppliers or recipients on the grounds of their respective nationality, residence 
or the like. 
It is only indirectly that such criteria do gain relevance also on the field of VAT. This is 
true on a twofold level. 
aa) Tax Exemptions 
Firstly, the status of a foundation is decisive for a number of tax exemptions. For 
instance, transactions of a foundation are exempt from VAT where a transaction is 
closely linked to welfare and social security work174. This rule includes, but is not 
restricted to, foundations which run old people’s homes. It applies only if the foundation 
is established under, and governed by, public law or if it is recognised by the Member 
State concerned as being devoted to social wellbeing. 
Under similar preconditions, tax exemptions apply to foundations which  
                                                 
174  Art. 132 (1)(g) of the Common System Directive. 
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– run hospitals, centers for medical treatment or diagnosis and other duly 
recognised establishments of a similar nature and which, in doing so, supply 
hospital and medical care and closely related activities175, 
– work on the protection of children and young persons176,  
– provide children's or young people's education, school or university education, 
vocational training or retraining, including the supply of services and of goods 
closely related thereto177, 
– as religious or philosophical foundations, supply staff for the above-mentioned 
activities and with a view to spiritual welfare178, 
– supply services to their members in their common interest in return for a 
subscription fixed in accordance with their rules179, 
– supply services closely linked to sport or physical education to persons taking 
part in sport or physical education180. 
It is remarkable, however, that the Directive itself contains very precise rules on the 
range of qualifying public purposes. However, this is true only for some (but not all) of 
the above-mentioned tax exemptions. E.g., certain supplies are exempt from VAT only 
if the foundation is a non-profitmaking organization with aims of a political, trade-
union, religious, patriotic, philosophical, philanthropic or civic nature181. Moreover, 
some (but not all) exemptions apply only if they are not likely to cause distortion of 
competition182. Nevertheless, many of the provisions contained in the Directive make 
recourse to domestic characterization of the respective foundation as “recognised” for 
the respective public purpose. 
bb) Reduced Tax Rates 
Secondly, the status of a foundation as a public purpose foundation under domestic law 
gains relevance with regard to the tax rates. According to no. 15 of Annex III to the 
Directive, the Member States may offer reduced VAT rates for supply of goods and 
services by organizations recognised as being devoted to social well-being by Member 
States and engaged in welfare or social security work.  
The ability of charitable organizations to qualify for these reduced rates will become 
more important if the recent European Commission proposal to expand the categories of 
goods and services that are eligible for reduced rates is implemented. 
4. “Bureaucratic Barriers” in Order to Avoid Tax Discriminations 
As the analysis has shown there are several barriers on the level of substantive tax law 
in case of direct cross-border transactions (income taxation of the foundation itself and 
                                                 
175  Art. 132 (1)(b) of the Common System Directive. 
176  Art. 132 (1)(h) of the Common System Directive. 
177  Art. 132 (1)(i) of the Common System Directive. 
178  Art. 132 (1)(k) of the Common System Directive. 
179  For details, see Art. 132 (1)(l) of the Common System Directive. 
180  Art. 132 (1)(m) of the Common System Directive. 
181  Art. 132 (1)(l) of the Common System Directive. 
182  Art. 132 (1)(l) of the Common System Directive. The competition proviso was designed in a more 
comprehensive way under Art. 13 A (2)(b), 2nd indent of the 6th VAT Directive (77/378/EEC) of 17 May 
1977 (OJ L 145 of 13 June 1977, p. 1). 
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its donors, as well as the gift and inheritance taxation of gifts by a donor (testator) to a 
foundation). 
a) Tax Planning Structures 
In practice these rules have given rise to various tax-planning structures. The aim of 
such structures is to avoid tax discriminations because of the described barriers by 
carrying out indirect cross-border transactions. In order to carry out an indirect cross-
border transaction it is necessary to establish another public benefit institution in the 
other Member State, which is the place of payment or the place of destination of the 
specific cross-border transaction.  
Two basic types of tax-planning structures ought to be distinguished here. 
– Firstly, the “parent foundation” might establish, or promote the setting up of, 
local sub-entities in the country of destination, i.e., in the country where the 
public benefit purpose should be realised. This case might be referred to as the 
interposition of an active agent (outbound transaction). 
– Secondly, the “parent foundation” may set up money-collecting entities 
(“supporting” organizations like other foundations, associations, trusts, non-
profit companies, etc.) in the countries where (potential) donors reside. This 
scheme might be referred to as the interposition of a passive (merely money-
receiving) agent183. (inbound transaction). 
From a practical viewpoint, the fact that there are network-like structures which bring 
the “parent foundation” in a position to circumvent the barriers mentioned above is 
certainly a fact which mitigates the difficulties but does not away with them. 
b) Compliance Costs 
Even if, from a legal standpoint, most of the described barriers on the level of 
substantive tax law barriers might be avoidable for the taxpayer, but the costs both for 
setting-up such tax planning structures and for maintaining such structures year by year 
(including compliance efforts) are significant as there will be costs for reduplication and 
for the compliance of different law systems which will be further described below184.  
C. Do the Existing National Legal Barriers Infringe the EC Treaty? 
European law as interpreted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is gaining more and 
more influence on the Member States’ national laws. One main objective of the 
decisions of the ECJ concerning business and other associations is to identify barriers 
and restrictions resulting from national legal rules and principles that make the exercise 
of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty, especially the freedom of 
establishment, less attractive.  
I. Civil Law 
The Court’s seminal rulings on the right of establishment include its decisions in 
Centros185, Überseering186, and Inspire Art187. As a consequence of these rulings of the 
                                                 
183  E.g., a so-called Förderorganisation under § 58 no. 1 of the German General Tax Code. 
184 See E I infra. 
185 Judgement of 9 March 1999, Case C-212/97, Centros, [1999] ECR I-1459. 
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ECJ, it is clear that the ’real seat doctrine‘ (‘Sitztheorie‘ or ’siege reel doctrine‘) can no 
longer be applied to deny the legal capacity of foreign companies that are entitled to the 
right of establishment under Art. 43188 and 48189 of the EC Treaty.  
It is necessary to analyse the impact of the pertinent case law on not-for-profit 
foundations.  
1. Freedom of Establishment: General Principles According to Case Law 
The question of whether a foundation that has been validly formed in accordance with 
the laws of a Member State may operate or engage in activities in another Member State 
is a question of both substantive law and conflict-of-laws principles. A Member State’s 
substantive law and conflicts-of-laws principles relating to cross-border activities of 
not-for-profit foundations need to be in conformity with EU law, in particular with the 
right of establishment pursuant to Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty. 
a) Inbound Cases (“Immigration” Cases) 
The ECJ has interpreted Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty in a series of seminal 
decisions involving corporations. The Court has never had the opportunity, however, to 
apply these Treaty provisions to conflict-of-laws issues involving foundations.  
aa) Centros 
Thus, in Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen,190 the Court took exception to 
a Danish authority’s refusal to register a branch of a company validly incorporated in 
the United Kingdom. According to the Court, the refusal to register the branch 
constituted a restriction of the English company’s right of establishment pursuant to 
Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty which could neither be justified under Article 46 of 
the EC Treaty nor under the four-factor test set forth in Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’ 
                                                                                                                                               
186 Judgement of 5 November 2002, Case C-208/00, Überseering BV, [2002] ECR I-9919. 
187 Judgement of 30 September 2003, Case C-167/01, Inspire Art, [2003] ECR I-10155. 
188 Article 43 of the EC Treaty reads as follows: 
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of 
nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such 
prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by 
nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State. 
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed 
persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning 
of the second paragraph of Article 48, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law 
of the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to 
capital. 
189 Article 48 of the EC Treaty provides: 
Companies and firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their 
registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community shall, for 
the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of 
Member States. 
“Companies or firms” means companies or firms constituted under civil or commercial law, including 
cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private law, save for those which 
are non-profit-making. 
190 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I-1459. 
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Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano191 and expressly reconfirmed in Centros. 
While it is debatable whether the English company in Centros had actually transferred 
its seat from England to Denmark, that is, whether the case involved the “primary” or 
“secondary” right of establishment, there can be no doubt that Centros Ltd. had, and 
continued to have, its registered office in the United Kingdom whilst its principal place 
of business or real seat had been in Denmark. In light of the Court’s holdings in 
Centros, a corporation that is validly incorporated in a Member State enjoys, in 
principle, the freedom of establishment guaranteed by Articles 43 and 48 of the EC 
Treaty even if it never intended to do any business in its state of incorporation but was 
formed in one Member State only for the purpose of establishing itself in a second 
Member State where its main, or indeed entire, business is to be conducted. Thus, the 
freedom of establishment is triggered by the valid incorporation in any of the 27 EU 
Member States; provided, the registered office of the corporation is, and continues to 
be, in its state of incorporation. In light of Centros, the reasons for which a company 
chooses to be incorporated in a particular Member State are, as a general rule, irrelevant 
with regard to application of the rules on freedom of establishment.  
                                                
bb) Überseering 
Similarly, in Überseering BV v. NCC Nordic Construction Baumanagement GmbH,192 
the ECJ held that Überseering B.V., which was validly incorporated in the Netherlands 
and had its registered office there, was entitled under Articles 43 and 48 of the EC 
Treaty to exercise its freedom of establishment in Germany as a company incorporated 
under the law of the Netherlands. According to the Court, the lower German courts’ 
refusal, under the German version of the real seat doctrine (i.e., the Sitztheorie), to 
recognise the legal status of Überseering B.V. as a Dutch corporate entity on the ground 
that the corporation had effectively transferred its principal place of business or real seat 
(effektiver Verwaltungssitz) to Germany, constitutes a restriction on the company’s 
freedom of establishment which, in principle, is incompatible with Articles 43 and 48 of 
the EC Treaty. Under Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, a Member State is required 
to recognise the legal personality of a corporation validly incorporated in another 
Member State as provided for by the lex societatis. Most importantly, the Member State 
in which the sister state corporation has its real seat (establishment) may not disregard 
the legal personality of that corporation as provided for by its lex societatis and 
substitute it by resorting to local forms of business associations. Also, the Member State 
may not deny a corporation validly incorporated in another Member State the right to 
sue or to be sued. 
cc) Inspire Art 
Überseering laid the ground for a much broader application of the freedom of 
establishment guaranteed by Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty as is evidenced by the 
Court’s decision in Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire 
 
191 Case C-55/94, Gebhard v Consiglio dell’ Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1993] ECR 
I-4165. 
192 Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v NCC Nordic Construction Baumanagement GmbH [2002] ECR I-
9919. 
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Art Ltd.193 The dispute in Inspire Art arose because Inspire Art Ltd. was not registered 
in the Netherlands as a formally foreign corporation as required by the Dutch Law of 17 
December 1997 on Pseudo-foreign Corporations (Wet op de Formeel Buitenlandse 
Vennootschappen). Inspire Art Ltd. was formed in the legal form of a private company 
limited by shares under the law of England and Wales, had its registered office at 
Folkestone (United Kingdom) and a branch in Amsterdam where it carried on business 
under the business name Inspire Art Ltd. in the sphere of dealing in objets d’art. Taking 
the view that Inspire Art Ltd. should be registered as pseudo-foreign corporation, the 
Chamber of Commerce of Amsterdam applied to the Kantongerecht (District Court) of 
Amsterdam for an order that there should be added to the registration of Inspire Art Ltd. 
in the commercial register the statement that it is a formally-foreign corporation.  
In accordance with its holding in Centros, the ECJ noted that it is “immaterial”, with 
respect to the application of the European rules on freedom of establishment, that 
Inspire Art Ltd. was formed in the United Kingdom only for the purpose of establishing 
itself in the Netherlands, where its main, or indeed entire, business is being conducted. 
The Court also pointed out that the fact that Inspire Art Ltd. was formed in the United 
Kingdom for the sole purpose of enjoying the benefits of more favorable legislation with 
regard in particular to minimum capital and the paying-up of shares, does not mean that 
the establishment by Inspire Art Ltd. of a branch in the Netherlands is not covered by 
freedom of establishment as provided for by Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty even if 
the company conducts its activities entirely or mainly in the Netherlands. “While in this 
case Inspire Art was formed under the company law of a Member State … for the 
purpose in particular of evading the application of Netherlands company law, which 
was considered to be more severe, the fact remains”, the Court opined, “that the 
provisions of the Treaty on freedom of establishment are intended specifically to enable 
companies formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their 
registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the 
Community to pursue activities in other Member States through an agency, branch or 
subsidiary …”.  
The Court refused to accept the argument that Inspire Art’s freedom of establishment 
was not in any way infringed by the Netherlands’ Law on Formally-Foreign 
Corporations. The government of the Netherlands had argued that, under the Law on 
Formally-foreign Corporations, foreign companies are fully recognised in the 
Netherlands and are not refused registration in the business register, the Law having the 
effect of simply laying down a number of additional obligations that were characterized 
as “administrative”. However, according to the ECJ, the effect of the Law is, in fact, 
that the Dutch company law rules on minimum capital and directors’ liability are 
applied mandatorily to foreign companies such as Inspire Art Ltd. when they carry on 
their business activities exclusively, or almost exclusively, in the Netherlands. 
Therefore, the Court concluded that the Law’s provisions relating to minimum capital 
(both at the time of formation and during the life of the company) and to directors’ 
liability constitute restrictions on freedom of establishment as guaranteed by Articles 43 
and 48 of the Treaty. The reasons for which the company was formed in the other 
Member State, and the fact that it carried on its activities exclusively or almost 
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exclusively in the Member State of establishment, do not deprive, the Court ruled, the 
company of the right to invoke the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the Treaty, 
“save where abuse is established on a case-by-case basis”. Having concluded that the 
Law’s provisions relating to minimum capital and directors’ liability constitute a 
restriction of the freedom of establishment of Inspire Art Ltd., the European Court of 
Justice addressed the question of whether there is any justification for such restriction. 
While it did not engage in a neat factor-by-factor analysis, the ECJ made it clear in 
Inspire Art that the restriction of Inspire Art’s freedom of establishment provided for by 
Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty could not survive scrutiny under the four-prong test 
of Gebhard and Centros.  
The immediate lesson from Inspire Art is that, within the EU, both capital requirements 
and directors’ liability are governed by the law of the corporation’s state of 
incorporation. In light of Überseering and Inspire Art, it is also fair to conclude that all 
other internal affairs of a corporation that is incorporated in one Member State but 
carries on business in another Member State are also governed by the law of the state of 
incorporation, its lex societatis. Thus, within the EU, the real seat doctrine has been 
effectively put to rest by the ECJ in regard to corporations formed in any of the 27 
Member States. Yet, even after Inspire Art, the question remains whether and to what 
extent a Member State can take measures to prevent certain of its nationals from 
attempting, under cover of the rights created by the EC Treaty, improperly to 
circumvent their national legislation or to prevent individuals from improperly or 
fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Community law. As the Court noted in 
Überseering, “[i]t is not inconceivable that overriding requirements relating to the 
general interest, such as protection of the interests of creditors, minority shareholders, 
employees and even the taxation authorities, may, in certain circumstances and subject 
to certain conditions, justify restrictions on freedom of establishment”. 
b) Outbound Cases (“Emigration” Cases) 
It is important to emphasise that Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art concern 
“inbound”, “immigration” or “entry” cases. Thus far, the ECJ has ruled only indirectly 
on the question of whether a corporation that is validly incorporated in a Member State 
may invoke freedom of establishment under Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty to 
transfer its principal place of business or real seat from its state of incorporation to 
another Member State (“outbound”, “emigration” or “exit” case). In The Queen v H. M. 
Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust 
PLC,194 the Court addressed the issue for the first time. 
aa) Daily Mail 
In Daily Mail, the Court held that a company could not rely upon the right to freedom of 
establishment in order to transfer its central management and control to another Member 
State (the Netherlands) for the purpose of selling a significant part of its non-permanent 
assets and using the proceeds of that sale to buy its own shares without having to pay 
the tax normally due on such transactions in the Member State of origin (the United 
Kingdom). The Court rejected the company’s view that the tax authorities had infringed 
                                                 
194 Case C-81/87, The Queen v H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail 
and General Trust plc, [1988] ECR 5483. 
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the right of establishment. The Court concluded that “in the present state of Community 
law” Articles 43 and 48 (ex 52 and 58) of the EC Treaty, properly construed, confer no 
right on a company incorporated under the legislation of a Member State and having its 
registered office there to transfer its central management and control to another Member 
State. In paragraph 23 of its decision in Daily Mail, the Court observed that “the Treaty 
regards the differences in national legislation concerning the required connecting factor 
and the question whether – and if so how – the registered office or real head office of a 
company incorporated under national law may be transferred from one Member State to 
another as problems which are not resolved by the rules concerning the right of 
establishment but must be dealt with by future legislation or conventions”.195 
bb) Überseering 
Distinguishing Überseering from Daily Mail, the ECJ held in Überseering that, despite 
the general terms in which paragraph 23 of Daily Mail is cast, the Court did not intend 
to recognise a Member State as having the power, vis-à-vis companies validly 
incorporated in other Member States and found by it to have transferred their seat to its 
territory, to subject those companies' effective exercise in its territory of the freedom of 
establishment to compliance with its domestic company law.196 The Überseering Court 
saw no grounds for concluding from Daily Mail that, where a company formed in 
accordance with the law of one Member State and with legal personality in that state 
exercises its freedom of establishment in another Member State, the question of 
recognition of its legal capacity and its capacity to be a party to legal proceedings in the 
Member State of establishment falls outside the scope of the Treaty provisions on 
freedom of establishment, even when the company is found, under the law of the 
Member State of establishment, to have moved its actual centre of administration to that 
state.197 
In Überseering, the ECJ made it also clear that the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment is not dependent upon the adoption of a convention on the mutual 
recognition of companies within the meaning of Article 293 of the EC Treaty.198 
According to the Court, Article 293 of the EC Treaty gives Member States the 
“opportunity” to enter into negotiations with a view, inter alia, to facilitating the 
resolution of problems arising from the discrepancies between the various laws relating 
to the mutual recognition of companies and the retention of legal personality in the 
event of the transfer of their seat from one Member State to another. Pointing to the “so 
far as is necessary” clause in Article 293 of the EC Treaty and the Opinion of the 
Advocate General in Überseering, the Court concluded that Article 293 of the EC 
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Treaty does not constitute “a reserve of legislative competence vested in the Member 
States”. It follows that the fact that no convention on the mutual recognition of 
companies has yet been adopted on the basis of Article 293 of the EC Treaty199 cannot 
be used by the Member States to justify limiting the full effect of freedom of 
establishment guaranteed by Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.  
cc) Further Developments 
The Court’s recent holdings in Sevic Systems AG v. Amtsgericht Neuwied200 can also be 
cited in support of the legal proposition that Article 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty prohibit 
restrictions “on entering” or “on leaving” national territory. In light of the Court’s 
holdings in Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministère de l’Èconomie, des Finances et 
de l’Industrie201 and Cadbury Schweppes202 it is also inconceivable that the Court 
would construe a corporation’s freedom of establishment guaranteed by Articles 43 and 
48 of the EC Treaty in the event of cross-border transfer of the real seat, principal place 
of business or center of administration to another cases (“emigration” or “exit” case) 
more restrictively than in an “immigration” or “entry” case such as Überseering or 
Inspire Art. To be sure, the negation by a Member State of the right of a cross-border 
transfer of the actual center of administration, principal place of business or real seat 
(“emigration”) and the requirement to reincorporate in the other Member State (i.e., the 
state of establishment) would be tantamount to outright negation of freedom of 
establishment that Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty are intended to ensure.  
dd) Cartesio 
This proposition is supported by the opinion of the Avocate General Poiares Maduro of 
May 22, 2008 in the matter of Cartesio203 which the ECJ is likely to decide in the near 
future. In Cartesio, a limited partnership (betéti társaság) constituted in accordance 
with the law of Hungary and registered in the Hungarian city of Baja, submitted an 
application to the commercial court to amend its registration in the local commercial 
register so as to record an address in Italy as its new operational headquarters (“központi 
ügyintézés helye”). The court, however, rejected Cartesio’s application on the grounds 
that Hungarian law did not offer companies the possibility of transferring their 
operational headquarters to another Member State while retaining their legal status as a 
company governed by Hungarian law. Therefore, in order to change its operational 
headquarters, Cartesio would first have to be dissolved in Hungary and then 
reconstituted under Italian law. In the subsequent proceedings pursuant to Article 234 of 
the EC Treaty the Hungarian court submitted, inter alia, the question of whether 
regulation of the transfer of a company’s seat is within the scope of Community law or, 
in the absence of the harmonization of laws, national law is exclusively applicable.  
                                                 
199 The Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate of February 29, 1968 
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As Advocate General Poiares Maduro stated in his opinion of May 22, 2008 in 
Cartesio, it is impossible to argue on the basis of the current state of Community law 
that Member States enjoy an absolute freedom to determine the ‘life and death’ of 
companies constituted under their domestic law, irrespective of the consequences for the 
freedom of establishment. Otherwise, Member States would have carte blanche to 
impose a ‘death sentence’ on a company constituted under its laws just because it had 
decided to exercise the freedom of establishment. 
ee) Trusts 
Similar considerations may apply where the foundation takes the form of a common law 
trust. Typically, a trust migrates to another (usually common law) jurisdiction by 
replacing the existing trustees with new trustees resident in the new host state and 
moving the administration of the trust to the new state or a tax neutral jurisdiction. In 
some states the act of emigration results in a deemed disposal of the trust’s assets at 
their market value on the date of migration. Such an “exit tax” on unrealised capital 
gains is imposed in the UK and Ireland. 
c) Cross-Border Transfer of the Registered Seat 
The cross-border transfer of the registered seat (Satzungssitz) is, of course, a different 
and more complicated issue.  
aa) Case Law 
For such a transfer, a corporation needs to acquire legal personality in the other Member 
State and lose it in the home Member State in order to avoid any complications arising 
from its being registered in two countries. In light of the holdings of the European Court 
of Justice in Centros, Überseering, Inspire Art, Sevic, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant 
and Cadbury Schweppes it is unclear whether the retention of legal personality in the 
event of cross-border transfer of the registered seat is possible within the EU or whether 
secondary Community legislation, such as a coordination Directive under Article 
44(2)(g) of the EC Treaty, needs to be adopted for these cases.204 Such legislation 
would have to provide appropriate safeguards in the Member States to allow companies 
to exercise their freedom of establishment by transferring their registered office, thereby 
acquiring legal personality under the law of the other Member State in order to be 
governed by that law and without having to be wound-up in the home Member State. 
The objective of such a Directive should be to facilitate the cross-border transfer, by 
way of freedom of establishment, of the registered office of a corporation already 
formed under the law of a Member State.  
bb) Draft 14th Directive 
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The EU Commission outlined its views as to the proposal of a 14th Company Law 
Directive on the Cross-border Transfer of the Registered Office of Limited Companies 
in a public consultation. According to the Commission, each Member State would have 
to recognise the right of a corporation governed by its own law to opt, by decision of the 
general meeting taken in accordance with the formalities and procedures for altering the 
articles of incorporation and the by-laws, to transfer its registered office to another 
Member State without acquiring a new legal personality in place of its original one. The 
decision of the general meeting would not in itself entail the removal of the company 
from its home Member State’s commercial register so long as the company has not 
acquired registration in the host Member State. To protect those who are particularly 
affected by the transfer, notably minority shareholders and creditors, the general 
meeting’s decision to transfer the registered office would have to be disclosed publicly 
in advance, as must its consequences. The home Member State should also have the 
power to ensure special protection of the rights of certain categories of person, 
particularly minority shareholders and creditors, in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality laid down by the ECJ.  
Obviously, the host Member State could not refuse to register a company which, on the 
basis of the decision taken by its general meeting and in particular of the changes of its 
articles of incorporation and its by-laws, satisfies the essential substantive and formal 
requirements for the registration of domestic companies. As the EU Commission has 
pointed out, the Directive should coordinate supervision by the home Member State of 
the validity of the decisions taken by the general meeting and supervision by the host 
Member State of the substantive and procedural requirements of its own law for the 
company to be recognised under its law and to be registered. Registration in the host 
Member State should result in the company losing its incorporation in the home 
Member State and being removed from the commercial register there, without losing the 
legal personality itself. The transfer of the registered office should be recorded both in 
the home state and in the host state. The EU Commission emphasises correctly that the 
cross-border transfer of a company’s registered office should be “tax-neutral” in 
accordance with the principles adopted for cross-border mergers by Directive 
90/434/EEC.205  
Upon re-evaluating the issue, Commisioner McCreevy concluded in December of 2007 
that no legislative action was needed at EU level. Consequently, work on the 14th 
Directive was discontinued.206 
2. Application to Foundations 
It is still a largely unsettled question whether and to what extent, if any, the right of 
establishment is applicable to foundations.  
a) General Observations 
If and to the extent that Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty can be applied to 
foundations, the principles developed by the ECJ in its jurisprudence are not only 
applicable to companies but also to foundations. As a result, restrictions by Member 
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State legislation “on entering” or “on leaving” national territory would be prohibited, 
regardless of whether those restrictions are substantive or procedural in nature or part of 
the conflicts-of-laws regime, which would allow a foundation to engage in cross-border 
activities, including the transfer of its (real) seat from one Member State to another 
while retaining its legal status as a foundation under the law of the state of formation. It 
appears to be equally clear from the ECJ’s case law regarding the right of establishment 
that the effective exercise of the freedom of establishment requires at least some degree 
of mutual recognition and coordination of the various systems of rules.  
It should also be emphasised that, according to the ECJ’s case law, Member States may 
take measures to prevent “wholly artificial arrangements, which do not reflect economic 
reality” and which are aimed at circumventing national legislation. In particular, the 
right of establishment does not preclude Member States from being wary of “scam” 
foundations. This follows from the principle of abuse of Community law the 
applicability of which in the context of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty was 
expressly mentioned in Centros and Inspire Art, even though the Court continues to use 
the notion of abuse with considerable restraint. In addition, restrictions by Member 
State legislation on the freedom of establishment of a foundation may be justified on 
grounds of general public interest, such as the prevention of abuse or fraudulent 
conduct, or the protection of the interests of individuals affected by the activities of a 
foundation or the tax authorities.  
b) In Search of an Answer 
As stated above, the ECJ has never had the opportunity to rule on the issue of whether 
and to what extent Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty apply to recognition of foreign 
foundations or to the cross-border mobility of foundations within the EU. The Court 
has, however, interpreted Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty in the contexts, for 
example, of taxation207 and Community competition law.208 Consequently, answers 
need to be developed in light of the pertinent European law as well as relevant case law, 
taking into account the opinions of legal commentators. 
aa) Literal Interpretation 
In view of the language of Article 48(2) of the EC Treaty, an argument could be made 
that only foundations carrying on a commercial (“for-profit”) activity are subject to the 
right of establishment. Thus, charitable foundations and other not-for-profit foundations 
engaged in cultural, scientific or social activities would not be entitled to invoke the 
right of establishment under Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty as those activities are 
not commercial in nature. Such an interpretation of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty 
would seem to be rather narrow, however, and inconsistent with other case law.  
bb) Functional Approach 
Alternatively, rather than construing Article 48(2) of the EC Treaty only based upon its 
language, one could apply a functional approach taking into account the EC Treaty’s 
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provisions, for example, on competition or EU legislation (e.g., Council Directive 
77/187/EEC) and the case law interpreting these provisions.  
Thus, for example, the Court held in Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID 
(MOTOE) v. Elliniko Dimosio209 that the fact that the Automobile and Touring Club of 
Greece (ELPA) does not seek to make a profit does not prevent the courts from treating 
it as an undertaking for purposes of Community competition law.  
Similarly, it should be noted that in Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze v. Cassa 
di Risparmio di Firenze and Others the Court stated that the fact that the offer of goods 
or services is made without profit motive does not preclude a court from characterizing 
as being an undertaking an entity that carries out those operations in the market, since 
that offer exists in competition with that of other actors who do seek to make a profit. 
“[W]here a banking foundation, acting itself in the fields of public interest and social 
assistance uses the authorisation given it by the national legislature to effect the 
financial, commercial, real estate and asset operations necessary or opportune in order 
to achieve the aims prescribed for it”, the Court opined, “it is capable of offering goods 
or services on the market in competition with other operators, for example in fields like 
scientific research, education, art or health”.210 On that hypothesis, which is subject to 
the national court’s assessment,211 the Court concluded that the banking foundation 
must be regarded as an undertaking, in that it engages in an economic activity, 
notwithstanding the fact that the offer of goods or services is made without profit 
motive, since that offer will be in competition with that of profit-making operators. 
cc) Application 
As applied to Article 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, this case law would seem to suggest 
that, notwithstanding the fact that their offer of goods or services is made without profit 
motive, not-for-profit foundations may be entitled to the right of establishment if and to 
the extent that they engage in an economic activity in a market by offering goods or 
services that are in competition with offerings of commercial offerors seeking a profit.  
In that regard it must be pointed out that, according to the case law,212 the mere holding 
of shares, even controlling shareholdings, is insufficient to characterise as economic an 
activity of the entity holding those shares, when it gives rise only to the exercise of the 
rights attached to the status of shareholder or member, as well as, if appropriate, the 
receipt of dividends, which are merely the fruits of the ownership of an asset. On the 
other hand, an entity which, owning controlling shareholdings in a company, actually 
exercises that control by involving itself directly or indirectly in the management 
thereof must be regarded as taking part in the economic activity carried on by the 
controlled undertaking. 
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Similarly, the Court held in Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt 
München für Körperschaften that in order for the provisions relating to freedom of 
establishment to apply, it is generally necessary that the property of a foundation 
located in another Member State is “actively” managed by the foundation.213 Thus, if, 
for example, a foundation having charitable status under the law of Italy is the owner of 
real property located in Germany and the services ancillary to the letting of that property 
are provided by a property management agent in Germany, the provisions governing 
freedom of establishment are nor applicable as the foundation has not secured a 
permanent presence in the host Member State. 
The actual scope of the concept of economic activity is illustrated in Didier Mayeur v. 
Associations Promotion d’Information Messine (APIM). In this case, the Court held that 
a private non-profit-making association which had legal personality separate from that 
of the city may be characterised, for purposes of Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 
February 14, 1977 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States relating to 
the Safeguarding of Employees' Rights in the Event of Transfers of Undertakings, 
Businesses or Parts of Businesses,214 as engaging in economic activity if it carries out 
publicity and information activities on behalf of the city in connection with the services 
that the latter offers to the public.215 Thus, the transfer of activities formerly carried out 
by an organization or entity organised under public law to a not-for-profit organization 
formed under privat law does not prevent the activity from being characterised as 
economic activity.  
dd) Summary 
In light of the foregoing case law it is fair to conclude that a foundation the activities of 
which are financed neither through its own business operations nor by means of an 
“active” management of its property is not engaged in economic activities. 
Consequently, such a foundation would not be able to claim the benefits of the right of 
establishment pursuant to Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty. 
As to the expenditures of a non-profit foundation, one needs to differentiate between 
grant-making and operating foundations.  
– An operating foundation carries out self-directed not-for-profit projects. If, in the 
course of such a project, goods or services are being exchanged for value 
(consideration), small or large, the foundation is to be qualified as engaging in 
economic activities. As a result, such an operating foundation would be subject 
to Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty. 
– The activities of a grant-making foundation, by contrast, is often limited to the 
distribution of money or similar financial means to individuals, institutions or 
projects. A grant-making foundation typically does not offer goods or services in 
exchange for money and is not competing against for-profit organizations. 
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Hence, a pure grant-making foundation normally does not fall within the ambit 
of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty. 
In sum, a foundation can only invoke freedom of establishment pursuant to Articles 43 
and 48 of the EC Treaty if it operates a business or if it is „actively“ managing its assets 
or property or if, in the course of its not-for-profit activities, it offers goods or services 
in exchange for money or similar financial means. If it does not meet any of the 
aforementioned prerequisites, the foundation will not fall within the ambit of Articles 43 
and 48 of the EC Treaty. 
c) Cross-Border Activities: Setting up Branches and Agencies 
If, however, a foundation is entitled to invoke freedom of establishment under Articles 
43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, the question arises to what extent, if any, Articles 43 and 48 
of the EC Treaty can be utilised to overcome existing civil law barriers. 
aa) Setting up Subsidiaries 
Freedom of establishment includes the right to set up and manage subsidiaries under the 
conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the Member State where such 
establishment is effected. Thus, the formation of a legally independent subsidiary of a 
foundation requires an act by the foundation or its founders in accordance with the law 
of the Member State in which the establishment is to be effected. The formation is 
governed solely by the law of the state of establishment which will differ, more or less, 
from the law of the Member State in which the foundation has been formed. 
bb) Setting up Branches 
Freedom of establishment also includes the right to set up agencies or branches. 
Obviously, agencies and branches are not legally independent entities. Rather, agencies 
and branches of a foundation are governed by the law of the state where the foundation 
was formed. It follows that non-profit foundations that can invoke freedom of 
establishment (see supra) are entitled to set up agencies or branches in another Member 
State. To the extent that the activities of an agency or branch are within the scope of the 
foundation’s purpose or purposes, the branch or agency does not need to be 
reconstituted under the non-profit-organizations laws of the host Member State. Thus, 
the establishment of an agency or branch in another Member State is within the powers 
of the management of the foundation. If the home state of the foundation imposes 
restrictions on the right of a foundation to establish an agency or branch in another 
Member State, such restriction would hinder or make “less attractive” the foundation’s 
freedom of establishment under Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty and, therefore, 
would constitute a violation of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty unless it can be 
justified under the “four-factor test” that was first applied by the European Court of 
Justice in Gebhard216 in the context of Article 43 of the EC Treaty and extended by the 
Court in Centros217 to restrictions on companies’ freedom of establishment guaranteed 
                                                 
216 Case C-55/94, Gebhard v Consiglio dell’ Ordine degli Avvocatti e Procuratori di Milano [1993] ECR 
I-4165 at para.37. 
217 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v Erhvers- og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I-1459 at para. 34. 
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by Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty and reconfirmed in Inspire Art218. Hence, a 
categorical denial by a Member State of the right to set up agencies or branches in 
another Member State would deprive foundations within the ambit of Articles 43 and 48 
of the EC Treaty (see supra) of their freedom of establishment. Similarly, attempts by 
the Member State in which the establishment is effected to impose its more restrictive 
law (e.g., concerning the purpose of a foundation) on the agency or branch of a foreign 
(EU) foundation would constitute a violation of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty 
unless such violation could be justified in accordance with the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice. 
In light of the case law just mentioned, a Member State law that requires the branch of a 
foreign (EU) foundation, that was validly formed in accordance with the law of the 
foundation’s home state, fully to comply with the foundation laws of the branch’s host 
state would seem to be inconsistent with the mandates of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC 
Treaty unless it could be justified under the “four-factor test” established in Gebhard. 
Similarly, a law that imposes unnecessarily rigorous requirements on the establishment 
of an agency of a foreign (EU) foundation would also restrict the foundation’s freedom 
of estsblishment and could be upheld only if it were justified in light of the Gebhard 
test. It appears that laws of this kind are presently in force in the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Italy, Spain, Poland and Bulgaria.. 
In view of the four-factor test set forth in Gebhard and expressly reconfirmed in 
Centros, Member States may, however, impose upon out-of-state foundations certain 
notification or registration requirements (see, e.g., the registration requirements under 
Czech law) as long as they are reasonable under the circumstances and not prohibitive. 
Thus, for example, a Member State may not charge foreign foundations prohibitively 
high fees or impose excessive waiting periods in connection with the registration.219 A 
Member State may, however, require useful information, for example, about the nature 
of the activities of the foreign foundation, the capitalization, the management and the 
persons behind the organization as well as the tax status in the country of formation.220 
The requirement of some member states (e.g., Estonia, Italy and Spain) that a foreign 
foundation follow certain recognition procedures or establish a representative office 
within the Member State in which it intends to carry on its activities (e.g., Poland and 
Bulgaria) constitute a highly questionable restriction that can hardly be justified in light 
of the four-factor test.  
                                                 
218 Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003] I-
10155 at para. 133. 
219 Cf. Cases C-163-/94, C-165/94 and C-250/94, Lucas Emilio Sanz de Lera and Others, [1995] ECR I-
4821 (holding that in cases involving the free movement of capital “[a] prior declaration, giving useful 
information as to the nature of the planned operation and the identity of the declarant, would enable the 
Member States to verify the actual use to which means of payment exported to non-member countries 
was put, without impeding liberalized capital movements, and thereby to ensure observance of any 
restrictions on capital movements authorized by Article 73c of the Treaty”]. 
220 Cf. Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt München für Körperschaften, 
[2006] ECR I-8203 (para. 49) (holding that “[t]here is nothing to prevent the tax authorities concerned 
from requiring a charitable foundation claiming exemption from tax to provide relevant supporting 
evidence to enable those authorities to carry out the necessary checks. Further, national legislation which 
absolutely prevents the taxpayer from submitting such evidence cannot be justified in the name of 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision”). 
 - 137 -
Similarly, the Court has held that a tax provision that has the effect that revenue from 
capital of non-Finnish origin receives less favourable tax treatment than dividends 
distributed by companies established in Finland constitutes an obstacle to the free 
movement of capital since shares of companies established in other Member States are 
less attractive to investors residing in Finland than shares in companies which have their 
seat in that Member State. Such a provision may also make a foundation’s right of 
establishment less attractive and is therefore in conformity with the EC Treaty only if 
the restriction can be justified in accordance with the four-factor test of Gebhard and 
Centros.221 
cc) Transfer of the Real Seat 
Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty apply also to the transfer of the center of 
administration or real seat (siège reel or effektiver Verwaltungssitz) of non-profit 
foundations. According to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, freedom 
of establishment includes the right of a company to transfer its center of administration 
or real seat (siège reel or effektiver Verwaltungssitz) to another Member State. The same 
principles apply to foundations within the ambit of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty 
(see supra).  
Thus, a Member State’s (State B) refusal to recognise the legal personality of a 
foundation that was validly formed under the laws of a Member State (State A) on the 
ground that the foundation had effectively transferred its real seat or center of 
administration to State B, constitutes a restriction on freedom of establishment which, in 
principle is incompatible with Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty (Überseering). In 
light of the Court’s holdings in Centros, a foundation that is validly formed in an EU 
Member State enjoys the freedom of establishment guaranteed by Articles 43 and 48 of 
the EC Treaty even if it never intended to engage in any activity in its home state, but 
was formed in one Member State only for the purpose of establishing itself in a second 
Member State where its main, or indeed entire, activity is to be conducted. The home 
state’s requirement that the same foundation be reincorporated in the country of 
establishment is tantamount to outright negation of freedom of establishment which, 
unlike a restriction, cannot be justified in any case under the “four-factor test” of 
Gehard and Inspire Art. In light of Centros and Inspire Art, the reasons for which a 
foundation chooses to be formed in a particular Member State are irrelevant with regard 
to application of the rules on freedom of establishment. It should be noted, however, 
that, as was stated above, a foundation can only invoke freedom of establishment 
pursuant to Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty if it operates a business or if it is 
„actively“ managing its assets or property or if, in the course of its not-for-profit 
activities, it offers goods or services in exchange for money or similar financial means. 
If it does not meet any of the aforementioned prerequisites, the foundation will not fall 
within the ambit of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.  
If it enjoys freedom of establishment under Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, the 
liability of its directors is subject to the law of the state of formation (State A) rather 
than the state of establishment (State B). This follows from the holdings of the 
European Court of Justice in Inspire Art. In light of the Court’s jurisprudence it is also 
fair to conclude that the law of the state of formation, rather than the law of the state of 
                                                 
221 Case C-319/02, Petri Manninen, [2004] ECR I-7477 (with further references to the Court’s case law). 
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establishment, governs the internal affairs of the foundation such as the role and powers 
of the directors, the requirement of board of supervisors, and minimum capitalization 
requirements. 
Measures and instruments of government supervision, by contrast, are not necessarily 
governed by the private law of foundations. However, even administrative and other 
public law affecting foreign foundations must be measured against freedom of 
establishment as Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty mandate that a foundation’s 
freedom of establishment must not be restricted regardless of whether the restriction is 
part of private and public law. Justifications, if any, need to meet the high standards 
developed by the European Court of Justice in Gebhard, Centros, Überseering and 
Inspire Art (“four-factor test”). 
As has been explained before, the principles established by the European Court of 
Justice regarding freedom of establishment in the “immigration” or “entry” cases are 
likely to be equally applicable to the “emigration” or “exit” cases (Cartesio). In light of 
the Court’s jurisprudence, it is inconceivable that the Court would construe a 
foundation’s freedom of establishment guaranteed by Articles 43 and 48 of the EC 
Treaty in the case of a cross-border transfer of the real seat, principal place of business 
or center of administration (“emigration” or “exit” cases) more restrictively than in an 
“immigration” or “entry” case such as Überseering or Inspire Art. This view is, as set 
forth above, shared by Avocate General Poiares Maduro in his opinion of May 22, 
2008 in Cartesio. 
d) Cross-Border Mergers between, and Acquisitions of, Foundations 
The European Court of Justice has never had an opportunity to rule on cross-border 
mergers between, and acquisitions or restructurings of, foundations. There is no 
pertinent secondary EU legislation either. Directive 2005/56/EC applies only to 
corporations but not to foundations.222 At the national level, there is hardly any 
discussion of the relevant issues. In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the law 
does allow foundations to merge. German law permits a foundation to spin off 
economic activities. The foundation laws of several German provinces (Länder) provide 
that foundations may merge; provided, such a merger is expressly permitted in the 
foundation’s articles of formation. Such a merger requires, however, approval by the 
competent government authorities. 
In Sevic Systems AG v. Amtsgericht Neuwied,223 the European Court of Justice has 
made it clear that structural changes such as a cross-border merger (in casu: 
Verschmelzung) fall within the ambit of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty.. The Court 
noticed that the relevant German law provided rules for domestic Verschmelzungen but 
did not attempt to regulate similar cross-border transactions224. According to the Court, 
the different treatment of domestic and cross-border transactions could prevent 
companies from exercising their freedom of establishment and does therefore constitute 
a restriction of Articles 43 and 48 of the Treaty225. The Court pointed out that 
                                                 
222 Directive 2005/56/EC on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, OJ L 310/1 (25 Nov 
2005). 
223 Case C-411/03, Sevic Systems AG v. Amtsgericht Neuwied, [2005] ECR I-4321 at para. 21. 
224 Case C-411/03 at para. 20. 
225 para. 22 et seq. 
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imperative requirements in the public interest such as the protection of creditors, 
minority shareholders or employees as well as the interest in an efficient enforcement of 
tax laws may justify certain restrictions of freedom of establishment, but the Court held 
that the refusal of cross-border mergers is incompatible with Articles 43 and 48 of the 
EC Treaty.226. It is fair to conclude from the Court’s holding that if a Member State 
allows domestic entities to merge or engage in similar restructuring transactions it must 
also allow these transactions across state borders. This would seem to apply equally to 
outbound (Hinausverschmelzung) and inbound transactions (Hineinverschmelzung).227. 
In order to make this kind of cross-border transaction viable, the two jurisdictions 
concerned would need to allow this kind of transaction, and the parties concerned would 
have to comply with the requirements of the laws of both jurisdictions, including any 
governmental approval requirements. In light of the fact Articles 43 and 48 of the EC 
Treaty apply only to foundations engaged in economic activities, cross-border 
Verschmelzungen of foundations and similar transactions would seem to be an 
extremely rare exception rather than a common transaction. 
                                                
3. Conclusions 
The preceding analysis illustrates the increasing significance of the right of 
establishment pursuant to Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, especially in the field of 
not-for-profit foundations. While the Court has not yet ruled on the issue, case law 
suggests that the provisions regarding freedom of establishment apply to a not-for-profit 
foundation if it engages in “economic activity”, i.e., if it offers goods or services in a 
market in competition with offers made by persons who operate in that market for 
profit. In contrast, if the foundation does not carry on an “economic activity”, it cannot 
invoke the right of establishment. Given the theoretically broad scope of the concept of 
“economic activity” it is fair to conclude that at least some not-for-profit foundations in 
the EU are subject to the right of establishment.  
Where to draw the line between economic and non-economic activities is not entirely 
clear, however. While the Court’s jurisprudence does provide some guidance, it does 
not offer clear, foreseeable, and reliable solutions for all possible cases. Thus, for 
example, it is subject to debate under what, if any, circumstance the management of a 
foundation’s assets can be characterised as “active”. Similarly, it is unclear whether the 
economic activity in question needs to be material and, if so, whether it needs to be 
quantitatively or qualitatively material or both. The absence of a clear distinction is 
particularly problematic because the applicability of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty 
depends upon the characterization of the activity of a foundation as an “economic” one. 
Only if the activity of a not-for-profit foundation can be characterised as an economic 
activity, may the foundation invoke the right of establishment which allows it, inter alia, 
to engage in cross-border activities. Under the provisions regarding the right of 
establishment, the not-for-profit foundation even enjoys the freedom to transfer its 
principal place of business or real seat (siège social) from its home Member State to 
another Member State. Specifically, the right of establishment allows a foundation both 
to emigrate and to immigrate. In contrast, at the current state of European law, the 
 
226 Case 411/03 at para. 28 – 30. 
227 Opinion of the Advocate General Tizzano in Sevic, [2005] ECR I-10805 at para 45. 
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transfer of the registered seat will be possible only if legal mechanisms are in place that 
ensure that the interests of all those affected by such a transfer are taken into account. 
It is also clear from the ECJ’s case law that if a foundation enjoys the right of 
establishment, a Member State may not, as a general rule, restrict this right or make its 
execise less attractive, unless the restriction can be justified according to Article 46 of 
the EC Treaty or pursuant to the four-factor test set forth in Gebhard and reconfirmed 
by the ECJ in Centros. In light of case law, the real seat doctrine would not seem to be a 
justifiable restriction of a foundation’s right of establishment in regard to both 
immigration and emigration cases. In contrast, Member States may impose registration 
requirements on foreign corporations; provided, these requirements are not contrary to 
the four-factor test. Thus, for example, under Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty the 
registration authority of a Member State may not charge prohibitively high registration 
fees or impose unreasonably long waiting periods in conncetion with the registration. 
Special recognition requirements for foreign not-for-profit foundations are subject to the 
same limitations as registration requirements. The requirement imposed by some 
Member States (e.g., Bulgaria and Poland) that a foreign foundation establish a 
representative office in the state in which it wishes to operate would seem to be an 
unjustifiable restriction of the foundation’s right of establishment.  
While for a some foundations (i.e., only those that are engaged in “active” economic 
activities) a cross-border transfer of the principal place of business, real seat or siège 
réel is possible under Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty, numerous material problems 
continue to exist. These problems result primarily from the supervision and control 
mechanisms that Member State authorities may exercise over domestic (and sometimes 
also over foreign) foundations. The interaction between state supervision and freedom 
of establishment is still unsettled. 
Most Member States have taken a rather narrow view with regard to mergers between 
domestic foundations. Cross-border mergers of foundations thus far appear to have been 
relatively seldom. For the time being, Articles 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty are not likely 
to open more opportunities for foundations engaged in economic activities. 
II. Tax Law 
1. Fundamental Freedoms: General Principles According to Case Law 
In the field of tax law, the impact of the fundamental freedoms is equally relevant.228. 
In European case law one can find three cases which discuss the impact of the 
fundamental freedoms to tax law barriers.  
a) Stauffer: Discrimination of a Real Estate Investment of a Foreign-Based Foundation 
As far as the tax treatment of non-resident foundations is concerned, the ECJ has 
already made the first and most significant step by its decision of 14 September 2006 in 
the Centro Musicologia di Walter Stauffer case.229 
                                                 
228 Also, less obvious, the state aid rules (Art. 87 EC) are applicable. 
229  Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt München für Körperschaften, 
[2006] ECR I-8203. 
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This inbound case concerned an Italy-based public benefit foundation which made a real 
property investment in Germany. While income from such investments is usually tax-exempt 
if derived by a public benefit institution resident in Germany, the clear wording of 
Germany’s Corporate Income Tax Act makes clear that the exemption is not available for 
non-resident institutions like the Stauffer Foundation. 
The case touches on several intricate questions of the fundamental freedoms, with some 
of them having been answered by the ECJ in its preliminary ruling:  
– Are the fundamental freedoms applicable to real estate investments of a for-
profit institution as well as to a non-profit institution? (if so, which fundamental 
freedoms in particular?) 
– Is there any justification for the current restriction? 
– If there is no justification, when is a foreign public benefit foundation 
comparable to a national one so that a restriction implies unjustified 
discrimination? 
aa) Applicability of Fundamental Freedoms to Foreign Investments of Public Benefit 
Foundations 
The first point concerns the applicability of the market freedoms to foreign income from 
an the investments of a public benefit foundation. While business and entrepreneurial 
foundations (e.g., in the Netherlands) act on economic markets and, for this reason 
alone, do enjoy full protection of the fundamental freedoms like any other player on 
such economic markets, public benefit foundations might be regarded as non-market 
actors and, for this reason, be denied any protection accorded under the fundamental 
freedoms. 
However, the mere fact alone that a foundation (like any other body, corporate or non-
corporate) earns income functions as a strong indicator of economic activity. If, and to 
the extent that, income tax rules of the state of residence provide for taxation of non-
profit activities where the foundation earns income (or derives capital gains) from 
sources abroad, it is exactly these rules which make perfectly clear that there obviously 
is a market activity of such corporation. Each single activity, and each item of income, 
might then be tested against the fundamental freedoms.  
Thus, in the Stauffer decision the ECJ determined that the fundamental freedoms of the 
EC treaty are applicable. In the specific case, the freedom of establishment was denied, 
because the Italian foundation had not secured a permanent presence in Germany (the 
services ancillary to the letting of the property were provided by a German property 
management agent).230 However, according to the ECJ, the freedom of capital 
movement was applicable, because ‘investments in real estate’ were included in the 
nomenclatura of the (former) Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24.6.1988, and because 
it is ECJ settled case law that the content of the nomenclatura can be used in order to 
define “capital movements”.231 
bb) No Justification 
The ECJ has clarified that restrictions of the fundamental freedoms cannot be justified 
in the field of the taxation of public benefit organizations in an easier way than 
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elsewhere. The ECJ especially denied a justification of the total exclusion of any foreign 
public benefit foundation (1) because of the special provisions Art. 87(3)(d) and Art. 
151 of the EC Treaty,232 (2) because of the need of effective fiscal supervision (which 
only allows “measures enabling it to ascertain in a clear and precise manner whether the 
foundation meets the conditions imposed by national law”),233 (3) because of the need 
to ensure the cohesion of the national tax system,234 and (4) because of the need to 
protect the basis of tax revenue and to the fight crime.235 
cc) Comparability of a Foreign Public Benefit Foundation with a National Public 
Benefit Foundation 
The ECJ was not competent to decide whether the Italian foundation in this specific 
case was comparable to a tax-exempt German foundation, because the interpretation of 
national (tax) law is a task for the national courts. 
However, the ECJ has provided hints concerning the criteria for the comparability test: 
According to the ECJ, the Italian foundation has to meet all requirements of German tax 
law, except the residence in Germany.236 For this test, it is not sufficient that the Italian 
foundation has the status of a tax-exempt foundation according to Italian tax law.237  
After the decision of the ECJ, the German Federal Fiscal Court had still to decide 
whether the Italian foundation met the requirements of German tax law.238  This test 
was not easy, because German tax law provides for additional requirements in 
comparison to Italian tax law. Therefore, it was uncertain whether the Italian foundation 
met criteria like the “duty of timely disbursement”, which exist in German tax law, but 
not in Italian tax law.239 Because of that uncertainty, the Federal Fiscal Court referred 
the case back to the Federal Local Court in order to clarify the facts. 
b) Currently Under Review: Persche and the Discrimination of Direct Cross-Border 
Donations 
In the case Persche the ECJ will have to decide whether the fundamental freedoms of 
the EC treaty also prohibit discrimination in the case of a donation to a foreign-based 
foundation. 
The German resident individual Hein Persche donated towels, walking frames and other 
medical devices to a social institution in Portugal in 2003. The tax authorities in Germany 
denied any deduction of donations on the grounds that the recipient institution was not 
resident in Germany.  
Germany’s Federal Tax Court has left open the question whether requirements other than the 
recipient’s residence were met. The Court made clear, however, that at least for the sake of 
its own rulings, the compatibility of the residence criterion was decisive. For these reasons, it 
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referred the case to the ECJ,240 where it is still pending.241 On 14 October 2008CJ) Advocate 
General Mengozzi delivered an opinion on the Persche case. The ECJ ruling may not be 
expected before spring 2009. 
In this case, it is necessary to look carefully at the following legal issues: 
– Are the fundamental freedoms also applicable to donations to a public benefit 
institution? (aa) 
– If the fundamental freedoms are applicable: Is there any justification for the 
current restriction? (bb) 
– If there is no justification: Is a foreign public benefit foundation comparable to a 
national one, so that a restriction means an unjustified discrimination? (cc) 
aa) Applicability of Fundamental Freedoms to Donations to Public Benefit 
Foundations? 
It is evident that a donation (which lacks a consideration) does not fall into the ambit of 
the freedom of establishment (Art. 43, 48, EC Treaty). 
However it is possible that a donation falls into the ambit of Art. 56 of the EC Treaty, 
read in connection with the nomenclatura in Annex I on the (former) Council Directive 
88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988.242 Indeed, according to chapter XII of that Directive 
(“Personal Capital Movements”) “gifts and endowments” as well as “inheritances and 
legacies” fall into the ambit of Art. 56 of the EC Treaty also. Although it may seem 
surprising that the “market freedoms” of the EC Treaty are also applicable in such 
“altruistic” cases, the wording of the nomenclatura is very clear. Consequently, the ECJ 
has already decided that even inheritance falls into the scope of Art. 56, read in 
connection with the nomenclatura in Annex I on the (former) Council Directive 
88/361/EEC, Chapter XII.243 Thus, it would be very surprising if the ECJ did not decide 
that donations fall into the ambit of the freedom of capital movement. In addition, the 
opinion of the Advocate General points in this direction. 
bb) No Justification? 
The strict focus on the divergence in residence seems to make the Persche case similar, 
if not equivalent, to the Stauffer case. In Stauffer, too, the ECJ convincingly stated that 
the mere fact that a recipient foundation has its seat and actual place of management in a 
different EC Member State does not withstand a full comparability of the two 
situations.244 Thus, it is questionable whether the ECJ will now decide differently on 
Persche? 
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According to some legal scholars, Persche is not comparable to Stauffer, because in 
Stauffer there was a “tax relation” between the source country and the charity by being 
taxable as a non-resident on the rental income of real estate in Germany. On the other 
hand, in Persche there was no such tax relation between the charity (in Portugal) and 
Germany, where the deduction would have to be granted. However, this argument is not 
very convincing, because in Persche there is indeed a “tax relation” between the donor 
(in Germany) who claims the deduction from his income tax and the source country 
(Germany).  
Another main argument is that effective control by the tax authorities may not be 
guaranteed:  there is continuous control and audit of domestic charities, whereas for 
foreign charities it would have to be on a case by case basis, which cannot be provided 
for in a view of the high numbers of donations. However, such problems also arise in a 
case like Stauffer as well as in many other transnational cases. In Stauffer, the ECJ 
rejected this argument,245 and it would not be consistent to decide on the two cases 
differently.246 
cc) Comparability – a Question for the National Court 
The question of comparability (would a donation to a resident foundation in such a case 
be accepted as a tax-exempt donation under German law247) will not be decided by the 
ECJ, since this is a question pertaining to German national tax law, which falls into the 
ambit of the German (tax) courts.  
dd) Prospect 
The ECJ will have to test whether the fundamental freedoms are also applicable to 
donations to a public benefit institution, and, if so, whether there is a justifying reason 
for the denial of tax benefits for the cross-border donation in the Persche case.  
Here, the authors will not anticipate the ruling of the Grand Chamber. However, given 
that it is the mere fact of the recipient’s residence which is at issue here,248 we can 
hardly see a convincing justification why Persche should be decided differently from 
Stauffer. 
After all, even if we are not fully confident what the outcome of the Persche case will 
be, it seems to us that the ECJ will likely rule in favour of a deduction of cross-border 
donations, as the Opinion of the Advocate General Mengozzi suggests. 
c) Laboratoires Fournier (Territorial Restrictions for Tax Benefits) 
Another question was to be decided by the ECJ in Laboratoires Fournier.249 
According to French legislation, a tax credit for research was available for research activities 
solely carried out in France. Fournier, which manufactures and sells pharmaceuticals, 
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subcontracted numerous research projects to research centres based in various Member 
States and took the resultant expenditure into account in calculating this tax credit for 
research for the years 1995 and 1996. In 1998 Fournier was audited for those years. 
Following that audit, tax adjustment notices were issued to Fournier, as the Direction des 
Vérifications had disallowed the aforementioned expenditure in the calculation of the tax 
credit for research as claimed by the company. The resultant additional tax assessments were 
levied on Fournier for the period at issue in the main proceedings. 
aa) Applicability of Fundamental Freedoms to Research Activities 
According to the ECJ, research activities fall into the ambit of the fundamental freedom 
of Art. 49 of the EC Treaty (freedom of services).  
bb) No Justification 
Restricting the benefit of a tax credit for research only to research carried out in the 
Member State in question was not justified. The ECJ denied a justification based on the 
need to ensure the cohesion of the national tax system.250 
Moreover, the additional argument that the territorial restrictions would be justified by 
the objective of promoting research did not convince the ECJ. The promotion of 
research and development could not justify a national measure which refuses the benefit 
of a tax credit for any research not carried out in the Member State concerned. Such 
legislation would be directly contrary to the objective of Community policy on research 
and technological development which, according to Art. 163(1) of the EC Treaty, would 
be, inter alia, ‘strengthening the scientific and technological bases of Community 
industry and encouraging it to become more competitive at an international level’. In 
addition, Art. 163(2) EC Treaty provides, in particular that, for this purpose, the 
Community is to ‘support [undertakings’] efforts to cooperate with one another, aiming, 
notably, at enabling [them] to exploit the internal market potential to the full, in 
particular through … the removal of legal and fiscal obstacles to that cooperation.’251  
Finally, the aim of the effectiveness of fiscal supervision would not justify that kind of 
restriction either. A Member State could apply measures which would make possible to 
ascertain the amount of costs deductible in that State as research expenditure clearly and 
precisely. However, national legislation that would absolutely prevent the taxpayer from 
submitting evidence that expenditure relating to research carried out in other Member 
States could not be justified in the name of effectiveness of fiscal supervision. The 
possibility could not be excluded a priori that the taxpayer would be able to provide 
relevant documentary evidence enabling the tax authorities of the Member State of 
taxation to ascertain, clearly and precisely, the nature and genuineness of the research 
expenditure incurred in other Member States.252     
2. Conclusion: Non-Discrimination Rule as Regards the Seat of a Foundation 
a) Taxation of a Foundation  
aa) Inbound Constellation 
                                                 
250 ECJ, Case C-39/04, ECR I-2057, para. 20-21. 
251 ECJ, Case C-39/04, ECR I-2057, para. 23. 
252 ECJ, Case C-39/04, ECR I-2057, para. 24-25. 
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The analysis of the Stauffer decision confirms the existence of the non-discrimination 
rule concerning the income taxation of a non-resident foundation by the state of source. 
bb) Outbound Constellation 
In the outbound constellation (tax treatment of resident foundations acting out of area) 
the described non-discrimination rule is not applicable, because in this constellation 
there is no discrimination of a foreign-based foundation, but a general restriction of 
national tax law for all foundations irrespective of their residence. 
According to Stauffer, such a general restriction does not generally infringe the 
fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty: “Member States are entitled to require a 
sufficiently close link between foundations upon which they confer charitable status for 
the purposes of granting certain tax benefits and the activities pursued by those 
foundations.”253 
However, as in Laboratoires Fournier, in certain cases a territorial restriction can 
nevertheless be regarded as an infringement of the fundamental freedoms of the EC 
treaty, e.g., if there is a contradiction to the aims of the EC Treaty.254 Thus, the 
territorial restrictions of some Member States can infringe the EC Treaty, if they are 
too strict.  
b) Taxation of Donors 
aa) Resident Donors of Non-Resident Foundations 
According to the analysis of the Persche case, there are good reasons to believe that the 
non-discrimination rule is probably also relevant to the deductibility of donations by a 
resident donor to a non-resident foundation. Concerning inheritance taxation, the 
fundamental freedoms (most notably, Art. 56 (1) EC) apply. In this respect, its effect is 
similar, if not identical, to the income tax situations analysed in Persche.  
With regard to donations made by a resident to a non-resident foundation, the 
fundamental freedoms might be applicable in their effect as rules prohibiting restrictions 
(including discrimination of outbound cases). 
bb) Non-Resident Donors of Resident Foundations 
In general, the fundamental freedoms do not preclude any agreement made between two 
or more Member States as to which of them has the primary responsibility to consider 
personal expenses of an individual taxpayer. In the absence of such an agreement, the 
ECJ has usually assigned the primary responsibility to the state of residence, 
considering that it is this state which has the best means to assess the taxpayer’s world-
wide income. This tendency dates back to the ECJ decision in Schumacker.255  
If one stays with the Schumacker jurisprudence, the solution is rather clear. As a rule, it 
is the state where the taxpayer is resident which bears primary responsibility for the 
deduction of the donation. As indicated above, this is fully convincing even without 
                                                 
253 Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt München für Körperschaften, 
[2006] ECR I-8203, para. 37. 
254 See supra C II 2 c. 
255 ECJ ruling of 14 February 1995, C-279/93, 1995-I E.C.R. 225 - Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt/Roland 
Schumacker. 
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reasonable alternatives where the taxpayer does not earn income from sources in the 
country where the foundation resides. But even if the taxpayer does earn income there, 
the ECJ does not regard him as being in a position sufficiently similar to the one of 
resident individuals. The only constellation where the Schumacker doctrine does 
constitute an obligation of the Member State to allow deductions also to non-resident 
taxpayers is the constellation where the taxpayer earns no (or almost no) positive 
income in his or her state of residence. In this atypical constellation, there is a 
substituting responsibility of the so-called source state (here, the state where the 
foundation resides) to allow the deduction of the donation. But again, this only applies 
if the taxpayer derives a relatively high amount of income from sources in this state 
(usually, the threshold is considered to be 90 per cent of his world-wide income). 
In the context of donations made by a non-resident taxpayer to a resident foundation, 
however, one may well argue against the application of the Schumacker doctrine. The 
reasoning could be that, at least from a tax policy viewpoint, it is the state where the 
foundation is resident which has in the end the primary (if not exclusive) responsibility 
to allow the donation for deduction simply because it is this state which has authority 
over, and might profit from the activities of, the corresponding recipient (the 
foundation). This concept of equivalence might indeed justify an abolition of 
Schumacker and constitute an extended, if not primary, obligation of the state where the 
foundation is resident to allow the donation for deduction. Still, this obligation is useless 
whenever the taxpayer does not derive taxable income from sources in this country. 
After all, with or without the Schumacker doctrine, the case of non-resident taxpayers 
making a donation to a resident foundation is highly intricate. But the overwhelming 
number of sub-constellations can be solved on the basis of the fundamental freedoms in 
a satisfactory manner. 
cc) Non-Resident Donors of Non-Resident Foundations 
Lastly, where a Member State imposes income tax upon non-resident donors of non-
resident foundations because the taxpayer earns income from sources within this State, 
the deductibility of the donation depends on Schumacker again. If he earns all or almost 
all of this world-wide income within this State, the State has to accept the same 
responsibility for the personal deductions of the taxpayer as his state of residence 
(which, in the absence of considerable amounts of income, is not in a position to grant 
effective deductions). EC law (Arts. 12, 18, 39, 43, 49 Art. 56 EC Treaty, as the case 
may be) prevents the taxpayer from paying higher taxes simply because of the fact that 
his income is being generated within more than one jurisdiction. Therefore, the “strong” 
source state might be obliged under EC law to allow donations made by a non-resident 
taxpayer for deductions.  
It should be noted, however, that this obligation does not go beyond the treatment of 
resident taxpayers making the same donations to the same (non-resident) foundation. 
c) Taxation of “Affiliated” Beneficiaries 
As pointed out in the course of the analysis of tax-law barriers, there are some (rare) 
cases where a state may impose income taxes on the beneficiaries of a foundation. 
According to the basic distinction between non-affiliated beneficiaries (e.g., people in 
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need who receive aid by the foundation in course of its charitable activities) and 
affiliated beneficiaries (the donor and his family), the following rules apply: 
For non-affiliated beneficiaries, EC law does not ban income taxation in general. It does 
grant non-discriminatory treatment in both inbound and outbound situations. There are 
no particularities, however, compared to standard cases of EC tax law. 
The same holds true for affiliated beneficiaries. Here, however, the protection against 
discriminatory treatment (including discriminatory restrictions in outbound cases) gains 
particular relevance if the respective state (usually, but not necessarily, the state where 
the taxpayer is resident) applies the concept of transparency of the foundation to non-
resident foundations only, whereas beneficiaries of resident foundations remain untaxed 
or are taxed on an accrual basis only. These cases are rare. It should be noted, though, 
that the fundamental freedoms (Art. 43 and/or Art. 56 (1) EC, as the case may be) grant 
a high level of protection. In this regard, the principles elaborated above will apply 
mutatis mutandis. 
d) VAT 
By contrast, the barriers which we have identified on the field of VAT may be best 
overcome by an EC law definition of the public purpose institutions. Currently, by 
making dynamic reference to domestic law, the VAT System Directive has assigned a 
considerable margin of discretion to the Member States.  
In the absence of further harmonization, some minor distortions might be tackled by a 
proper application of the fundamental freedoms and/or state aid rules. However, from a 
methodological viewpoint, the ECJ is extremely reluctant in increasing the density of 
secondary Community law (here, the System Directive) through an active interpretation 
of primary law.  
3. “Bureaucratic Barriers” in Order to Avoid Tax Discriminations 
a) The Non-Discrimination Rule – A New Opportunity for Tax-Planning Structures 
As a consequence of Stauffer and (probably) Persche, there seems to exist a general 
non-discriminatory rule in the inbound cases which are most important in practice in 
order to source funds (investment activities and probably donations).  
If this is true, new opportunities for tax-planning structures emerge apart from the 
solution to create indirect cross-border transactions by using other public benefit 
institutions in various Member States:256 Direct cross-border transactions are also 
possible without negative tax consequences, if the foundation in the state of destination 
is regarded as tax-exempt in the state of source. 
b) Compliance Costs 
Such a solution avoids some of the compliance costs, which are necessary to use in the 
traditional tax-planning structure of a network of public benefit organizations,257 as 
there are no costs for reduplication and no costs for compliance with different law 
systems of two or more different institutions. However there are still costs for 
                                                 
256 Cf. B II 4 supra. 
257 Cf. B II 4 supra.  
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compliance with different law systems of one institution which can even be higher, as 
described in more detail below.258 
D. Economic Relevance of the Barriers according to the Field Study 
In the field study we included questions about the relevance of barriers against 
international activities and the perception of barriers as well. It was our goal to establish 
firmer knowledge of the relevance of international activities to foundations in the 
Member States (1) and to test their perceptions concerning barriers to cross-border 
activities (2). In analysing these perceptions of barriers, we need to distinguish between 
the responses given by foundations which do have experience in such activities and 
those which do not, i.e., which only report their expectations without real experience in 
the cross-border arena.  
Relevance of International Activities  
Despite other data sources, our survey enables us to give at least an estimation of the 
scope of the international orientation of foundations. Through several questions we are 
in a position to provide for some informed indication, as to how often and to what 
extent (compared to their overall expenditure) foundations are active on the 
international level. 
1. Number of Foundations Conducting International Activities 
According to Table 13, the average share of foundations that are active on an 
international level is astonishingly high (65-67 % of the weighted data).259  
 
Table 13: Rate of foundations, conducting international activities 
% of foundations conducting international activities 
Country EFC260 Unweighted data Weighted for 
expenditures 
Weighted for assets 
  Yes261 No Yes No Yes No 
Belgium 43 75.00 25.00 51.88 48.13 3.75 96.25
Cyprus  100.00 100.00  100.00 
Czech 
Republic 
 66.67 33.33 79.04 20.96 74.69 25.31
Denmark  33.33 66.67 0.05 99.95 0.05 99.95
Estonia 30 66.67 33.33 66.67 33.33 52.05 47.95
Finland 6 66.67 33.33 50.14 49.86 99.77 0.23
France 22 92.86 7.14 92.40 7.60 91.77 8.23
Germany 18 100.00 100.00  100.00 
Greece  75.00 25.00 96.93 3.07 96.93 3.07
Hungary  60.00 40.00 50.04 49.96 50.04 49.96
                                                 
258 See E I infra. 
259 This figure includes cases that have stated that they are active internationally at least occasionally. 
46% have stated that they conduct international activities “regularly”. 
260 In the EFC data, the rate of foundations active internationally is included. Unfortunately, this figure is 
available only for very few cases as described in Table 13. 
261 The assessment that a foundation is conducting international activities is based on the answer to the 
question “Do you conduct international activities never, rarely, occasionally, or more or less regularly?”. 
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% of foundations conducting international activities 
Ireland  100.00 100.00  100.00
Italy 0 92.31 7.69 90.94 9.06 91.69 8.31
Latvia  100.00 100.00  100.00 
Lithuania  100.00 100.00  100.00
Malta  100.00 100.00  100.00 
Netherlands  85.71 14.29 83.55 16.45 80.21 19.79
Poland  100.00 100.00  100.00 
Portugal  100.00 100.00  100.00 
Romania  100.00 100.00  100.00 
Slovakia  71.43 28.57 67.91 32.09 67.91 32.09
Slovenia  100.00 100.00  100.00 
Spain  100.00 100.00  100.00 
Sweden  100.00 100.00  100.00 
United 
Kingdom 




 71.72 28.28 66.75 33.25 65.32 34.68
Total (all 
foundations) 
 81.8 18.2 66.3 33.7 67.8 32.2
 
 
There could be several reasons for this surprisingly high number.  
First, larger foundations that are more likely to be active internationally could be 
overrepresented in the sample. This is surely true because (1) in the sample, larger 
foundations are represented by a higher number than in the ground population; (2) 
larger foundations are much more likely to answer a questionnaire concerning a 
potential European Foundation Statute; (3) larger foundations have much more often the 
resources to fill out an extensive questionnaire as used for the purpose of this study. We 
tried to diminish these factors by weighing the data and giving smaller foundations 
additional weight in doing so. With the implementation of our weighing factors, the 
share of foundations active internationally is reduced from 72 % in the raw data to 65 to 
67 %. But this share still seems to be much too high for immediate understanding. 
The second reason for the high rate of internationality could be a specific answering 
behaviour which could have also led to an overrepresentation of larger foundations. One 
could argue that especially foundations performing international operations would 
answer this specific question. But the rate of missing values is under 1 % of all cases for 
this question, so that this argument seems to be unsustainable. Nevertheless, we 
controlled for the classification of a foundation into “being active internationally” or not 
by comparing several answers and could validate the finding. 
Third, it could be argued that the small number of cases per country distorted the 
results. If nearly all responding foundations in some countries are orientated towards 
international activities, the average between countries is biased in this direction. But a 
                                                 
262 This average does not include those cases where (due to numbers too small in cases like in Cyprus) the 
share of one category adds up to 100%. This reduces the share of foundations active internationally 
somewhat but not significantly.  
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glance at the overall averages (not grouped for countries) shows that this is not the case. 
The rate of international active foundations stays the same or even rises. 
A fourth reason for the high rate of foundations active internationally in the sample (and 
the weighted calculation) is that the questionnaire is answered only by foundations 
which exceed a certain level of economic size. The result would be that we were blind 
to some (possibly many) very small foundations which are not running international 
programmes and that would in turn give the calculations a bias towards larger 
foundations. 
Fifth, it could be argued that there may be differences between Member States regarding 
the rate of foundations active internationally. However, the cases of Cyprus, Germany, 
Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden illustrate why it 
is not advisable to calculate averages for single countries. The sample contains no 
foundations without international activities in these countries and therefore displays 
rates of 100 % of internationally active foundations. For the calculation of the overall 
average in Table 13, we used only countries where we have in fact observed cases 
without international activities. Nevertheless it seems useful to take a look at Table 13 
to get an impression of the (data) situation, depicted above. 
Sixth, what could increase the rate of internationally active foundations is the huge 
amount of very small-scale cross-border activities. This suggestion is substantiated by 
the finding that smaller shares of operating expenditures spent internationally (< 1m 
euros) constitute already 56 % of the overall cases of international activities (Table 14). 
 
Table 14: Operating expenditures abroad (categories) 
Category Frequency263 Share Cumulated share 
0 - 500,000 6977 46.66% 46.66%
500,000 - 1,000,000 1447 9.68% 56.33%
1,000,000 - 2,000,000 2293 15.33% 71.67%
2,000.000 - 4.000.000 4184 27.98% 99.65%
4,000,000 - 10,000,000 27 0.18% 99.83%
10,000,000 - 14000.000 8 0.05% 99.88%
14,000,000 - 25.000.000 18 0.12% 100.00%
  14954 100.00%   
 
The seventh line of thought could be that there are in fact more foundations active on 
the international level than we have thought so far. 
The obvious uncertainty about the validity of the data leads to the question whether we 
can use the results at all and in which way.264 We decided not to step back from any 
further calculation, but to try to come to reasonable results and underline the 
preliminary character of the following figures. Thus, for the purpose of this study and 
on the basis of our findings, we assume that the number of foundations that perform 
international activities is significantly higher than other studies would suggest. There is 
                                                 
263 The number of foundations results from the weighting process. 
264 Unfortunately, a comparison with the EFC data sheds no more light on this topic. The response rate 
here is even worse than to the European Foundation Statute survey, which is demonstrated in the first 
column of Table 13. 
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a certain probability that the numbers in Table 13 are too high, but the finding remains 
that internationality is very common among European foundations. 
2. Further Results 
Table 15 shows that a very large share of foundations operates at the EU or even global 
level. The orientation towards single countries or regions is less frequent. This could be 
seen as a result of a strategic orientation towards either a national topic (foundations 
active only on the regional or national level) or a more general and geographically less 
specific international scope. This finding corresponds to the general number of 
foundations active internationally. With respect to tendency, European foundations are 
significantly more outward looking and less limited by regional boundaries than 
assumed before. 
 














Unweighted 31.8 5.6 10.3 15.6 5.6 30.8
Expenditure 
weighted 27.0 4.6 11.3 10.3 3.7 43.1
Asset 
weighted 32.9 4.5 16.2 12.4 5.7 28.7
 
If we look at the amount of expenditure differentiated between spent “domestically” and 
“internationally” (Table 16), European foundations spend an average of 5-6 % of their 
total operating expenditure for international activities. This adds up to € 73.9m. 
 
Table 16: Share and average amount of international expenditure 




Sum for all 
foundations 
Unweighted 89 15.6m € 1.7bnDomestically 
Weighted 93 5.9m 
Unweighted 6 4.1m € 73.9mInternationally 
 Weighted 5 1.7m 
Unweighted  € 1.9bnTotal (all 
foundations)266 Weighted  € 153bn
 
                                                 
265 Despite the fact that for the calculation only those cases are included that state they are active on the 
international level sometimes, there are many foundations that state that their scope of activity is 
“domestic only”. This could be caused by either the fact that they are active in one other country only or 
that they deal with international topics but organise them on the domestic level. These cases are ignored 
in our interpretation because we do not know exactly what caused this inconsistency. 
266 Included in the ‘total’ row of Table 16 are foundations that answered the question about their operating 
expenditure by stating a figure for “domestically” too. That causes the lower numbers in this row, 
compared to the addition of the rows above.  
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Further to the mere status quo of internationality of European foundations, it is 
interesting to look at the potential growth of this domain of programme interests. 
Table 17 shows clearly that a considerably large number of foundations that are already 
performing international activities are willing to increase these operations even further. 
About half of the foundations are planning to expand their international scope in one 
way or another. This depicts the huge potential of cross-border activities the foundation 
sector in Europe has in addition to the existing strong international orientation. In this 
view, foundations are no exception to the general trend of internationalisation which can 
be observed in the for-profit sector in particular. This is underscored by the fact that 
only about 5 % of the respondents say they plan to reduce international activities. 
 
Table 17: Intention to expand international activities267 
Foundation is planning to expand international activities 
  Yes No 




Asset weighted 46.34 53.66 
II. Perception of Barriers 
To analyse the barriers a foundation could face when conducting international activities 
we have to distinguish between barriers which are really experienced by a foundation 
and those which are only anticipated before taking up the program. The following 
paragraphs reflect this differentiation. 
1. Experienced Barriers 
For foundations experienced in conducting work on an international level, the working 
conditions in a foreign legal environment seem to be the largest problem. Between 15 
and 20 % (depending on weighing factor) state that “Working in different jurisdictions 
complicates programme operations”. The uncertainty of working under legal conditions 
dissimilar to those in the home country obviously requires an intensified effort to come 
to the same results as when conducting a programme at the national level. 
Second and third are the statements that grant-making is more complicated (12-15 %) 
and more costly (9-10 %). 
It is also worth mentioning that a high number of respondents do not see significant 
barriers when conducting international activities. Unfortunately, the open question 
about what is meant by “other” barriers has been answered far too rarely to be processed 
with any validity. 
 
Table 18: Significant barriers experienced 
                                                 
267 For this calculation only those foundations are included which conduct international activities at least 
occasionally. 
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 Unweighted Expenditure 
weighted 
Asset weighted 
Grant-making is more complicated. 15.29 13.06 12.38
Grant-making is more costly. 10.19 7.48 9.23
Working in different jurisdictions 
complicates programme operations. 
20.38 19.62 15.11
Different tax laws make the 
differentiation of what is related and 
what is unrelated business income 
cumbersome. 
7.01 3.26 4.96
Reporting requirements to different 
authorities is cumbersome and costly. 
10.19 4.19 7.48
Asset management costs increase. 3.82 1.94 0.05
Fundraising costs increase. 5.10 2.70 3.77
Administrative costs are higher due to 
the need to establish affiliate 
organizations. 
8.92 3.95 4.75
Other barriers 3.18 6.93 7.24
No barriers 15.92 36.87 35.04
 
In a somewhat more detailed way we asked in what aspect of their work foundations 
experience most of the barriers. Depending on the weighting factor, the most frequently 
stated items were “Day-to-day operational activities” and “Reporting requirements to 
tax and other relevant authorities”. Second and third were “Programme planning” and 
“Fundraising” as shown in Table 19. 
 





Programme planning 11.54 12.58 9.46
Formation of new 
organisation/programme 
6.73 3.82 4.98
Establishment and legal recognition 9.62 3.47 5.84
Reporting requirements to tax and 
other relevant authorities 
13.46 9.24 17.79
Asset management 3.85 2.58 0.22
Fundraising 11.54 11.04 12.30
Day-to-day operational activities 20.19 18.53 16.53
Other 6.73 10.58 6.40
None 16.35 28.17 26.47
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2. Anticipated Barriers 
For the calculation of anticipated barriers toward international activities we include only 
those foundations which responded that they were planning to increase their 
international activities. As Table 20 shows, the top 3 anticipated barriers stated differ 
slightly from the experienced barriers as described above. First mentioned is (as above) 
the work in different jurisdictions which complicates programme operations. Second, 
(14-15 % of responses) fundraising costs would increase, and the third place is shared 
by the items “Administrative costs are higher due to the need to establish affiliate 
organizations” and “Different tax laws make the differentiation of what is related and 
what is unrelated business income cumbersome”. 
Dealing with an unfamiliar legal environment seems to be the most severe barrier for 
these foundations too. Those foundations looking into the future are more concerned 
with the costs of their activities than others. 
Notable here are the relatively (compared to the shares in Table 18) low numbers of 
respondents expressing the opinion that there would be no barriers. In advance to the 
start of international activities, the responding foundations seem to be more convinced 
that they would experience difficulties than those who are already conducting those 
programmes. 
 
Table 20: Significant barriers anticipated 
 Unweighted Expenditure 
weighted 
Asset weighted 
Grant-making is more complicated. 15.00 13.07 11.37
Grant-making is more costly. 10.83 12.52 7.54
Working in different jurisdictions 
complicates programme operations. 
19.17 21.14 19.85
Different tax laws make the 
differentiation of what is related and 
what is unrelated business income 
cumbersome. 
6.67 6.65 11.58
Reporting requirements to different 
authorities are cumbersome and 
costly. 
11.67 4.41 3.67
Asset management costs increase. 1.67 0.02 3.98
Fundraising costs increase. 9.17 13.98 14.64
Administrative costs are higher due to 
the need to establish affiliate 
organizations. 
10.83 13.37 9.81
Other barriers 4.17 3.51 3.06
No barriers 10.83 11.33 14.50
 
The top 3 detailed aspects of barriers differ in one way from Table 21. Second (with 16-
17 % responses) comes the establishment and legal recognition. Foundations planning 
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to take up new international programmes are obviously more concerned about legal 
barriers. This agrees with the finding that experience leads to a diminished degree of 
seeing important barriers. Foundations already conducting at least some projects on the 
international level do not see the legal barriers towards the introduction of new 
organisational entities as a major problem. Foundations exploring the possibility to 
extend their scope do. 
 





Programme planning 17.86 12.03 9.14 
Formation of new 
organisation/programme 
9.52 6.57 6.42 
Establishment and legal recognition 13.10 15.88 17.46 
Reporting requirements to tax and 
other relevant authorities 
16.67 10.62 10.20 
Asset management 3.57 0.38 5.53 
Fundraising 11.90 14.42 14.34 
Day-today operational activities 17.86 23.31 20.49 
Other 9.52 16.79 16.41 
 
3. Other Reasons for not Expanding International Activities 
In addition to the previous questions, we asked the respondents why they did not intend 
to take up or expand international activities. The possible answers are divided into 
absolute and relative barriers, to distinguish between hard and rather soft factors which 
hinder foundations from being active on the international level. In asking this question, 
we were primarily interested in identifying foundations which are not restricted by any 
forbidding factors and could therefore take up international programmes but are not 
doing so yet. 
The most important reason preventing international activities is a restrictive charter with 
a purpose which is aimed explicitly at specific regions. Those foundations are most 
unlikely to ever start activities across national borders. 
The second most important factor is size. ”Being too small” could be a severely 
restricting factor. However, as shown above, the perception of barriers towards 
international activities decreases with experience and information. So there might be a 
chance that at least some of this 19-27 % of foundations that state that they are too small 
could alter their point of view if they were better informed or if there were clear, 
transparent and simple rules on how foundations can become active across borders. 
 
Table 22: Absolute barriers 
 Unweighted  Expenditure 
weighted 
Asset weighted 
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Foundation is too small. 26.83 18.63 21.99 
Purpose is geographically limited to 
specific region. 
41.46 53.61 52.77 
Donor wish (deed) 12.20 9.61 10.31 
Legal recognition 6.10 0.23 1.58 
Other 13.41 17.92 13.35 
 
As could be expected, next to mentioning unspecific “other” reasons for not becoming 
active internationally, the perceptions of barriers are the two most important reasons in 
the category of “relative barriers”. Table 23 depicts this result in detail. For the 
unweighted cases, costs that arise from the need to establish affiliate organizations are 
the most important argument (and still for 20-28 % of the weighed cases). As shown 
above, for foundations already active internationally, this is rather a less urgent 
problem. Even if we interpret the findings in Table 23 in the way that the need to 
establish new organisational entities is not in fact that difficult or even necessary, it is 
still important that many foundations refuse to become active internationally because 
they anticipate this problem. 
 
Table 23: Relative barriers 
 Unweighted  Expenditure 
weighted 
Asset weighted 
Tax reasons 9.76 5.88 2.26 
Administrative costs due to the need to 
establish affiliate organizations 
34.15 19.81 28.21 
Administration costs overall prohibitive 7.32 1.12 1.92 
Overall cost-benefit ratio not 
favourable 
14.63 7.44 13.65 
Assessment of barriers resulted in 
negative board decision 
7.32 19.69 22.14 
Other 26.83 46.05 31.81 
 
4. Interpretation of the Results 
The results of the survey support the findings of the legal analysis of the barriers. 
First, they also show that there exist legal barriers to cross-border activities, but the 
barriers are not “absolute” in the sense that they would prohibit cross-border activities.  
Secondly, most foundations report increasing costs in order to cope with the barriers. 
But there is an interesting difference between the foundations which have experienced 
barriers and foundations which anticipated barriers: In the first group the number of 
foundations which see no significant barriers when conducting international activities 
was remarkably higher than in the second group. At first sight, this difference could be 
interpreted as a sign that the significance of the barriers is overestimated. However, if 
we look more closely at the details, it seems that this difference underlines the finding 
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of the legal comparative analysis that there exists comparatively high legal uncertainty 
in civil law and tax law. This argument is strengthened by the finding that foundations 
which already have a larger scope of international activities (Europe-wide or global) 
express far more often the perception that there are no significant barriers than their 
counterparts that are active on a smaller scale only. It seems that the perception of 
barriers towards international activities underlies some sort of scaling-effect. The more 
such activities are performed by a single foundation, the easier it becomes because the 
legal uncertainty decreases the more the foundation’s managers gain experience.  
III. Excurse: Vignettes of Case Studies  
in European Cross-Border Public Benefit Activities 
In addition to a systematic analysis of the barriers to cross-border activities of European 
foundations, or more generally activities for the European public benefit, the following 
sample of vignette descriptions serves the purpose of illustrating the kinds of activities 
which are relevant in the context of European cross-border activities. Each of the 
vignettes refers to a programme or an organisation which emerged in recent European 
philanthropic history and serves beneficiaries in several Union Member States, works 
with programmes, people and also resource development in several Member States. 
1. Rise Foundation 
By Conrado Pirzio-Biroli, CEO, RISE 
The RISE Foundation (Rural Investment Support for Europe Foundation) is a new 
initiative. It is unique and independent. It covers all aspects of conservation and 
development of the rural world, promoting private investments, the advancement of 
private property and cooperation between land managers and rural communities. The 
RISE Foundation operates primarily across all 27 current EU Member States.  
During the establishment of the foundation, there were many questions and hesitations 
as to the best way of inserting a trans-national instrument of philanthropy into a national 
system of law in the absence of a European framework facilitating the attainment of the 
foundation’s statutory objectives. The RISE Foundation opted for a statute of a public 
utility foundation under Belgian law, making Belgium the base for its operations, but it 
included a stipulation in its statutes that it would adopt a European Statute for 
Foundations as soon as such an option became available.  
The RISE Foundation faced and/or faces a number of challenges in dealing with 
different legal systems, in drafting its articles of incorporation, in fund-raising, and in 
supporting trans-national projects. It had to battle with Belgian notary habits, not to say 
idiosyncrasies, and adapt the language of its draft statute, which was based on the EFC-
proposed draft statute. It actually complained with the European Commission that 
Belgian and many other EU Member States’ laws were blatant cases of discrimination 
among EU citizen donors, in contradiction with the provisions of the Internal Market. 
Commission action with the European Court of Justice regarding several complaints 
since the creation of RISE was an encouragement for the Board of RISE to persevere in 
its endeavour. 
As RISE is currently mainly involved in fund-raising, the main obstacles currently 
relate to taxation. The lack of tax rebates for cross-border donors across Europe is a 
 - 159 -
serious impediment to its future as it makes it more difficult to find donors. While it was 
possible to reduce this impediment by joining the Trans-national Giving Europe (TGE) 
Network of the KBF, TGE is currently limited to some ten countries, is not generally 
known, and involves a loss of donation value of up to 5 %. A further enlargement of the 
TGE Network would make it eventually possible to by-pass discriminatory fiscal 
fragmentation of donors in Europe. But this is inevitably a slow undertaking. So is the 
decision-making process of the EU via Commission, Council and Parliament. The EU 
judicial process is far quicker. There is little doubt that denouncing discriminatory 
treatment in contradiction with the Community treaties is the most rapid and effective 
way to hopefully end it. If ECJ rules soon, this will help other philanthropic initiatives 
in Europe with cross-border purposes. 
While RISE seeks a European image, it still has too much of a national one. It is 
increasingly absurd in a Single Market, which includes the option of setting up 
Societates Europaeas, to ignore the need for a European Foundation Statute. The latter 
should not attempt to harmonise different tax-rebate/exemption provisions of Member 
States. Instead it should ban their unequal application across intra-EU borders. Applying 
national law on donations in a discriminatory fashion to the advantage of national 
donors supporting national beneficiaries, as against national donors supporting other 
European beneficiaries, is intolerable. Charity is the least appropriate subject for 
discrimination!  
As RISE moves into operations - it has just started financing its first project (land 
reclamation, Spain) -, its Board continues to believe that a European Foundation would 
facilitate also supporting cross-border investments, including the financing of trans-
national projects, devising cross-border financing instruments, and possibly also 
facilitating the application of different inheritance provisions and VAT systems to cross 
its cross-border activities. 
2. EUSTORY: Europe’s History - A Challenge for Foundations 
By Wolf Schmidt, Board Member and CEO, EUSTORY 
Unfortunately, the European Union has not yet managed to reconcile European 
economic integration with a European civil society. The citizens of Europe lack civil 
and tax law frameworks which would allow them to found associations or foundations 
across the EU. So far, civil society can only organise itself nationally. 
At the same time there are increasing numbers of issues which require effective pan-
European strategies. For example, every country sees its own history from a national 
perspective although it is really only comprehensible in a wider context. It will be 
difficult to forge a common future if we do not find the means to share details of our 
respective pasts. A project is devoted to the idea of correcting this shortcoming which, 
given the continued lack of a European foundation law, has had to act creatively to find 
a means of European funding: EUSTORY - The History Network for Young Europeans. 
The network is based on an established model of international cooperation. 
The Association – the Network 
'EUSTORY – The History Network for Young Europeans' is a common platform of 
non-governmental organizations from 19 European nations which is arranged in ways 
similar to an association. In accordance with the 'German Federal President’s History 
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Competition', an approved model since 1973, students are asked to trace historical 
paths. Since 2001, over 90,000 teenagers have participated in EUSTORY competitions 
with 40,000 research projects extending from Wales to Vladivostok and from the North 
Cape to Sicily. Between 2001 and 2007, EUSTORY’s supporters have donated some 
€11m (US$17m). In addition, 2,500 volunteers also support EUSTORY. The starting 
point was a Polish initiative.  
In 1996, the organization KARTA successfully conducted its first history competition in 
Poland following the German model. The Stefan Batory Foundation financed this 
national project and the Körber Foundation has become the most important partner of 
this international network. Experience shows that adolescents are interested in history. 
The lack of knowledge of each other and the level of prejudice against ‘the others’ are 
enormous. However, the willingness to encounter and learn is very encouraging. What 
EUSTORY requires is additional money to satisfy young people’s interest in Europe’s 
past stories. Here we are dealing with adolescents whose intelligence and commitment 
make them stand out, and who in future will be seen as part of Europe’s elite. 
EUSTORY enjoys an excellent reputation. It operates under the international auspices 
of Martti Ahtisaari, Władisław Bartoszewski and Jacques Delors, and the presidents of 
countries including Germany, Estonia and Latvia and the Swiss Foreign Minister are 
patrons of the national competitions. Last year, EUSTORY received the German 
National Foundation’s National Award from Horst Köhler, the President of Germany. 
European Fund-Raising as a problem 
Until today, EUSTORY has not been registered as an association so as to avoid linking 
the highly symbolic common activities with a single national law. However, EUSTORY 
is, as a non-registered association, not contractually capable: it cannot win sponsors, or 
submit an application to the EU, and it does not even have its own bank account. So it 
seemed obvious that, in addition to the civic education operating network of 
competitions, there should be a separate fund-raising unit with special know-how. 
In 2006 a tool for this was developed: an International Eustory Foundation, which could 
also act as an interim model for a European foundation. The Netherlands offers the best 
legal conditions for this and the aim to acquire ‘European money’ can be realised in 
cooperation with the European network ‘Transnational Giving Europe’. In a 
complicated process this ensures for several European countries, including Germany 
that trans-national donations are tax-deductible. 
Forming a pan-European foundation is an ambitious task, which only makes sense as a 
joint effort. The conditions for this, set by the Körber Foundation, were to win ten 
partners from ten European countries. Following 18 months of advertising, it has 
become clear how difficult this is due to the lack of a European foundation law and 
public benefit tax law. If the inclination to invest in a foundation’s capital is less than 
the interest in investing in current activities, then the missing familiarity with foreign 
national foundation laws becomes a virtually insurmountable obstacle. There could not 
have been better evidence to prove the importance of an EU-wide foundation statute. 
From this, the EUSTORY-Network has concluded that it should postpone having an 
International EUSTORY Foundation and instead concentrate initially on financing 
innovative projects with European partners. 
EUSTORY as an Alliance of Foundations 
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The idea of launching a European foundation has opened many doors. Up to that point, 
only the Compagnia di San Paolo and Norway’s Fritt Ord were participants in the 
international field along with the Körber Foundation. In the past year, the King 
Baudouin Foundation (Belgium), Mercator Foundation (Switzerland) and the Open 
Estonia Foundation, have been recruited. In Germany, the Gerda Henkel Foundation is 
willing to cooperate, in Sweden, the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, in 
Finland, the Swedish and Finnish Cultural Foundations, and in Austria, the ERSTE 
Foundation. 
Thus, with EUSTORY a strong union of European foundations is emerging with the 
motto: “We promote our future by helping our youth to understand our past”. After 
quite complicated work on statutes in line with the requirements of Belgian law, 
EUSTORY is going to register as an AISBL (Association Internationale Sans But 
Lucratif, or non-profit international association) this year. This way it will function on 
the same legal basis as the European Foundation Centre, but the work will be done in 
different countries including a team at the Körber Foundation. 
3. Carpathian Foundation  
Based on Internet research and a telephone interview with János Lukács, CEO, 
May 6th, 2008 
The Carpathian Foundation is a cross-border network of regional foundations 
that focuses primarily on inter-regional and transfrontier activities, and economic and 
community development in the bordering regions of Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Ukraine. It encourages the development of public/private NGO 
partnerships, including cross-border and inter-ethnic approaches to help prevent 
conflicts and to promote regional development. It implements development programs 
and provides financial and technical assistance to projects which will result in tangible 
benefits to the communities on both sides of national borders and which will improve 
the quality of life of the people in the disadvantaged small towns and villages of the 
Carpathian Mountains. 
When the Carpathian Foundation was established in 1995, it was decided that it should 
be established as a network of foundations, with a separate legal entity in each country. 
The mission of the organisation is cross-border in nature, and the network solution was 
found in order to overcome the fact that foundations are not allowed to operate in their 
neighbouring countries. The Carpathian Foundation International is based in Hungary, 
with additional national organizations established in Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Ukraine. Naturally there were considerable costs in having to establish 
separate offices in all the countries, including the administrative and office costs, and 
finding out about the legal environment of foundations in each country. There were 
additional costs arising from the fact that it was not possible to establish identical 
organisations in each country as the requirements for setting up foundations were 
different in all the different countries, for instance, in terms of governance and 
supervisory authorities. The network structure is currently working sufficiently well that 
there are no big problems in the foundation’s everyday operations, but it would 
naturally be simpler and less costly to have been able to establish one organization on 
the European level. 
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Carpathian Foundation does most of its fundraising overseas and in some other EU 
countries. There have not been problems to raise funds from overseas and to channel 
them across the network. In the absence of a regime that allows tax-efficient donations 
from one EU Member State to another, the foundation resorts to using the Transnational 
Giving Europe (TGE) network to raise funds. Carpathian Foundation has now applied to 
be a member of the TGE network, which would enable tax-efficient donations from all 
the countries in the TGE network to all the countries where the Carpathian Foundation 
has offices. 
Although the Carpathian Foundation has managed to find a practical solution to the 
barriers to cross-border work that it faces, its operations would be less cumbersome and 
costly if there was a European-level legal form for foundations. Currently, a lot of time 
is spent on keeping abreast of foundation law and foundation tax law developments in 
all the countries where it is necessary for the foundation to have separate legal entities 
in order to operate. This makes operations more costly and less transparent as 
Carpathian Foundation International is not able itself to track the legal developments in 
all the languages in the countries involved and it has to rely on second-hand local 
information.  
The lack of a suitable environment for the cross-border activities of foundations also 
prevents the Carpathian Foundation from undertaking further cross-border activities. 
The foundation would be interested in expanding to other EU Member States, but the 
fact that it would need to go through the costly process of setting up another legal entity 
after familiarising itself with the national laws and regulations in the country in question 
is currently preventing it from going ahead. If there was a European Foundation Statute, 
the foundation would be able to direct more resources to its public benefit activities and 
expand to other EU Member States. The Statute would also resolve a lot of 
inconveniences that the foundation faces on a daily basis in its operations. 
4. The European Climate Foundation 
In 2007, considerations started to set up a European Climate Foundation, which would 
promote climate and energy policies that reduce Europe’s greenhouse gas emissions and 
help Europe play an even stronger international leadership role in mitigating climate 
change.  
Because of the lack of a European legal tool, the legal and tax situation of public benefit 
foundations in selected European countries was reviewed and checked against a set of 
criteria which were considered essential for the establishment and functioning of such a 
foundation. In terms of strategic assessment, a European legal instrument would have 
been the best option.. 
The European Climate Foundation was established in 2008 in The Hague (head office), 
the Netherlands.  It also has a presence in Germany (Berlin) and Belgium (Brussels). 
The decision to establish the head office in the Netherlands was based on the fact that 
the Dutch foundation law provides a flexible environment and easy and quick 
establishment of foundations.  
 
The European Climate Foundation currently has six funding partners: 
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- The Arcadia Trust www.arcadiatrust.org <http://www.arcadiatrust.org>  
- The Children’s Investment Fund Foundation www.ciff.org 
<http://www.ciff.org>  
- The Ecofin Research Foundation 
- The McCall MacBain Foundation 
- The Oak Foundation www.oakfnd.org <http://www.oakfnd.org>  
- The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation www.hewlett.org 
<http://www.hewlett.org>  
 





5. The Benefits of Becoming a European Foundation for the Stiftung Liebenau 
Initial Position 
Stiftung Liebenau (the Liebenau Foundation) is currently organised as a holding 
foundation which has operating subsidiaries (“mittelbare unternehmenstraegerstiftung”, 
with not-for-profit GmbHs as subsidiaries). The predominant portion of the operative 
activities is carried out by (mostly wholly owned) subsidiaries of the Foundation. A few 
of the direct activities having to do with the realisation of the Foundation’s goals are 
carried out by the Foundation itself (e.g., WfbM in the grassland enterprises). 
Stiftung Liebenau offers direction to the functionally active subsidiaries in and outside 
Germany, is in charge of central services (e.g., finances , construction) for the use by the 
subsidiaries, carries out research and development in the social services sector, and 
subsidises subsidiary activities. In addition, the Foundation provides and manages the 
properties used by the subsidiaries in the pursuit of its goals. 
1) Benefits of a European Legal Structure 
1. Administrative, Financial, Fiscal 
Some administrative expenditures having to do with the recognition of the non-profit 
status and possibly (see below for further details) the need to found separate national 
operating companies for the activities of Stiftung Liebenau and its subsidiaries outside 
Germany would be eliminated. This would facilitate speedier and more cost-effective 
action abroad where applicable. 
A fiscal, Europe-wide recognition of the non-profit activity within the relative country 
would be a great benefit since it would simplify considerably the schemes currently 
necessary and long administrative and organisational processes within each country. 
2. Image/Marketing 
A Stiftung Liebenau according to European law, analogous to a European Company 
(i.e., an SE), would highlight the supra-regional character and European orientation of 
Stiftung Liebenau, presenting its foreign activities as a matter of course. A European 
Foundation could also elicit a better image outside Germany because of its recognisable 
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international rather than national orientation. These aspects could be used as image and 
brand forming. 
3. Organisation 
Where applicable, national subsidiaries could eliminate the need for national 
foundations abroad. The corresponding founding and administrative efforts would save 
time and money and make entry into foreign markets easier. 
A central issue for Stiftung Liebenau as an operating foundation having great 
entrepreneurial dynamism is its supervision. Those acting in this capacity must be able 
to meet their supervisory duties without hindering the Foundation in its pursuit of its 
operative responsibility or to deprive it of information. It is our view that a supervisory 
body for Europe-wide activities cannot perform its duties via an institution in Brussels 
or a regional institution (such as the Regional Commission responsible for the 
foundation office). What remains as a possibility is a decentralised approach to 
supervision by independent boards, such as a supervisory board which fulfils the criteria 
of an independent controlling body. 
 
2) Disadvantages 
 1. National Orientation 
According to the EU Treaty and the prospective EU Constitution, social services are 
subject to national regulation. 
In our view, the usefulness of a European foundation can only develop fully when the 
EU as an economic and currency union also becomes a social union. 
The nation-states will continue to attach value to shaping their social services 
themselves according to their cultures and abilities. As a recognisably foreign provider 
(because of the name or because of the developing European naming conventions), it is 
likely that one would experience more disadvantages than advantages. 
2. Operating Company Partnerships 
The experience of Stiftung Liebenau indicates that partnerships, when possible, with 
local companies that have their own operating experience are very helpful. Such 
partnerships facilitate the understanding of cultural, national, linguistic and other similar 
regional and national particularities. Institutional features are likewise easier to market 
when they appear in the national language. That would mean that a foreign operating 
company would carry a foreign name in any case and in many cases would found a 
company with domestic partners. In such a situation having the legal form of a 
European Company would not lead to direct benefits.  
3. Image 
In some European countries (e.g., Austria) a foundation is not a form of organisation 
that is necessarily widely recognised and associated with charitable and reputable 
activities. Similarly here the legal form ‘foundation’ would not necessarily be chosen 
for the operation of social institutions. In such a case, a European foundation would not 
offer any particular benefit either. 
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6. Summary 
The common characteristic of all these cases (and a number of other ones which await 
vignette description) is the need to establish several legal entities in different Member 
States along with all the transaction costs involved in doing so in order to pursue a 
common public benefit purpose across Member State borders. This involves, in 
particular, setting up different legal entities serving the same purpose in different 
jurisdictions and investing a lot of time and resources into information gathering, 
professional advice and preparation work to design such a structure. The problems as 
described in the vignette cases do not refer to tax law issues only, but rather concentrate 
on civil law matters. The vignette descriptions confirm that even larger organizations 
have to go through substantial efforts to establish the knowledge required as to the 
situation in different jurisdictions of the European Union. In addition, the evidence 
shows that issues of common branding and common organisational cultures are as much 
at stake as are governance and proper organisational matters. The programme examples 
associated with the organizations in question also document that an increasing number 
of public benefit issues have a European dimension (like civic education, common 
history, democratic transition, environmental issues and the like) and therefore call for a 
supra-national legal form to be organised on the European Union level rather than on 
national levels. The vignette cases confirm that a feasible solution could be found in any 
of these cases, however, at substantial cost for information gathering and organisational 
provisions. The vignettes obviously do not allow us to make any judgement on those 
causes for which the solution has not been found yet. They will be addressed under E.3 
below as incalculable costs.  
A second level of concern to these organizations is naturally the tax deductibility of 
contributions which is, however, an issue of secondary concern here because both 
Transnational Giving Europe Structures as well as European Court of Justice rulings on 
non-discrimination seem to be providing the basis for the handling of tax law issues. 
Transnational Giving Europe is a network of European foundations or charitable 
institutions which have mutually agreed to accept and pass through donations to 
network partners in other countries to the extent that their charters and national tax laws 
permit. The structure operates between eight European countries against a transaction 
fee of a maximum of 5 % and tests each individual case of a cross-border pass-through 
donation before accepting it. The purpose is to provide donors with an opportunity to 
deduct contributions to public benefit organizations in other countries by claiming 
deductibility for a gift to a national organization.268  
E. Estimation of the Costs of the Barriers 
In the following chapter we try to give an estimation of the barriers cost against 
international activities. Therefore, we first distinguish between different types of costs, 
then we explain our model used to calculate the costs for individual foundations, 
illustrate the potential dealing with difficulties for three cases, and finally calculate the 
overall costs that arise because of existing barriers. In a separate paragraph on 
incalculable costs we address the effects of philanthropic activities foregone because of 
the expectated prohibitive barriers of excessive costs by the parties involved.  
                                                 
268 Transnational Giving Europe: www.givingineurope.org. 
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I. Kinds of Costs 
As the analysis has shown, from a legal standpoint, most of the described barriers which 
can arise in cross-border transactions might be overcome by two main approaches: (1) 
by the traditional way of establishing a network structure,269 or (2) (as regards tax 
barriers) by using the non-discrimination rule, which was developed by the ECJ in 
Stauffer as regards investments and may be extended to donations in the pending case of 
Persche.270 However, both solutions will lead to significant compliance costs. 
1. Transfer of a Foundation’s Seat 
As already shown the transfer of a foundation’s seat will lead to barriers which can be 
so high that it seems hardly possible to overcome them.271 Even if it were possible to 
overcome the barriers at least in some cases, it is reasonable to assume that the costs for 
the necessary steps would be very high. There would be at least extensive legal 
counselling required to gather all necessary information and to fulfil all requirements 
which the two governmental administrations involved might pose. 
2. Costs of the Network Solution 
a) Costs of Establishing Additional Institutions 
The establishment of additional pubic benefit foundations or non-profit organisations in 
one or more foreign Member States will necessarily lead to some costs. Management 
has to comply with different formal and establishing procedural rules in civil law, 
depending on the legal form of the subsidiary entity (foundation law, association law, 
trust law, company law, etc.).  
If a new foundation is to be established, a certain minimum endowment is necessary in 
several Member States.  
A challenging task may be the coordination of the statutes of the main foundation with 
the statutes of the newly established institution(s) which has to achieve two different 
aims. On the one hand, every foundation/organisation has to meet the national 
requirements of civil law and tax law. On the other hand, both institutions should still 
support the same aim, as though they were a single institution. Thus, the statutes should 
be as similar as possible, which will make it necessary to find rules which avoid that the 
different institutions “drift apart”.  
In order to overcome the information gaps about other jurisdictions and to deal 
effectively with the inherent degree of legal uncertainty as described above for both  the 
civil law and tax law of the Member States, using the help of legal experts seems 
unavoidable.  
Costs of Maintenance of a Network Structure 
As regards the costs of maintaining a network structure, some consist of a mere 
reduplication of the positions in the two institutions (e.g., board), as well as of a 
reduplication of identical or equivalent duties, e.g., establishing accounting systems, 
                                                 
269 See supra B II 4. 
270 See supra C II 3. 
271 See supra B I 5. 
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filing annual tax returns, and reporting on the activities of the foundation in the local 
language and to local authorities. 
On the other hand, the costs are caused by the fact that civil law and tax law regulations 
of the Member States is not identical. Thus, there may be different rules on reporting 
and accounting, and management may have to consider a more or less broad variety of 
differences with regard to the preconditions of civil law and tax law. 
Differences also may exist in the case of fundamental decisions (e.g., important 
amendments of the statutes of the institution (which can. be necessary for all institutions 
because of a tax law reform in one Member State). In such a case, it may be difficult to 
avoid that the different institutions “drift apart” or that their charters and bylaws become 
more inconsistent because of different requirements and procedural rules. 
3. Cost of the Non-Discrimination Solution 
If the non-discrimination solution is regarded as the most likely approach to overcome 
tax law barriers, there are no costs of establishment and reduplication.  
However, the compliance costs of different tax law regimes remain and are even higher 
than in the traditional tax-planning model of an institutional network. In the case of an 
indirect transaction, generally, the public benefit institution in the state of destination 
does not need to meet all the requirements of the state of source. It is usually sufficient 
that only the public benefit institution in the state of source has to fulfil all requirements 
of tax law, while the public benefit institution in the state of destination usually only has 
to fulfil some basic/fundamental requirements of the state of source (e.g., a public 
benefit purpose of the state of source). In the case of direct transactions by using the 
non-discrimination rule of the ECJ, it is thus necessary to ensure that all the public 
benefit foundations fulfill all requirements of two or more tax law regimes.  
Although the common features of the tax laws seem to be quite similar in the Member 
States, we still do not have legal comparative studies which include all elements of the 
tax laws of the Member States. As a result, the legal uncertainty is considerable and thus 
it is necessary for the individual foundation to seek legal advice, an effort which, due to 
complexity and legal uncertainty, may require some time and money to check all the 
aspects.  
In addition, it will be necessary to establish an overview of the situation in the relevant 
Member States because tax law can change, be it due to amendments in the law or due 
to interpretation of the law by the courts or the competent authorities. In such a case, an 
amendment of the foundation’s statutes may be necessary, which itself  will generate the 
requirement to verify that such an amendment is also accepted by the tax laws of the 
other relevant Member States. 
4. Costs to Overcome Psychological Barriers 
In certain cases there may be additional costs because of psychological barriers. Such 
barriers may be relevant, as for example is the case in the EUSTORY vignett :272 In this 
case a supranational European Foundation would be regarded as a “neutral” institution 
and be more readily accepted by donors and academic partners in the Member States 
                                                 
272 See supra D III 2. 
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than a national institution, which may be regarded as more “biased”. Of course, this 
neutrality can also be ensured by a network of foundations in close cooperation or by 
institutional provisions (e.g., pluralistic inclusion of board members) accompanied by a 
well-designed communication campaign which would lead, however, to other types of 
additional costs. 
5. Costs of Failure 
Finally, “costs of failure” can come into play if the barriers create prohibitive obstacles 
or at least expectations of such for potential cross-border activities in the Member 
States. In this case, possible contributions to the public good of the EU Member States 
as a whole are foregone altogether. 
 One could argue that in such a case the money could still be used for a national public 
benefit purpose, so that the “costs of failure” at a European level are compensated by 
benefits at a national level.  
In some cases this may be true, in others if may run counter to donor intent and, 
therefore, the contribution may never materialise. It therefore seems doubtful whether 
such a “zero-sum game” is realistic in all cases, because the opportunity to serve a 
purpose using the means of a supranational legal form like a European Foundation may 
increase the willingness of some founders/donors to donate more money than under the 
status quo. An example of such a situation would be the entrepreneurial family which 
has family members in several Union Member States, owns corporate assets there, and 
shares a common vision of their philanthropic interests which can currently only be 
organised in a sub-optimal way using more than ten different legal entities. The family 
is listed among the wealthiest Europeans, but has declined to make itself available for a 
formal vignette case description. 
Thus, the European Foundation may attract more private money. Unfortunately, due to a 
lack of comprehensive data, it is not possible to verify or reject this hypothesis. 
However, there are examples which may provide some evidence. In Germany, the 
number of foundations increased significantly after a tax law reform which increased 
the amount of income tax deductibility for gifts to a threshold of 1m euros for the 
establishment of new foundations, to be claimed in addition to a general deductibility 
for charitable contributions of up to 20 % of taxable income.  
The reason for this phenomenon is probably the heterogeneity of donors. Some donors 
are irrational and will not take the legal situation into account. Other donors are rational 
and will, therefore, take into account the legal framework. It is plausible that a donor 
who wants to spend a relatively high amount of money will usually be a rational donor. 
Concerning corporate contributions to philanthropy, we tried to test our hypotheses and 
assess the costs by conducting a survey among the corporate giving programmes and 
corporate foundations of the US with the help and support of the US Council on 
Foundations. The low response rate to our survey unfortunately does not permit us to 
give any quantitative results. The few respondents, however, seem to confirm the notion 
of relative barriers (no prohibitive situation, but costs to establish information). 
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II. Experienced and Anticipated Costs 
The transaction cost argument concerning barriers to international activities needs to 
distinguish between a real cost and an anticipated cost approach. Basically, we are 
testing the following line of argument: The legal situation in Europe allows for cross- 
border activities and does not create prohibitive obstacles albeit at a certain level of 
transaction costs. This level is judged by the donors and foundation governors of 
Europe as being really high or as being significant in terms of the perceptions of the 
parties involved or both. We tested the argument in several steps by both asking for 
general perceptions concerning higher or lower costs of cross-border activities as well 
as trying to estimate the total level of costs which have to be seen as a loss to the public 
good.  
To evaluate the perception of cost differences between activities on the national and on 
the international level, we asked which ones would be cheaper or if there were no 
significant differences. To double check, the issue was addressed in two different 
questions.  
Table 25 shows that the overall assessment of responses corresponds to our expectations 
that costs for international activities are at least “somewhat higher” than those on the 
national level. However, we have to remark that the answers are not that explicit. There 
is a tendency towards a neutral evaluation of cost differences.273 
A closer look reveals that the assessment of higher costs (just like the perception of 
barriers) is highly dependent on experience. Foundations that are only active 
internationally from time to time are much more likely to state that costs for 
international programmes are higher, while foundations with a larger scope of activities 
present a more differentiated view on this topic by stating that the cost differences are 
not that high or even not measurable. We must also consider that the perception of cost 
differences and also of barriers differs not only according to the size and experience of 
foundations. For smaller foundations the barriers and costs are (relative to their capital 
and staff) in fact more severe than for larger foundations. It is probably not only a 
difference in the view of possible difficulties but also a factual difference of the 
individual capability to master those barriers. 
 
 
Table 24: Evaluation of cost differences 





In terms of operation costs: It is 
relatively cheaper to operate at the 
national level only. 
4.3 10.1 17.4 
 
31.9 34.8
In terms of operation costs: It is 
comparatively cheaper to operate 
50.8 21.3 18 8.2 0
                                                 
273 The high numbers in the “neutral” category could, to a certain extend, be explained by the fact that 
respondents tend to choose the middle category when confronted with a five value Lickert scale. 
 - 170 -





at an international level only.  
 
In terms of operation costs: It is 
irrelevant whether we operate at a 
national or international level. 
















Are the costs of 'doing business' 
abroad lower, the same, or higher 
than at the national level 





III. Modelling and Evaluation of Costs 
1. Introduction: Calculable und Incalculable Costs 
Unfortunately, only a comparably small part of the presented costs can be calculated, 
whereas other costs are incalculable, because nobody knows the number of cases or/and 
the amount of the costs. Table 25 below gives an overview of types of costs ensuing 
from dealing with several jurisdictions. The table does not include the many types of 
costs which originate from additional administrative structures which would not be 
required if one legal entity was sufficient to organise the transnational contributions for 
the public good. 
In order to present a manageable model calculation, we focused on what is calculable - 
the cost of legal counselling, as we have some information about the number of cases 
and some information on the average costs of a legal counselling case. A very rough 
estimate can also be provided concerning the additional cost of establishing new 
institutions274 and meeting the minimum capital requirements, which vary, however, 
between the Member States. A conservative estimate can be regarded as most likely in 
this case because the affiliate institutions will most likely not receive endowments far 
beyond what is legally required. As for the other cases, we unfortunately do not have 
enough information about the number of cases or/and the amount of the costs. 
2. Model of Cost Estimation for Legal Counselling (Calculable Costs) 
As regards the costs for legal counselling, the cost model is a multiplication of the 
numbers of cases and the fees for the individual legal counselling. Here we can 
distinguish between the establishment of a new organization abroad (a), and the running 
of the affiliated organization in a foreign country (b).  
 
Table 25, depicts the findings for this model calculation  
                                                 
274 For the sake of simplicity and to avoid an over-speculative approach, we assumed that foundations 
which see the need to create affiliate institutions to perform activities in other countries use the equivalent 
legal form of a foundation available in the countries in question.  
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Table 25: Model cost for internationally active foundations 





























Euros) 10,000 – 16,000 euros275 -- 




in a foreign 
country -- -- 6,000 euros 





countries 0 0 0 6,000 euros (every 2 years) 
a) Legal Counselling for the Establishment of New Organizations 
For foundations that are planning to establish a new organization in another country, 
there are one-time expenses for legal and fiscal counselling (civil law and tax law). We 
assume the ideal case that a foundation both wants to establish a new organization and 
meet all the legal requirements necessary to be treated the same way as domestic 
foundations. This holds especially for the requirements to be tax exempt like a domestic 
organization.  
The estimated cost for this legal counselling is 10,000 - 16,000 euros per case.277 This 
amount could also constitute a barrier that especially hinders small and less informed 
foundations to integrate international programs in their strategy.  
Calculating the total costs that arise for foundations due to the need to establish new 
organizations in foreign countries is a most sensible task. It is essential to estimate the 
number of cases for which these costs apply. There are between 25,000 and 30,000 
foundations278 which indicate that they plan to expand their international activities. Not 
all of them will necessarily establish affiliate organizations to do so. This means that we 
had to calculate the ratio of foundations which will chose the way of creating affiliate 
organisations to expand their activities. From the approximately 55,000 foundations 
                                                 
275 As described under Part 4 E II 2 a, these are only costs for legal counselling in the case of establishing 
of a new legal entity and only a minimal estimation due to the incalculable nature of other costs. 
276 We assume that the expenses for this adjustment and the legal evaluation of national law are not due 
every year but rather in periods of 2 years. 
277 25 - 40 hours of work in a legal office of good reputation at 400 euros per hour. 
278 The following figures are calculated based on our own survey data. 
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which carry out international activities, between 3 and 4 % report difficulties 
concerning the establishment of new legal entities, so that we can assume that they have 
indeed experience with the formation of affiliate organizations and have well-
established intentions to use them.  
If we apply this share of 3 to 4 % to the 25-30,000 foundations intending to expand their 
international activities, between 750 and 1,200279 of those foundations that expressed 
their intention to become active internationally would create new organizations in order 
to expand their scope of activity. These figures add up to respective costs of 7.5m to 
19.2m euros. 
It seems plausible to us to expect that these costs would occur each year. This is because 
the number of 750 to 1,200 cases takes into account only foundations that already exist 
and that have declared the wish to expand their geographical scope. Not included 
(because of the great difficulty to calculate) are those cases that result from a growing 
foundation sector. From the analysis of the dynamics of the sector, we learn that it is 
highly active and currently growing vigorously. With the concentration on existing 
cases only, our calculation stays on the more conservative side and stands back from 
any ungrounded assumptions. 
b) Running Legal Counselling for the New Organization 
For foundations that are already active in one or more countries there are running 
expenses for the adjustment of the organization to changes in national legislation (civil 
law and tax law). Again, in an idealised case, a foundation would regularly monitor 
these changes, having a legal office oversee the changes in law on the one hand, and 
execute the necessary changes at the organizational level on the other. 
The estimate for legal counselling is 6,000 euros.280 
There is a high probability that many foundations are not spending this amount every 
year for the supervision of their legal status. Therefore, we estimate that these costs are 
due only every second year in order to appropriately cover potential changes in the 
jurisdictions of the Member States (2 years). 
On the other hand, the estimate of 3,000 euros in expenses for permanent legal 
counselling is very low. There are many large foundations that employ a legal 
department of their own and that spend significantly more on legal advice than the 
estimated amount. In the context of this study, however, the costs and resulting 
behaviour of average foundations are of special interest. 
 
Table 26: Annual Costs of Barriers 







                                                 
279 This rather cautious calculation of cases takes into account that many of the international projects 
might well be small and therefore not that expensive. Because we have no indication of the distribution of 
size among international activities this approach seems appropriate. 
280 15 hours of work in a legal office of good reputation at 400 Euros per hour. This figure is based on 
information gathered from some interviews with lawyers, specialized in international corporate law. 
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Costs for the 












3000 euros 27,500 82.5m euros 




Estimation of minimum capital Average: 
64,150 
euros 
750-1200 48m to 77m 
euros 
Further incalculable costs 
- Costs for establishment apart from legal 
counselling 
- Additional administration costs 
- Psychological costs 
- Costs of failure 
- Other 
? ? ? 
Grand Total   138m to 
178.7m + 
X281 euros 
3. Assessment of Incalculable Costs 
a) Transfer of a Foundation’s Seat 
As already stated,282 a possible transfer a foundation’s seat would probably cause a 
huge amount of costs for legal counselling to meet the requirements of the 
administrations involved. 
                                                
We stand back from calculating those costs. This is due to several reasons. First, there is 
no precedent which would inform us about the real amount of costs. Second, the costs 
would be highly dependent on the constellation of the countries in question. The costs 
for the mandatory termination of a foundation would surely vary widely from Member 
State to Member State (if it is possible at all). Third, even if we could find one or 
several cases of foundations which have had their seat transferred to another Member 
State, the specifics of the constellation mentioned under the second point would forbid 
any generalization and calculation of an average. And fourth, it is hard to estimate how 
relevant such transfers would be, if there were less severe barriers. 
b) Costs for the Establishment of New Organizations Apart from Legal Counselling 
As a matter of fact, there are additional costs apart from legal counselling, if a new 
organization is established. 
The costs for the establishment of a new organization would include a potentially 
required minimum amount of capital. This requirement varies between the Member 
States of the European Union and lies between zero (for most associations and 
foundations) and one million euros, as is the case for French traditional foundations. 
 
281 The X indicates further incalculable costs which we do not estimate. 
282 See supra B I 5 and E III 3. 
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If we calculated a simple average, these costs would be 64,150 euros, which would 
constitute a large barrier for smaller foundations looking at this option to go 
international. Because of the large range and the many cases where no minimum capital 
is required, we have not included these costs in the formal assessment of calculable 
costs. However, if that average cost level was applied, the endowment costs of new 
affiliates would be the single largest cost item, even though it only it applies once in the 
lifetime of an organization. We therefore offer the figure in Table 26 as an additional 
indicator, while admitting that it is not really possible to provide for a balanced estimate 
of the endowments costs. On the other hand, the number of cases assumed is so 
conservative that the resulting figure can hardly overstate the case.  
A second line of argument could also support this reasoning: If we did not consider the 
minimum capital requirement to be a legal issue but rather looked at it from a practical 
point of view, it would be realistic to assume that establishing a new organization in 
another country would require a minimum investment of the same dimension. It may 
therefore be justified to include the figure in the overall considerations, even though we 
may have to assume a large margin of error.  
c) Additional Administration Costs 
We refrain from calculating further costs that occur in this case (like administration 
costs, staff and so forth) because there is a vast variety of differences in the capability of 
foundations to deal with this. Furthermore, the more experienced a foundation is and the 
larger its already realised scope of activities, the lower the costs will probably be.. As in 
the perception of barriers, some learning effect might apply that especially reduces the 
staff costs over time. Furthermore, the level of information a foundation has gathered 
could be cost reducing. In general, foundations that are already active on the 
international stage have surely an advantage against those establishing their first 
international program. 
d) Psychological Costs 
As mentioned above, the costs originating from expectations may be higher than those 
actually needed to resolve the given problems and to establish solutions to real barriers. 
It is impossible to give an estimate of those costs which primarily refer to information 
asymmetries among the foundation population of Europe. Perceived barriers (even if 
not existing in reality) will either have prohibitive effects or create additional 
transaction costs from information gathering only to find out that the perceived barriers 
are either non-existent or not insurmountable. The empirical findings of our survey 
indicate that those “psychological” effects exist (foundations with real experience 
giving a more realistic picture of the barriers and their likely impact). However, 
decisions are not based on “the truth” but on the existing levels of information and 
expectations based on them. They may be more effective in preventing action than real 
barriers themselves.  
e) Costs of Failure 
The costs of failure, i.e., the contributions to the public good foregone because of both 
real and perceived barriers cannot be assessed. Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest, 
however, that this kind of costs is an additional element in the field which should not be 
ignored. With the methodological approaches feasible and chosen for the purpose of this 
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study (with the exception of the US corporate giving and corporate foundation survey 
which was intended to serve as a proxy for this question) we cannot estimate the level 
of philanthropic activity which does not get realised because donor intent and existing 
barriers as well as perceptions thereof cannot be reconciled. It should be noted, 
however, that an increasing number of globally active corporations include corporate 
social responsibility considerations in their strategies. In addition, the integrated 
European single market creates a growing number of wealthy families who have assets 
in different Member States. Both the globalisation and European integration of the 
economy, as well as the transfer of post world-war II wealth to the next generation, 
create a growing potential for this kind of donor intent with a European rather than 
national scope in mind. 
f) Total Potential of Cross-Border Transactions with Barriers Removed 
The calculation of the additional resources that would be spent internationally if there 
were no barriers for such activities is restricted by several factors: 
– We assume that the overall sum of expenditure stays the same. There seems to 
be no way to estimate a possible growth of expenditure if there were no barriers 
towards international activities. 
– For the variables used for the calculation, we have only very few responses. So 
the calculation of averages is not that reliable and a breakdown by country is 
nearly impossible. 
In order to estimate the amount of money which is not spent internationally in Europe, 
we performed the following steps of calculation: 
Step 1: Calculation of the average share of operating expenditure which is used for 
international activities by foundations that are active on an international level. For all 
responding foundations that are active internationally the average of expenditure spent 
internationally is 17.94 %. 
Step 2: Calculation of the amount that equals this share for the operating expenditure of 
foundations which are not active internationally and not restricted to a regional topic. 
Here we include first and foremost those foundations that state that the reason for not 
conducting international activities is that the foundation is too small. As described 
above, this might be the main group that could become internationally active if they 
were sufficiently informed and if they saw the possibility to do so clearly. This group 
makes up 14 % of all respondents. 
Step 3: Building the weighted total of this amount of euros. If we calculate this share of 
the expenditure of those foundations that are not yet active abroad, the sum total is 
about 3.8 billion euros per year. It is clear that this figure is more or less fictive. But we 
are convinced that a certain number of foundations would become internationally active 
if the costs they anticipate could be reduced and the level of transparency rose. Given 
the very high total levels of foundation expenditure in Europe, even a shift of a small 
share of the total would result in a substantial gain for international activities.  
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F. Main Findings of Part 4 
I. Existing Legal Barriers to Cross-Border Activities 
The overall assessment of barriers to international activities of foundations in the 
Member States indicates that legal barriers do exist both in civil law and in tax law.  
As regards civil law, cross-border activities may be subject to various barriers of a 
different nature and magnitude.  
If a foundation intends to carry out activities in another country without transferring its 
seat to that country, it very often faces national measures and prerequisites that go 
beyond the requirements imposed by its home country. Thus, it is not uncommon for 
Member States to impose national recognition procedures on out-of-state foundations.  
If, however, a foundation decides to transfer, or has effectively transferred, its siège réel 
or effektiven Verwaltungssitz to another Member State, Member States applying the real 
seat doctrine (Sitztheorie) will require the foundation to dissolve itself and to 
reconstitute itself in the respective Member State; provided, of course, the dissolution is 
permitted in the first place or approved by the competent government authority. As the 
dissolution and liquidation of a foundation effectively terminates the will of the original 
benefactor or founder, the board’s decision to dissolve and liquidate the foundation will, 
as a general rule, require government approval. Formation of a new foundation in 
another Member State, in turn, will be subject to a set of entirely new and different laws 
that may be based on a totally different perception and conception of non-profit 
organizations and foundations. The same is true with regard to the formation of a 
subsidiary organisation in another Member State if a foundation decides not to dissolve 
itself in its home state and reconstitute itself in another Member State but rather form a 
subsidiary organisation in the other Member State in which its wants to engage in 
activities. 
As regards tax law, there are barriers for public benefit foundations receiving tax 
benefits. The vast majority of the Member States only grant tax benefits to resident 
foundations but not to non-resident foundations. This is also true for tax benefits to 
donations which exist in almost all Member States. As regards outbound constellations, 
however, more or less all Member States accept that a public benefit foundation can 
promote its public benefit purpose in another Member State. Only comparatively few 
Member States restrict such cross-border activities of a resident foundation to a certain 
point. In practice, the usual way to overcome the existing tax law barriers seems to be 
the establishment of one or more other foundations or non-profit organizations in 
compliance with the national laws of the states in which these other foundations or 
organizations are to engage in activities.  
II. National Barriers and the Fundamental Freedoms of the EC Treaty 
There is a debate currently whether some or all existing barriers infringe the 
fundamental freedoms of the EC Treaty, especially the freedom of establishment and 
the freedom of capital movement.  
There is an increasing significance of the right of establishment pursuant to Articles 43 
and 48 of the EC Treaty, especially in the field of public benefit foundations. While the 
ECJ has not yet ruled on the issue, case law suggests that the provisions regarding 
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freedom of establishment apply to a not-for-profit foundation if it engages in “economic 
activity”, i.e., if it offers goods or services in a market in competition with offers made 
by persons who operate in that market for profit. In contrast, if the foundation does not 
carry on an “economic activity”, it cannot invoke the right of establishment. Given the 
theoretically broad scope of the concept of “economic activity” it is fair to conclude that 
at least some not-for-profit foundations in the EU are subject to the right of 
establishment. Where one is to draw the line between economic and non-economic 
activities is not entirely clear, however. 
But even if the freedom of establishment is not applicable, the freedom of capital 
movement may apply. The freedom of capital movement has a wide ambit which even 
seems to include donations.  
It is clear from the ECJ’s case law that if a foundation enjoys the right of establishment 
or the right of capital movement, a Member State may not, as a general rule, restrict this 
right or make its exercise less attractive, unless the restriction can be justified according 
to Article 46 of the EC Treaty or pursuant to the four-factor test set forth in Gebhard 
and reconfirmed by the ECJ in Centros.  
As regards the civil law barriers in the light of case law, the real seat doctrine would not 
seem to be a justifiable restriction of a foundation’s right of establishment in regard to 
both immigration and emigration cases. In contrast, Member States may impose 
registration requirements on foreign foundations provided these requirements are not 
contrary to the four-factor test.  
As regards the tax law barriers, the analysis of the Stauffer decision confirms the 
existence of a non-discrimination rule concerning the income taxation of a non-resident 
foundation by the state of source. According to this non-discrimination rule, a non-
resident foundation is entitled to receive similar tax benefits like a resident foundation, 
if the non-resident foundation meets all requirements of the tax law of the state of 
source. There are good arguments that such a non-discrimination rule is also applicable 
to tax benefits for donations; the ECJ will decide this question soon in the Persche case 
which is just under review. If such a non-discrimination rule were accepted by the ECJ, 
a new possibility to overcome existing tax barriers would be possible as any non-
resident foundation could claim tax benefits under the condition that it can prove that it 
meets the requirements of the state of source (except its seat). However, such a “non-
discrimination solution” is not easy to implement, because of several legal uncertainties 
regarding the requirements of the tax laws of the Member States. 
Comparing the barriers for cross-border activities of foundations with the barriers for 
cross-border activities of companies in the light of the fundamental freedoms of the EC 
Treaty, it seems that the nature and magnitude of barriers are quite similar, but in the 
foundation sector there is still much more legal uncertainty (e.g., meaning of “economic 
activities, comparability of tax law requirements, etc.). Therefore, the transaction costs 
will be often higher, because more legal expertise is needed in order to cope with the 
legal uncertainty. 
III. Economic Relevance of the Barriers 
Our findings from an economic point of view indicate clearly that the foundation sector 
in Europe is to a very large extent experienced in conducting international activities. 
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There are far more foundations that have at least tried to perform cross-border activities 
than one would think. 
From our study, we learn clearly that foundations experience and anticipate barriers in 
the context of international activities. There seem to be some scaling effects since larger 
and more experienced foundations find it easier to be active internationally than smaller 
and less experienced ones. 
IV. Estimated Costs of the Barriers 
The assessment of the costs for activities in a foreign country also indicates that there 
are economically relevant differences to the conduction of the same activity on the 
national level. In particular, working in a different legal environment is named as one of 
the major difficulties foundations have to deal with. 
The overall assessment of barriers to international activities of foundations in European 
Union Member States indicates that barriers do exist, even though they cannot be 
described as insurmountable in nature. The main part of these barriers consists of 
uncertainties as to the provisions of other jurisdictions in both civil and tax law. 
Consequently, these uncertainties actually suggest that the level of perceived barriers is 
higher – especially for smaller foundations and those less experienced in international 
activities – than the level of actual barriers, even though all but the largest foundations 
report the latter. Even if barriers could be identified basically as surmountable and 
resolvable, this remains a costly endeavour which puts a high demand on the 
foundations’ capacity to process complex information of Member State jurisdictions. 
This cost level is carefully assessed in differentiating calculable and incalculable costs. 
Among the least calculable are the psychological costs and the effects of philanthropic 
contributions foregone because of barriers or perceptions thereof. 
Even the limited range of calculable costs (primarily of the nature of the legal cost of 
establishing affiliates and of legal counselling alone with international activities) results 
in substantial losses (two-digit million) to the public good per year. If endowment costs 
for affiliates, administrative costs of additional entities as well as failure cases were 
calculable, they would certainly add a substantial share to the very conservative cost 
estimate which we offer at a minimum of € 90m per year without and of € 138m per 
year with endowment costs included. If the high end of our range is considered, the 
respective costs vary between € 101.7m and € 178.7m. The growing potential for cross- 
border philanthropy in Europe suggests that these figures should be seen as a minimum 
level of costs when considering a dynamic perspective. The non-calculable costs will 
certainly add another substantial share to the total transaction costs incurred by cross-
border activities of European foundations or by foregone activities of European donors. 
The potential for further growth in the philanthropic sector of Europe exists and 
therefore we can expect the growing relevance of these cost estimates. 
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Part 5: Overcoming National Legal Barriers 
A. Models 
Several alternative models are conceivable for overcoming, or at least easing, national 
legal barriers, and the costs involved for cross-border activities in the European Union. 
Specifically, we are going to address five different models. 
– The status quo, possibly combined with instruments of soft law, 
– Harmonization 
– Multilateral or bilateral treaties 
– Introduction of a European Foundation Statute 
– Introduction of a European Foundation Statute with tax-exempt status in all 
Member States 
I. Status Quo Model 
1. Implications 
a) No Direct Legal Implications  
There would be no further direct legal implications 
b) Other Implications 
However, in this case the status quo does not necessarily mean total stagnation. The 
adjudication of the ECJ seems to develop certain borderlines for the current barriers. 
Apart from this, the Commission could consider an additional package of measures in 
order to facilitate the conquest of the existing barriers. 
aa) Adjudication of the ECJ and Infringement Procedures 
As already stated, the ECJ may declare in the Persche case a general non-discrimination 
rule. According to such a rule, some (but not all283) of the existing tax law barriers 
would be incompatible with the EC Treaty. The Commission may use infringement 
procedures to deal with national legislation and offer assisting programmes to overcome 
internal market difficulties (e.g., Solvit284). 
bb) Information Campaign 
Since the magnitude of most legal barriers identified is increased because of information 
inadequacies and can be overcome by incurring more or less substantial transaction 
costs, an information campaign could be considered a means of choice to remedy the 
situation. In this context, one could also imagine that the Commission could prepare an 
                                                 
283 The non-discrimination rule is only applicable to inbound constellations (a non-residential foundation 
wants tax benefits from the state of source), but not to outbound constellations (a residential foundation 
wants tax benefits although its activities are abroad). However, most Member States do not seem to have 
barriers for outbound constellations, and some of the current barriers may infringe the EC Treaty because 
of other reasons (cf. the case Laboratoires Fournier supra C II 2 c). 
284  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/interactive_info/practical_info_en.htm 
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interpretative communication clarifying the legal issues (as highlighted in the terms of 
reference for the study).  
It should be kept in mind, however, that we are speaking of a matter far from trivial. 
The complexity of information required on 27 Member States does not suggest that 
helping to facilitate the availability of the information needed could be organised easily. 
Such an information effort would require at least a highly competent unit of monitoring 
experts which would have to process the information with the lowest possible risk of 
errors and incorrectness. The results of any such information approach would either 
have to be in the form of a fairly comprehensive online information portal or a 
handbook-style publication, but certainly not a collection of information brochures. The 
very fact that 27 Members States are involved creates a substantial level of complexity 
by the number of possible combinations which cannot be reduced. Therefore, an 
information campaign approach would certainly cause substantial ongoing costs and the 
need for a decision on which party would have to cover them. 
Assuming that this task could be performed by the trade associations of the foundation 
sector or by networking solutions of academic partners on a voluntary basis would 
certainly fall short of the quality levels adequate to really foster philanthropic activity in 
the EU. This would also mean that the compliance costs of the current situation of 
complexity of 27 jurisdictions would be allocated exclusively to the foundation sector 
itself, which does not seem to be a feasible option. In addition to these cost allocation 
considerations, foundations and donors interested would still have to resort to legal 
counsel in order to avoid liability consequences of inappropriate information and in 
order to base their operations on legally sound judgements. Such a campaigning 
approach, therefore, could only provide for limited effects in dealing with the barriers 
below the threshold of legal action and would only have limited effects of cost 
reduction.  
cc) Code of Conduct and Accreditation System 
Voluntary codes of conduct could also be encouraged and used as another means of soft 
law285. Such a code could be combined with a voluntary accreditation system which 
would be based on trustworthiness, to be implemented at a European rather than 
national level. The aim of an accreditation system is that the Member States may 
voluntarily support such an accredited “European Foundation” and that the 
“psychological barriers” perceived by founders, donors, beneficiaries and the public are 
reduced. 
Clearly, central to the model is to find adequate rules to ensure that the accredited 
“European Foundation” will be seen as a trustworthy institution by the Member States, 
founders, donors, beneficiaries and the public. Specifically, there are two crucial 
institutional questions:  
– Which body is to be entrusted to stipulate the requirements for the accreditation? 
– Which body is to be responsible for the accreditation? 
Trustworthiness requires that a reputable public body should be nominated to develop 
the system. It should be a European body in order to underline the European character 
                                                 
285  The Commission has already issued, in a different context, a code of conduct for not-for profit 
organisation, Communication COM(2005) 620. 
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of the accreditation system. Thus potential bodies would be the European Commission 
or the European Parliament. 
The actual implementation and running of the accreditation procedure, too, rests on a 
trustworthy body, either public or private, with a good reputation. Another question is 
whether it should be one European body or several national bodies. The advantages of a 
European body would be increased consistency and a stronger emphasis on the 
European nature of the accreditation system. The advantage of a national body may be 
greater flexibility of regional conditions and circumstances, perhaps even greater 
acceptance in political terms. In either case, the accreditation procedure should not be 
very burdensome. 
The requirements for the accreditation should promote the aim of trustworthiness. 
Governments and the public in every Member State should view any accredited 
“European Foundation” as a reputable and trustworthy institution. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the European Foundation has to copy the 
most restrictive national foundation law among the Member States or combine the most 
restrictive provisions from every Member State. We have to keep in mind that the 
proposed European Private Company is no less restrictive than the national company 
law of several Member States (e.g., as regards minimum capital requirements). 
Ways of enhancing protection to the extent needed to prevent abuse of any such ‘seal of 
approval’ are to stipulate clear functions for the accreditation status of a ‘European 
Foundation’ as well as appropriate governance models, including publicity and due 
diligence requirements. The aim would be to prevent the accredited European 
Foundation from being misused as a “cheap” escape from more restrictive national 
foundation laws in some Members States (see further infra B). 
2. Expected Cost Reduction 
In the status quo scenario, the costs of barriers against international activities of 
foundations would, ceteris paribus, remain in the range of 138m to 178.7m euros per 
year, as calculated in Table 26, or slightly below that level.  
There might be some cost reduction as a result of current or future ECJ decisions and 
continued and expanded information and knowledge management by umbrella groups 
such as the European Foundation Centre. Included in this information management 
approach might be improved efforts at systematic information which could reach as far 
as a formal campaign. In that case, remaining costs for legal counsel in order to deal 
with liability and reliability suggest that the reduction will be limited and, certainly, the 
larger part of costs will be sustained. It also needs to be kept in mind that a large part of 
the costs for legal counsel address ongoing issues of monitoring legal and tax law 
changes which would only be reduced by a small margin.  
Alas, at least for the foreseeable future, substantial barriers against, and legal 
uncertainties about, actual and potential cross-border activities will remain. 
Due to the rather soft and, in terms of its outcomes, somewhat unpredictable instrument 
of an accreditation system, the potential cost reduction is hard to estimate. At some 
level, it seems plausible that certain foundations in some Member States would start 
international activities, encouraged by the cost reductions and greater opportunities the 
seal of approval granted by accreditation brings. The overall result would be higher 
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amounts of cross-border flows of grants and operations. However, we need to keep in 
mind that accreditation as such does not automatically reduce costs and increase 
opportunities; at the very minimum its labelling effect offers comparative advantages to 
those foundation possessing the ‘seal’ over those that do not. 
II. Harmonization Model 
The other extreme to the implied ‘no direct legal action’ of the status quo model would 
be the harmonization of the various foundation laws and/or tax laws across Member 
States.  
1. Implications 
As regards foundation law, the harmonization model would be neither desirable nor 
feasible. Although common historical roots exist, foundation law has developed 
differently across Member States, and for different reasons and with different outcomes. 
For example, some Member States accept Family Foundations, while other Member 
States do not. In light of these fundamental, historically developed differences, it is 
obvious that harmonization of the national foundation laws is not a desirable solution. If 
considered in detail, any harmonization approach to European foundation law would by 
necessity impoverish the wealth of traditions existing in Europe. This wealth of 
traditions lends itself to a subsidiary approach in the development of any policy for 
European laws on foundations.286  
As regards tax law, harmonization would theoretically seem to be easier, because the 
national tax regulations are not as different as the legal treatment of foundations. 
Politically, however it does not seem to be realistic that the Member States would be 
ready to harmonise their tax laws. 
2. Expected Cost Reduction 
In the case of total harmonization of foundation law in Europe, all costs for cross border 
activities would no longer apply. However, it is quite likely that some new short- and 
medium-term costs might arise that are associated with legal changes and with 
compliance to what could be significantly new bodies of law, rules and regulations. 
However, the assumption would be that such costs remain transitory and, in the long 
run, the costs of a harmonised system would be substantially reduced and significantly 
lower than the status quo. 
III. Bilateral or Multilateral Treaties (Treaty Model) 
Another option for overcoming the national legal barriers is the use of bilateral or 
multilateral treaties, which are possible in both civil law and tax law. 
                                                 
286 Thus, it is not surprising that no legal scholar has argued for such a harmonization of foundation law 
and that the vast majority of the consulted foundations were against such a harmonization. 
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1. Implications 
Under a civil law treaty each Member State would mutually recognise the legal 
personality of foreign foundations. Under a tax law treaty each Member State would 
mutually accord tax-exempt foundation status to foreign foundations, with the 
consequence that such foreign foundations would receive the same tax benefits as a 
national tax-exempt foundation. Thus, in theory, it is possible to overcome national 
legal barriers by the use of multilateral or bilateral treaties both in civil law 
(recognition) and in tax law (tax-exempt status). 
However, there are still almost no multilateral or bilateral treaties between the Member 
States: the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition 
from 1985 was only ratified by a few Member States (Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands and the UK). Tax treaties are even more of a rarity. One reason for this lack 
of treaties may be that it is not always easy to equate a foreign legal form with a 
national one, e.g., if a public benefit purpose is a requirement in national civil law 
and/or national tax law, the term could have another meaning in other Member States. 
Another factor is that some Member States do not regard a foreign foundation as a 
resident of the other contracting state for the purposes of an income tax treaty where the 
foundation has no liability or only a partial liability to income tax in that other state. In 
view of these experiences, it seems unrealistic to expect the Member States to ratify 
unilateral or bilateral treaties in the course of the next few years.  
What is more, bilateral tax treaty policy within the EU is dominated by the influence of 
the OECD model’s tax conventions and commentaries. The recently published 2008 
update of the OECD model income tax treaty affirms the OECD position that the non-
discrimination article in the model treaty is not intended to preclude discrimination 
based on residence.287 Hence, the bilateral option could potentially reduce the policy 
influence of the European Union in strengthening Europe’s foundation sector. 
2. Expected Cost Reduction 
The potential to reduce the costs of barriers by multilateral or bilateral treaties is hard to 
estimate, as it largely depends on the countries and barriers involved. If the scale and 
scope of such treaties is large, i.e., involving many Member States and addressing most 
barriers, the costs of barriers would be reduced significantly; in case only a few Member 
States engage in such treaties, overall costs would not be too different from the status 
quo option. 
IV. European Foundation Statute (European Foundation Model) 
An important alternative in overcoming the national barriers is the introduction of a 
European Foundation Statute.  
The European Foundation would be an additional and optional instrument like the European 
Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG),288 the European Company (Societas Europaea, 
                                                 
287 http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3343,en_2649_33747_41231132_1_1_1_1,00.html 
288 Council Regulation (EC) no. 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping 
(EEIG), Official Journal C 285. 
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SE),289 the European Cooperative Society (Societas Cooperativa Europaea, SCE),290 
and the proposed European Private Company (Societas Privatae Europaea, SPE). 
                                                
1. Implementation Questions 
a) Potential Legal Basis: Art. 308, EC Treaty 
As all other European enactments, a Statute or Regulation for a European Foundation 
requires a legal basis within the EC Treaty. The other European legal forms (EEIG, SE, 
SCE, as well as the proposed SPE) are based on the “catch-all” rule of Art. 308 of the 
EC Treaty. The European Foundation, too, could be based on Art. 308.291 
b) Applicability of the EC Treaty to the Establishment of European Non-Profit Legal 
Entities?  
Another question is whether Art. 308 of the EC Treaty would also allow for the 
introduction of a European Foundation. It could be argued that a fundamental difference 
from other European legal forms exists in this case.  
Indeed, the EEIG, SE, SCE and SPE are “economic” European legal forms, which can 
lay claim to the freedom of establishment (Art. 48, EC Treaty), whereas a Foundation is 
typically a “not-for-profit” entity. The wording of Art. 48, paragraph 2, EC Treaty 
explicitly excludes “non-profit-making” organisations.292 However, as already stated, 
there are strong arguments that this provision means each entity is regarded as a “for-
profit” organisation if it carries on economic activities, regardless of whether this 
organisation has a non-distribution constraint or is tax-exempt.293 As a consequence of 
this test, all foundations carrying on economic activities would be protected by the right 
of freedom of establishment.294 Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that it is not 
economic activity that is typical of a foundation, but grant-making activity. Thus it 
seems odd that only European Foundations which are not purely grant-making should 
be allowed. 
However, even if the freedom of establishment only protects “economic” foundations, 
there are other good reasons to regard foundations which are purely grant-making as 
also protected by the freedom of capital movement (Art. 56, EC Treaty). As already 
stated, there are good arguments that the ECJ will decide in Persche that donations are 
covered by the freedom of capital movement.295 
 
289 Council Regulation (EC) no. 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company 
(SE), Official Journal L 294. 
290 Council Regulation (EC) no. 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative 
Society (SCE), Official Journal L 207. 
291 See also ECJ, Case C 436/03, which clarifies that Art. 308 and not Art. 95 of the EC Treaty is the 
appropriate legal basis for the SCE. 
292 According to Art. 48, EC Treaty, "companies or firms" means those constituted under civil or 
commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private 
law, save for those which are non-profit-making. 
293 See also Part 4, C I 3 supra. 
294 In some cases the freedom of services may be applicable too. 
295 See Part 4, C 2 1 b aa supra. 
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Thus, a European Foundation with economic activities could be based on the freedom 
of establishment, whereas a European Foundation with grant-making activities on the 
freedom of capital movement. 
c) Methodology 
The usual method would be to implement the European Foundation in the same way as 
all other European legal forms, i.e., by means of a statute which provides the legal 
framework. A further question is whether the statute should be comprehensive (like the 
draft statute for the SPE) or whether it should only contain rules or a set of questions 
and should be supplemented by the law of the home country (like the SE) (see infra B 
II). 
d) Transformation of National Foundations into a European Foundation 
In company law, a decision by a (qualified) majority of the shareholders usually allows 
the transition of the company into another (European) legal form.  
As regards the question of transformation from a national Foundation into a European 
Foundation, the situation is different. As the legal comparative analysis shows, all 
Member States have procedures for fundamental decisions (e.g., an amendment of the 
foundation’s statutes), but the most common procedure for such a decision is (1) that the 
relevant majority of board members (the majority that is required by law and/or by the 
statutes of the foundation) agree, and (2) that the state supervisory authority finds that 
the transformation is in line with donor intent.296  
It could seem to be quite a difficult task to decide whether the founder of an existing 
national foundation would have preferred the European Foundation as an organizational 
form, which did not exist when he made his endowment. In a few cases, the future 
possibility of a transition to European Foundation may actually have been mentioned in 
the foundation deed. Further indication of donor intent may be that the purposes of the 
foundation are purely “European” and/or that a comparatively high level of cross-border 
activities is necessary in order to pursue that purpose. However, there may be cases 
where it is questionable whether the transformation would meet the more or less fictive 
will of the donor.  
Thus, it may be reasonable that the national legislator establish additional procedural 
rules for the existing foundations. Such procedural rules could give the board of the 
foundation an option whether it wants to transform its legal form from a national 
foundation to a European Foundation. One requirement of such a transformation may be 
that the statutes of the national foundation can remain much the same. That means that 
the freedom of scope of the European Foundation Statute has to allow the current 
version of the statutes of the national foundation being transformed. If it were necessary 
to amend the statutes of the national foundation, the national rules for such amendments 
might be applicable. Under such a condition, it seems possible also to allow national 
foundations a transformation to a European Foundation as the transformation would 
have no direct impact on the statutes of the individual foundation. 
                                                 
296 In some Member States the requirements are less strict, see Part 3 D II 1.  
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2. General Guidelines for the Content of a European Foundation Statute 
The aim of this feasibility study is to test the potential of a European Foundation Statute 
for overcoming barriers to cross-border activities. It is not our goal to develop a detailed 
draft of such a European Foundation Statute. However, in order to show the potential of 
a European Foundation Statute, it is necessary to provide an overview of what the 
fundamental guidelines and options of a European Foundation Statute could be.  
a) Primary Aim: Overcoming National Barriers 
As already stated, the primary aim of a Statute for European Foundations is to overcome 
the existing barriers to cross-border activities. This involves two essential aspects: 
– To overcome civil law barriers, the European Foundation will have to be a legal 
personality recognised in all Member States. In addition, the European 
Foundation shall be entitled to conduct activities of any kind in order to promote 
its purpose. 
– To overcome tax law barriers, the European Foundation will be entitled to 
receive the same tax benefits as a domestic tax-exempt public benefit 
foundation. 
The introduction of a European Foundation Statute will directly overcome the civil law 
barriers only. None of the other European legal forms affect the different tax law 
systems of individual Member States.  
Another option would be to combine the European Foundation Statute with the added 
status of a tax-exempt organization in every Member State. This option will be 
discussed as a follow-on option. 
b) Second Aim: Trustworthiness 
The second aim is to find adequate rules to ensure that the European Foundation will be 
seen as a trustworthy institution. The Member States will probably not agree to the 
introduction of a European Foundation Statute if they have concerns that this European 
legal form might not be trustworthy, e.g., because it could be misused for the 
circumvention of their national foundation law, tax law or trade law. 
Again (as in the case of accreditation), this does not necessarily mean that the European 
Foundation has to copy the most restrictive national foundation law from among the 
Member States or combine the most restrictive provisions of every Member State.  
Ways of enhancing protection to the extent needed to prevent abuse are to stipulate clear 
functions or purposes for the European Foundation, and also appropriate governance 
models, publicity requirements and due diligence rules. The aim would be to prevent the 
European Foundation from being misused as a “cheaper” and “easier” version relative 
to national ones. 
3. Expected Cost Reduction 
The introduction of a European Foundation Statute would probably have multiple 
effects on the costs of barriers.  
First the costs for the establishment of new organizations would no longer apply, 
because a European Foundation created in one Member State would automatically be 
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accepted in other Member States without the need to obtain legal (civil law) information 
which would otherwise be required to create an affiliate foundation (moreover, the most 
current expenditures for legal counsel would no longer be needed). Some reduction of 
tax counselling costs might also occur in conjunction with a non-discrimination 
approach combined with the EFS. However, some costs here may remain because the 
tax treatment of EFs will still vary from Member State to Member State. Using the 
calculation model described above (Part 4 E), the minimum cost reduction would be the 
calculable costs to the amount of at least between 48.5m – 60.2m euros annually.297 If 
we included in this figure the very rough estimate of the minimum capital endowment 
or other start-up investment costs (described above as incalculable costs) of affiliate 
organizations, the savings could amount to as much as 96.5 - 137.2m euros. As for the 
other types of incalculable costs, we can expect a remarkable impact, in particular, on 
the psychological costs and the costs of failure. With a European vehicle at the disposal 
of European subjects and European as well as other international corporations, we can 
expect a growth trend for European investments in philanthropy even though we cannot 
identify the size of this trend. Depending on how widespread knowledge of the vehicle 
of a European Foundation will be, these effects will most likely grow over time and 
help to stimulate growing dynamics in European philanthropy. The full cost effects of 
the European Foundation will depend on the approach to transforming existing 
foundations into the new legal form. If the legal provisions only allow doing so ex nunc, 
the effects will be more limited because all existing foundations will not have the 
opportunity to transform. They will, however, still have the opportunity to create one 
new affiliate instead of the several or many previously required. If the legal provisions 
create generous opportunities for transformation and manage to deal with an assessment 
of potential donor intent on the levels of national legislation, the cost effects will be 
comprehensive because all institutions wishing to transform will actually be able to do 
so. 
In addition, there would be large gains in transparency as well as visibility for European 
foundations. The possibility of taking up international programmes would become both 
much more feasible and more visible. The empirical results given above show that the 
assessment of costs for international activities decreases with knowledge and 
experience. This could have an effect on the range of foundations that would find it 
attractive (and feasible!) to be active on a European level, thereby strengthening the 
European dimension of foundations in the EU. 
A full assessment of the cost effects of the European Foundation Statute will also have 
to take into account any counteracting tendencies of remaining or new transaction costs 
due to the new legal framework. There will most likely be costs associated with cross-
border activities even if conducted by a European Foundation. These costs cannot be 
easily investigated. For example, if current costs originate from the fact that foundation 
law is, to a high extent, unwritten law in the Member States, expert legal help will 
                                                 
297 The savings are calculated according to Table 26: The figure is explained by avoiding the costs for 
legal counsel when establishing affiliate foundations (7.5m-19.2m) as well as by avoiding the running 
costs for legal counsel in those cases because a EFS would make affiliate foundations redundant (we 
assume that these cost savings amount to 41m which equals around half of the total running expenses for 
international activities). The span is explained by the between 750 and 1.250 cases assumed. 
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continue to be required, and this problem will not cease to exist with a European 
Foundation Statute, since many rules in the European Foundation Statute would 
probably have to refer back to the rules applicable in the Member States.  
In conclusion, our final estimate of the cost reductions associated with a European 
Foundation Statute will be slightly below the figures given above. We may overestimate 
the number of cases to fully benefit from a European Foundation Statute, and 
underestimate the costs of conducting cross-border activities as a European Foundation. 
If our considerations do not only focus on the cost reduction potential of a European 
Foundation Statute among existing foundations and their interest to become active 
internationally but also addresses the cases of foundations currently failing to come into 
existence with a European agenda at all, the overall effect of a European Foundation 
Statute would be more positive on the whole.  
4. Further Possible Effects of a European Foundation Statute 
According to the terms of reference, this feasibility study also assesses the possible 
effects of a European Foundation Statute on: (a) the activities and governance of 
foundations and trusts (especially a preliminary assessment on the possible type/group 
of foundations which are more likely than others to use such a statute); (b) the attitude 
of donors towards giving; (c) the corporate sector; and (d) on the national and European 
economy (notably in the fields of research innovation, technical development, 
competitiveness and growth). The goal of this point of the terms of reference is to 
identify possible benefits and drawbacks arising from the introduction of a European 
Foundation Statute.  
As the empirical analysis shows, it is not possible to provide a quantitative assessment 
on these issues in light of the evidence collected in the survey. However, we can give a 
qualitative assessment on the four points.  
a) Possible Effects on the Activities and Governance of Foundations and Trusts 
A European Foundation Statute would at the same have effects of a model law on 
national jurisdictions. Assuming that the legal form of the European Foundation would 
be created with strict governance, accountability and publicity requirements enacted 
because of the wide scope of privileges granted to such an institution in the whole EU, 
the European Foundation Statute could set standards concerning these issues in Europe.  
We expect that primarily large and medium-sized foundations which operate above the 
threshold of small, volunteer-run organizations will find the European Foundation of 
interest. In particular, this could apply to operating foundations serving purposes in 
regulated quasi-markets like social welfare or education. A number of these foundations 
are currently beginning to develop a European scope of interests (for instance by 
serving constituencies of European citizens who migrate between Member States and 
who are being served by foundations from their home country when they move to other 
countries, e.g., for their retirement or for professional reasons). 
A European Foundation Statute would also offer an opportunity for more institutions in 
the sector which address efficiently a European agenda in the first place (e.g., European 
citizenship, civic education, migration and labour market issues, environmental 
purposes, or purposes of European cultural or scientific interest).  
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b) Possible Effects on the Anticipated Attitude of Donors towards Giving 
This report clearly concludes that the legal status quo fails to mobilise a certain (though 
not quantifiable) level of donations by European citizens and by corporate players from 
both within and outside the EU. The vignette cases and the evidence from certain donor 
families like the one briefly mentioned under the paragraph on incalculable costs 
suggest that the current barriers, and even more so the perceived costs of barriers, result 
in reduced levels of contributions to philanthropy, i.e., have prohibitive effects. In 
addition, the growing trends of globalization and internationalization of the economies 
and the current transfer of wealth to the next generation provide qualitative criteria 
which support an argument of further sustained growth of philanthropy and therefore of 
a growing potential for the use of a European Foundation. This implies that even if the 
full potential brought about by reducing the costs for transnational programmes was 
only relevant to new foundations, this would still have positive effects on the overall 
levels of foundation activities in Europe. We need to state again that even with a 
restrictive approach to the transformation of existing legal forms, the existing 
institutions would have the opportunity to resolve the issue by only creating one affiliate 
institution instead of several.  
c) Possible Effects on the Corporate Sector 
Empirical results provided for the Member States where an empirical assessment of the 
relationship between foundations and corporations was feasible show that only in 
certain Member States (e.g. Denmark, Germany, Austria, with a predominance of 
private purpose foundation the latter country, and the Netherlands) do foundations own 
stock or even majorities of stock in corporations. Compared to both the number of 
foundations in Europe as well as the capitalization of corporations in the EU, the cases 
in question represent a marginal share, even though some very prominent cases are 
involved. It therefore does not seems to merit special attention to restrict the asset 
management of foundations in order to prevent abuse, as long as the European 
Foundation Statute foresees the European Foundation as a public benefit institution 
only. In terms of market efficiency, the research by Thomsen shows that foundation-
controlled corporations do not generate lower returns than public companies which is an 
argument against inefficiencies as a consequence of these asset holdings.298  
With a growing interest of corporations in corporate social responsibility activities, a 
European Foundation Statute will most likely have positive effects among those 
corporations which are European or global players, putting an efficient vehicle at their 
disposal to conduct their activities using a single legal instrument. This opportunity 
could also create an incentive for international corporations, especially those from the 
US which are already interested in CSR activities, to increase the level of their 
involvement.  
                                                 
298 Thomsen, Steen Corporate Ownership by Industrial Foundations. The European Journal of Law and 
Economics 7(2), 1999. 
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d) Possible Effects on the National and European Economy 
Regarding the possible effects on the national and European economies (notably in the 
fields of research, innovation, technical development, competitiveness and growth), we 
must first refer to the findings on the economic importance of the foundation sector. 
Not only is foundation work in the field of research and development (R&D) a good 
example of the international activities of foundations, it also constitutes an important 
field for the strategic development of the European Union, not the least in light of the 
Lisbon Strategy.299 
The report “Giving More for Research in Europe”300 underlines the importance of 
foundations in the European Research Area. Foundations do not only fund important 
research through grants to institutions but also conduct valuable research themselves. 
Foundations are seen to be in a unique position to boost research with their ability to 
fund research programs which other institutions would rather neglect (basic research) 
and to support the researchers with their own competencies. 
Despite the fact that the financial contribution to R&D spending from foundations is 
small at first sight,301 given the specific qualities of foundations, they contribute in more 
than just financial ways to the European Research Area. The report which was 
completed by an expert group for the Commission sees foundations as one important 
pillar in the overall architecture of the European research landscape which merits efforts 
to expand it. 
Little is known about the total scale of research foundations in Europe, with OECD and 
Eurostat statistics shedding little light on the field of foundations’ activities. Hopefully 
the FOREMAP project currently conducted at the European Foundation Centre will 
bring some new insights here and possibly develop a methodology to evaluate the sector 
more precisely. 
One reason for the lesser extent to which foundations in Europe contribute to the field 
of research could be the difference between an international research field which is 
increasingly organised across borders and the foundation sector which is very 
heterogeneous and largely organised within national borders. The argument is that the 
level of international research funded or conducted by foundations is too low, and that it 
is in the best interests the European Union to raise it to a higher level. Here again, the 
differences between the jurisdictions are seen as the major obstacle to trans-European 
giving, funding and programme operations. Like the more general findings in this 
feasibility report, legal uncertainty seems to be the major problem in the development of 
a transnational and European culture of research funding by foundations. There seem to 
be some severe problems in organising international collaboration, raising funds 
internationally and funding international programs or projects. 
                                                 
299 This could be deduced also from the strong interest of the European Commission and umbrella 
organisations like the EFC that recently conducted a research project dealing with research foundations in 
Europe (FOREMAP). 
300 http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/rec_5_7800_giving_4_051018_bat.pdf 
301 The average share of “other national sources” (i.e., others than governmental or industrial and covers 
not only foundations but the non-profit sector as a whole) on R&D spending was 2.3% in 2003 for the EU 
27. In comparison, the same figure for the United States was 4.8%. See: OECD Main Science and 
Technology Indicators Volume 2007/2 - Table 15. 
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To overcome these obstacles and to expand the contribution made by foundations to 
research in the European Union, the Report “Giving More for Research in Europe” 
provides clear suggestions we cannot but underline. The report, which was completed 
by an expert group for the Commission, makes the following recommendations to 
strengthen the framework for private and corporate giving in the field of research: 
- Improve visibility and information about research foundations 
- Create a more beneficial fiscal and regulatory environment for foundations 
- Improve mechanisms for leveraging funds for research 
- Promote more effective funding arrangements and mechanisms  
- Foster a more conducive EU-wide environment for foundations 
Under letter e) the explicit recommendation is to consider the implementation of a 
European Foundation Statute in order to facilitate international activities of research 
foundations. 
With a common legal form research foundations could cope with the needs of the 
international research community in a much better way. The European Foundation 
could also serve as an important cornerstone in the strategy for European Research 
Infrastructures as proposed by the Commission for a council regulation on the 
Community legal framework for a European Research Infrastructure (ERI).302 In 
addition, REGULATION (EC) No 294/2008 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 March 2008 establishing the European Institute of 
Innovation and Technology (EIT) mentions that “[the] EIT shall have power to establish 
a Foundation with the specific objective of promoting and supporting the activities of 
the EIT.” Because of the absence of the European legal form, this foundation would 
need to be set up according to one national foundation law.  
Furthermore, the European Foundation could boost the designated features of a 
European Research Area (ERA), as proposed in the Green Paper “The European 
Research Area: New Perspectives” as follows:303 
An adequate flow of competent researchers with high levels of mobility between 
institutions, disciplines, sectors and countries; 
World-class research infrastructures, integrated, networked and accessible to research 
teams from across Europe and the world, notably thanks to new generations of 
electronic communication infrastructures; 
Excellent research institutions engaged in effective public-private cooperation and 
partnerships, forming the core of research and innovation 'clusters', including 'virtual 
research communities', mostly specialised in interdisciplinary areas and attracting a 
critical mass of human and financial resources; 
Effective knowledge-sharing notably between public research and industry, as well as 
with the public at large; 
Well-coordinated research programmes and priorities, including a significant volume of 
jointly-programmed public research investment at the European level involving 
common priorities, coordinated implementation and joint evaluation; and  
                                                 
302 COM (2008) 467 final. 
303 COM (2007) 161 final. 
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A wide opening of the European Research Area to the world with special emphasis on 
neighbouring countries304 
In this context, the European Foundation could become a common tool to meet the 
goals of the proposals and to further develop the set of European Research 
Infrastructures (besides the pure academic networks and commercial institutions active 
in the field of research). 
We expect that the introduction of a European Foundation Statute would have positive 
effects concerning all of the above points. It would increase the visibility of the 
foundation sector in public, diminish transaction costs for international activities in R& 
D (as in many other fields), and facilitate the organisation of international programmes 
and operations. By means of easier access to information, an additional effect could be 
that more foundations will be willing to set up international research programmes, raise 
funds in different countries and offer their grants Europe-wide. 
V. European Foundation Statute with Additional Tax-Exemption (Tax-Exempt 
European Foundation Model) 
Another option would be a European Foundation with a tax-exempt status in all 
Member States.  
1. Scope of Tax-Exemption 
Theoretically there are three main sub-options regarding the scope of tax-exemption 
(tax benefits): 
a) Harmonization 
Under the tax harmonization model (see A I supra) the European Foundation and the 
national foundations receive identical tax benefits in all Member States under identical 
conditions. Such a solution, however, is not realistic. 
b) Specific Tax Regime for European Foundations 
There could be a specific tax regime for the European Foundation: This means that a 
European Foundation receives the same tax benefits in all Member States, regardless of 
the tax benefits of the Member States for their national foundations (which can be more 
or less generous). 
Example 1: Donations to a European Foundation are tax-exempt up to 10 % of the 
income of the donor in any Member State. This is also true in Member State A, where 
such donations to a national tax-exempt foundation are tax-exempt up to 20 % of the 
income of the donor, and in Member State B, where a donation to a national tax-exempt 
foundation is only tax-exempt up to 5 % of the income of the donor.  
Such a solution seems to be problematic because it may lead to severe frictions between 
the tax regime for national public benefit foundations and the tax regime for the 
European Foundation: There would be discrimination, if one of the two regimes (e.g., 
tax benefits for the European Foundation) offers wider tax benefits than the other (e.g., 
                                                 
304 COM (2007) 161 final, pp 2 
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tax benefits for a national foundation in Member State X) and the foundation of the 
discriminated tax regime fulfils all requirements of the other tax regime.  
In Example 1 as regards the tax benefits for donors, in Member State B a donor to a 
national tax-exempt foundation is discriminated in comparison to a donor to the 
European Foundation, and in Member State A a donor to a European Foundation is 
discriminated in comparison to a donor to a national tax-exempt foundation.  
Such discriminations are politically not desirable and may be regarded as an 
infringement of national constitutional law and/or European law. 
c) Non-Discrimination Solution 
A third solution would be that a European Foundation receives the same tax benefits in 
each Member State as accorded to national tax-exempt foundations (non-
discrimination).  
Example 2: In Member State A, donations to a European Foundation are tax-exempt up 
to 20 % of the income of the donor (because donations to a national tax-exempt 
foundation are also tax-exempt up to 20 %). In Member State B, donations to a 
European Foundation are only tax-exempt up to 5 % of the income of the donor, 
because the national tax-exempt foundation is only tax-exempt up to 5 % of the income 
of the donor. 
Such a solution avoids friction between the national tax regime and the tax regime for 
the European Foundation. Thus, the non-discrimination solution is the only solution 
which is both realistic and reasonable. 
2. Implications 
Consequently, we will review only the possibilities of implementing a non-
discrimination solution. There are three possible ways of implementing such a solution. 
a) Implementation by the European Foundation Statute Itself 
It is questionable whether a legal basis exists for implementing a non-discrimination 
rule in the European Foundation Statute itself. Even if it were legally possible, one has 
to bear in mind that first drafts of other European legal forms also included a part on 
taxation but those rules were removed later because no agreement among Member 
States could be reached. Thus, such an implementation does not seem to be realistic. 
b) Implementation by a Multilateral Treaty 
A European Foundation with additional tax-exemption could be implemented by a 
European Foundation Statute which is accompanied by a multilateral treaty of all 
Member States accepting the status of the European Foundation as a tax-exempt 
organization.  However, such an implementation seems somewhat unrealistic. As 
already stated, the experiences to date have shown that there is no real prospect of the 
unanimous approval of the Member States that would be necessary for such an 
undertaking. Unfortunately, the prospect of a move by national governments to 
harmonise their foundation tax law, to conclude a special multilateral treaty, or to make 
use of double taxation treaties, is not much better.  
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c) “Automatic” Implementation in the Form of the Lowest Common Denominator of 
the National Tax Laws  
Apart from these two more traditional ways there is a new way to introduce a European 
Foundation accepted in all Member States as a tax-exempt organization, and that is 
simply by means of a European Foundation Statute without an additional multilateral 
treaty: According to the new adjudication by the European Court of Justice in the 
“Stauffer” case, it is unlawful to deny tax-exempt status to a foreign foundation if this 
foundation meets all the State’s other requirements of a national tax-exempt 
foundation.305  
Thus, theoretically the European Foundation would be automatically tax-exempt in all 
Member States, if the European Foundation Statute were to combine all requirements of 
the tax law of the Member States (de facto lowest common denominator), i.e., by 
allowing only such public benefit purposes as are allowed in all Member States, by 
prohibiting remuneration for the board of directors (as under Spanish tax law306), by 
requiring a duty of timely disbursement and several formal statements in the 
foundation’s statute (as under German tax law307), by allowing only such purposes 
which are regarded as “public benefit” in every Member State,308 etc.  
The requirements of tax law could be mandatory for all European Foundations or be 
part of a “model statute”, leaving it open to the founder whether she/he wants the 
additional advantage of the status of a tax benefit foundation in all Member States. 
At first sight, such a tax-exempt European Foundation may seem unrealistic, because it 
would be over-regulated and too ‘bureaucratic’. However, according to the results of the 
comparative legal studies of the tax law of foundations, the similarities in tax law seem 
to be much greater than in foundation law309. Thus, it is imaginable that such a 
European Foundation could be a viable proposition and the price may be worth 
considering tax-exemption in all Member States. 
3. General Guidelines for the Content of a Tax-Exempt European Foundation Statute 
The primary aim of a tax-exempt European Foundation Statute is obvious: tax-
exemption in all Member States. As a matter of fact, a tax-exempt European Foundation 
Statute has to find the lowest common denominator of the tax law of the Member States 
in order to reach this aim. As the task is complex, ways would have to be found to make 
the European Foundation as simple as possible from an administrative and tax point of 
view. 
4. Expected Cost Reduction 
The introduction of a European Foundation Statute with competencies in tax law would 
decrease the costs of barriers further in addition to the gain of the European Foundation 
Model without tax-exempt status. Total annual transaction costs amounting to 90m and 
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101.7m euros could be saved, not including incalculable costs such as minimum capital 
and the consequences of barriers perceived as prohibitive. Most of the counselling costs 
would be obsolete and the neutrality of treatment for international active foundations 
would be maximised. 
5. Further Possible Effects 
In addition to the positive effects of the European Foundation Statute without tax-
exempt status, the comprehensive approach, including automatic tax exemption 
according to the non-discrimination approach, would create a high degree of 
standardization and further reduce national discretion as to the tax treatment of the 
European Foundation. The approach would create the most far-reaching incentive for 
funding trans-national European causes and would have the greatest potential to foster 
science and research funding as well as other causes of European interest. It would lead 
towards a shared concept of a European public good, even though such a concept may 
not be feasible except for a limited list of purposes mentioned in European Treaties such 
as the goal to promote R&D and the competitiveness associated therewith. 
B. Options for the Content of a European Foundation Statute or Code of Conduct 
Both the European Foundation Statute and a Code of Conduct (as an alternative means 
of soft law) have the aim of fostering trustworthiness. Because of similarities, it seems 
reasonable to discuss several options both for the European Foundation Statute and the 
Code of Conduct for a “European Foundation” together. Since the aim of the tax-
exempt foundation statute is different (lowest common denominator of the national tax 
laws), the options for such a statute will be discussed later (see C infra). 
I. Fundamental Characteristics of a European Foundation 
The European Foundation should have the following five main characteristics: 
– Legal personality 
– Promotion of a public benefit purpose 
– No membership 
– State supervision 
– Establishment by registration 
1. Legal Personality 
The European Foundation should have legal personality (with full capacity and limited 
liability) which is acquired upon registration. A comparative legal analysis shows that 
this is the rule in almost all Member States.310 
2. Public Benefit Purpose 
The European Foundation should promote public benefit purposes only.  
                                                 
310 See Part 3 
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The comparative legal analysis shows that public benefit foundations are accepted in all 
Member States, whereas other types of foundation are usually only accepted in some 
Member States.311  
A limitation to exclusively public benefit purposes has two advantages:  
– The function of the European Foundation is clearer, which may strengthen the 
case for a European Foundation Statute.  
– The countries requiring a national foundation to pursue only public benefit 
purposes would probably not support a European Foundation allowed to 
promote any lawful purpose. 
3. No “Formal” Membership  
As the comparative legal analysis shows, in all Member States a foundation normally 
has no “formal” membership.312  It seems reasonable, therefore, that the same would 
apply to the European Foundation. 
4. State Supervision 
According to the comparative legal analysis, in every Member State a foundation is 
supervised by the state supervisory authority.313 Thus, a European Foundation should 
also be supervised by such an authority.314 
5. Establishment by Registration 
In order to provide the necessary legal certainty, a European Foundation should be 
established not only by the private act of the founder but also with the participation of a 
public authority. The aim of legal certainty means that the act should be non-
discretionary registration by the registration authority.  
This is also the rule of the national foundation laws of almost all Member States:315 
Establishment normally needs the participation of a public authority which has no 
discretion if the requirements for establishment are fulfilled. Registration is common to 
many Member States, and this seems to be an adequate model for a European 
Foundation, providing legal certainty as to whether the European Foundation has been 
established in law or not. 
Apart from these five fundamental criteria, there are a number of questions for which 
certain alternative solutions are possible. 
II. Options for the Combination of the European Statute and National Law of the 
Member States 
One important question is how detailed a Statute on the European Foundation should 
be.  
                                                 
311 See Part 3, B IV supra. 
312 See Part 3, C I 10 supra. 
313 See Part 3, C III 1 supra. 
314 See also B VI infra, which discusses further details. 
315 See Part 3, D I 4 and 5. 
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Generally two models are possible: 
– In the case of the draft of the SPE, the statute is comprehensive as regards 
company law. The national law of Member States is applicable as regards other 
legal fields (e.g., tax law, insolvency law). 
– In the case of the SE, the statute gives only rudimentary rules for the SE, which 
are supplemented by the national rules of every Member State not only in other 
legal fields but also in company law. Thus, the SE is not a mere “European” 
legal form. In practice there exist 27 SEs, combining national company law of 
the Member States and the statute for the SE (e.g., the “French SE”, the 
“German SE” and the “Italian SE”). 
Both models have their advantages and disadvantages: 
The model of the SE gives the Member States more opportunities to avoid friction 
between the European Statute and their own national company law and thus may be 
easier for Member States to accept. However, such a model is complex and lacks 
transparency, because of the national differences to which the SE model is subject (de 
facto 27 different SEs).  
Consequently, it is quite understandable that the newer draft of the SPE tries to avoid 
this complexity and lack of transparency. Since our main argument in favour of a 
European Foundation Statute is based on the current transaction costs, any solution still 
requiring the help of legal counsel to shed light into the complex situation would reduce 
the cost advantages of a European Foundation Statute.  
III. Options for the Definition of Public Benefit Purpose 
As already stated, the purpose of a European Foundation should be restricted to a 
“public benefit purpose”. Consequently, it is necessary to decide whether the 
comparatively vague term “public benefit purpose” should be defined more exactly.  
As the legal comparative view shows, three kinds of definition are possible: 
– Definition by a closed list 
– Definition by an open list 
– No definition at all 
The advantage of a comprehensive definition is the increase of legal certainty; the 
disadvantage is that such a definition could be too inflexible to be able to react to new 
developments in philanthropy.  
The danger of inflexibility is probably the reason why only a few Member States which 
stipulate a public benefit purpose in foundation law or tax law define the term “public 
benefit purpose” by means of a closed list. 
As regards the European Foundation, it is reasonable to minimise legal uncertainties as 
much as possible. Therefore, there should be a description of public benefit purposes, 
which includes the public benefit purposes which are accepted by all Member States. 
According to the legal comparative analysis, at least the following purposes seem to be 
accepted in all Member States as public benefit purposes both in civil law and in tax 
law:316 
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1. health preservation, disease prevention, therapeutic and medical rehabilitation 
activities, 
2. social activities, family counselling, care for the elderly, 
3. scientific activities, research, 
4. school instruction and education, personal ability development, dissemination of 
knowledge, 
5. cultural activities, 
6. preservation of cultural heritage, 
7. preservation of historical monuments, 
8. nature preservation, animal protection, 
9. environmental protection, 
10. children and juvenile protection, children and juvenile advocate services,  
11. promoting of equal opportunity within society for underprivileged groups. 
The description could comprise a closed list or an open list. The advantage of a closed 
list is that the legal certainty is higher; however, the danger of such a closed list is that it 
is too inflexible.  
The vast majority of the Member States define what is meant by a public benefit 
purpose by means of an open list. An open list could also be chosen for the European 
Foundation. In that case, the next question would be which institution is to be 
competent to decide whether a non-defined purpose is a public benefit one. In the 
national law of Member States these questions are usually decided by the competent 
governmental authorities, but at the end of the day the courts are entitled to review the 
decision if the foundation lodges a claim against it. Thus, in case of a European 
Foundation Statute, defining what is meant by a public benefit purpose by means of an 
open list, would make the review of such decisions the task of the European Court of 
Justice. 
The alternative would be a closed list. We can find such closed lists in only a few 
Member States: in Hungarian non-profit law as well as in German tax law (after a recent 
reform). However, in both countries the lists are extensive. Furthermore, in Germany a 
“procedural opening clause” has been introduced: It is possible to extend the list by 
agreement between the tax authorities of the German Länder, so any reform of the law 
by Parliament is unnecessary.  
IV. Options for the Establishment of a European Foundation 
As already stated, a European Foundation should be established by registration and the 
two requirements for registration should be that it promotes a public benefit purpose and 
that it has no “formal” membership (see B I 2 and 3 supra). As regards the governance 
of the foundation, there may be additional mandatory rules which are discussed in B V 
below. 
1. Foundation Deed 
Apart from this, an additional requirement for the registration should be that the 
foundation deed contains the necessary information about the foundation’s purpose, 
assets and organization. It is reasonable to require a certain form for the foundation deed 
(e.g. notarization). 
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2. An Obligatory “European” Dimension? 
It is an open question whether an obligatory “European” dimension of the mission 
should be required in order to establish a European Foundation. 
Such a European dimension could be required in one of two different ways (alternative 
or cumulative):317 
– as a requirement for the purpose, stating that a European Foundation must 
promote a “European” public benefit purpose, 
– as a requirement for the activities, stating that a European Foundation must 
conduct activities in at least two Member States. 
The necessity for such a requirement could be justified by two arguments: 
(i) The other European legal forms traditionally have the requirement of a 
European dimension.  
(ii) A foundation with only domestic purposes and funding sources will not need 
to carry out cross-border activities and thus does not need a European legal 
form, which aims to overcome barriers of cross-border activities.  
However, in each case there are strong counter-arguments: 
(i) The requirement of a European dimension is more a politically motivated 
restriction, a point which is also debatable for the other European legal 
forms. Interestingly, the draft for a new European Private Company 
deliberately does not require any European dimension.  
(ii) The test of whether a purpose or an activity is a “European” one can become 
very complex, because the requirement should not exclude the overcoming 
of legal barriers to cross-border activities. 
In the case of the purpose, some public benefit purposes are usually 
international by their nature (e.g., science, international understanding). 
Even if the purpose of a European foundation was restricted to the territory 
of one Member State, it is not easy to decide whether such a purpose is not 
“European”. For example, a foundation for the preservation of an object of 
great cultural value (e.g., a church or a museum of international reputation) 
should be accepted as a European foundation regardless of the controversial 
and artificial question of whether such a purpose should qualify as a national 
or a European one (because of the cultural impact of the object) and also 
regardless of the question of whether the foundation is active in other 
Member States.  It is unconvincing that in the example the Foundation 
should be able to qualify in another way if it also preserves another church in 
another Member State.  
The question of what kind of activity can qualify as a sufficiently 
“European” activity may also lead to doubtful and undesirable results. One 
example is the question as to the nature of the conditions that have to be met 
when fundraising in another Member State in order to be regarded as 
“activities” there. Another example is the question of whether a European 
                                                 
317 A third possible alternative would the requirement to have founders from different Member States. 
However, such a requirement would not make much sense, for the nationality of the founder is not 
relevant for the overcoming of existing national barriers. 
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Foundation which has immovable property in another Member State should 
lose its status as a European Foundation if it decided to sell this property and 
acquire immovable property in its home state. If this were to be applied, a 
European Foundation could be forced to continue holding property in 
another Member State even if this were to become economically 
unreasonable. In addition, the possibility of receiving or making cross-border 
donations is inherent to practically all European Foundations. 
In order to avoid complicated questions of definition and to avoid undesirable results, 
there are good reasons to follow the approach of the draft for the European Private 
Company and require no European dimension. An alternative would be the necessity of 
a European dimension, which is defined in very generous terms.  
3. Obligation of an Initial Minimum Endowment? 
It is debatable whether apart from a “European” dimension there should be any 
additional requirement in order to establish a European Foundation. 
As the comparative legal view shows, the Member States have rather different solutions 
with respect to this point. Some Member States do not stipulate any initial endowment, 
while other Member States do (up to a million euros in France). 
One argument for the requirement of a certain minimum amount of capital is that it may 
be seen as a sign of the seriousness of the purpose of the European Foundation, and that 
a European Foundation thus capitalised may be regarded as more trustworthy than a 
European Foundation without any initial assets of substance.  
In addition, those Member States which do require a certain minimum amount of capital 
could have concerns that the European Foundation might be used as a tool to 
circumvent the requirements of their national foundation law.  
However there are also good counter-arguments: 
The draft for the new European Private Company only requires a symbolic minimum 
capital of 1 euro. This is justified by the argument that getting established as a European 
Private Company should also be open to smaller companies. In the case of the European 
Foundation it is reasonable to allow the establishment of small European Foundations as 
well. In those Member States which stipulate a minimum level of initial assets, it is not 
unusual for a foundation to start with a comparatively small endowment which will then 
be increased by later donations (e.g., community foundations). Some types of 
foundation (e.g., alumni, friends of a museum) do not even need a substantial 
endowment to embark on their mission.318 
As regards the danger of circumvention, it should be kept in mind that the draft for the 
new European Private Company does not require any minimum capital, while many 
Member States do have such a requirement in their national company law. Thus, not 
every difference between a European legal form and a national legal form can be 
regarded as “circumvention”.  
                                                 
318 Of course, even the lack of such a minimum endowment requirement does not mean that a foundation 
could exist without any assets at all. There could be a provision which clarifies that a European 
Foundation must be liquidated when, for lack of adequate assets, the duties of the foundation can no 
longer be fulfilled. Additionally, (national) insolvency laws are applicable in the event of insolvency. 
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It is therefore recommended either not to require a minimum capital or to keep it rather 
modest (e.g., € 25,000 or 50,000) in order to allow smaller initiatives to use this legal 
form as well. 
V. Options for the Governance of the Foundation 
According to the suggestions above, a European Foundation should have no “formal” 
membership, and there should be mandatory State supervision.319 All Member States 
require these two fundamental criteria as a rule. There are only two additional 
mandatory rules for the governance of a foundation which are accepted in all Member 
States: (1) that the foundation has at least a board of directors as its executive organ, and 
(2) that in case of any amendment of the foundation’s statutes, a certain formal 
procedure is necessary (usually requiring participation by a State supervisory authority). 
Apart from this, many Member States leave considerable latitude to the founder to 
determine the foundation’s governance in its statutes. The lack of more detailed 
mandatory rules for internal governance in the foundation’s governing legislation may 
also be explained by the convention that the State supervisory authorities call on the 
foundation to account and ensure proper management by its executive organs. 
If we look at the strictness of the regulation of internal governance compared with the 
strictness of State supervision in the Member States, we can distinguish four basic 
models: 
1. Intensity of Regulation and Supervision 
– the “liberal model” which requires only very rudimentary rules for governance 
and private supervisory mechanisms and has a comparatively low level of State 
supervision (e.g., the Netherlands), 
– the “private supervision model” which combines several mandatory private 
supervisory mechanisms (e.g., accounting and auditing) with a comparatively 
low level of State supervision (e.g., the Austrian “private foundation”), 
– the “state supervision model” which has a comparatively high level of State 
supervision but only rudimentary requirements as regards governance and other 
private supervisory mechanisms (e.g., the Austrian “public foundation”), 
– the “strict model” which combines a comparatively high level of State 
supervision with detailed requirements for internal governance and private 
supervisory mechanisms (e.g., France). 
The “liberal model” is cheap and leaves it open to the founder to stipulate the level of 
private supervision she/he regards as adequate. However, there is a danger that the lack 
of control can lead to abuse and that public trust in the institutional form of the 
foundation could be lost as a consequence of such abuses. 
The “strict model” provides mandatory protection against abuses, which should increase 
public trust in the integrity of the foundation as an institutional form, but there is the 
danger of too much bureaucracy, especially if the foundation is comparatively small. In 
order to find a compromise, some Member States distinguish between “small” 
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foundations, which are less strictly regulated, and “large” foundations, which are more 
strictly regulated. 
In the case of the European Foundation, there may be good arguments for choosing a 
“private supervision model”, which combines private supervisory mechanisms (for most 
issues and requirements) with state supervisory mechanisms (for a small list of key 
issues like fundamental changes):  
– Adequate private supervisory instruments support the trustworthiness of the 
European Foundation. 
– State supervision is naturally more complex, if a foundation is active in different 
Member States.  
– The tendency of modern legislation in the Member States is to introduce a 
“private supervision model” which sometimes replaces or complements the 
traditional “State supervision model”. Examples are the newer private 
foundation in Austria and the new foundation laws of most East European 
Member States. 
2. Private Supervisory Mechanisms 
We distinguish between several basic forms of private supervisory mechanisms which 
can be identified in the Member States (sometimes alternative, sometimes cumulative): 
– Mandatory rules for a foundation’s organs (board of directors and its members, 
supervisory board and/or other organs), 
– Procedural rules for specified kinds of decisions (e.g., appointment of board 
members, amendment of the foundation’s statutes),  
– Information and enforcement rights for persons with a legitimate interest (e.g., 
the founder, subsequent donors, beneficiaries, creditors, etc.), 
– Requirements for an auditor, 
– Mandatory rules for the content and quality of annual reports and annual 
accounts, 
– Requirements for transparency/disclosure (which may include the foundation’s 
statutes, annual reports, annual accounts and/or audit reports). 
For the European Foundation, some of these requirements could be introduced 
– as mandatory requirements for all or for “large” foundations, 
– as voluntary recommendations in a kind of “Foundation Governance Code” as a 
means of self-regulation. 
a) Foundation’s Organs 
One possible requirement for the internal organization is that there should be at least 
three directors. Such a requirement can establish a system of mutual checks and 
counterbalances within the board. This system is a convenient way to compensate for 
the lack of control resulting from the fact that a foundation has no shareholders and thus 
no proprietors like a commercial company.  
As regards the personal requirements for a board member, it could be required that the 
board member should be a natural person (in order to support transparency and 
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certainty), “personally independent” from other board members (in order to avoid the 
danger of being influenced by side-interests of a private nature). 
The establishment of a supervisory board is most uncommon in the Member States. As 
there is already an internal control mechanism within the board, an additional 
supervisory board should only be required for the largest foundations (if there should be 
a mandatory rule at all).  
b) Procedural Rules for Fundamental Decisions 
Fundamental decisions like the amendment of a foundation’s statutes should require the 
consent of the State supervisory authority. The State supervisory authority should (only) 
be entitled to reject a change to the statutes if this is deemed necessary in order to 
prevent the original intentions of the founder, or the reasonable expectations of the 
foundation’s beneficiaries, or the legal rights of other persons affected, from being 
compromised. 
c) Rights for Persons with a Legitimate Interest 
Most Member States do not give any mandatory rights to the founder, beneficiaries or 
other third persons (e.g., other donors, creditors) with a legitimate interest. 
Nevertheless, in order to achieve an adequate system of private supervisory control, it 
seems reasonable to give such persons at least a “limited” enforcement right, namely 
that they may submit a report to the State supervisory authority, complaining that the 
foundation’s organs are not fulfilling their legal responsibility. The State supervisory 
authority should then be obliged to issue an adequate statement to the person within due 
time.  
d) Auditor 
At least the largest European Foundations should have their annual accounts audited by 
an eligible independent auditor who is subject to professional regulation. 
e) Content and Quality of Annual Reports and Accounts 
At least for the largest European Foundations, there should be some mandatory 
requirement for the content and quality of annual reports and accounts in order to 
increase transparency and to ensure that a true and fair view is shown by the accounts. 
Examples of such requirements can be found in England and Wales and also in 
Scotland. 
f) Disclosure 
The registration of a European Foundation, its annual reports and accounts (and, where 
applicable, audit reports) should be a matter of public record. Disclosure in the public 
domain is required to achieve the transparency necessary for the maintenance of public 
confidence in the proper administration of the foundation. 
3. Directors’ Duties 
Most Member States do not have explicit rules about the directors’ duties. In the case of 
the European Foundation it may be helpful to clarify that both a general duty of care and 
a general duty of loyalty exist.  
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Additionally, some specific duties may be stipulated. One example for a specific duty of 
loyalty could be the regulation of self-dealing transactions. Such transactions may be 
allowed on condition that they are fair, and that the annual report and accounts contain 
adequate information about the self-dealing transactions. 
VI. Options for State Supervision 
1. State Supervisory Authority 
In the case of the European Foundation there are two potential models:  
– Supervision by a central European State supervisory authority 
– Supervision by the relevant national State supervisory authority or authorities 
Both models have their pros and cons. 
A central European State supervisory authority may have the advantage of a good 
reputation and can develop a uniform standard in its supervisory policy and practice. In 
the case of enforcement measures, the European State supervisory authority may need 
the cooperation of national governmental authorities. Disadvantages of a central State 
supervisory authority are a certain amount of bureaucracy as well as the challenge of 
having to cope with the different languages in the Member States, and the costs of 
funding the authority.  
Decentralised State supervision by national State supervisory authorities has advantages 
in being able to avoid some of the bureaucracy and translation problems. 
If the second model is chosen, the following question arises as to which national State 
supervisory authority should be competent:  
– the State supervisory authority of the Member State where the European 
Foundation has its statutory main office (registered office/home office), or 
– the State supervisory authority of the Member State where the European 
Foundation has its actual administrative main office (operational 
headquarters/house office). 
If the second model is chosen, the usual and more convincing solution seems to be the 
first option (registered office), since otherwise there could be legal uncertainty 
regarding cross-border activities. Whatever the case, a certain amount of cooperation 
between the different national State supervisory authorities will be necessary. 
2. Competences of the State Supervisory Authority 
The State supervisory authority should have the following tasks and powers: 
– Registration, 
– Consent to fundamental decisions, 
– Information rights, 
– Intervention rights in the event of any significant breach of the law or the 
statutes. 
The State supervisory authority should not have the right to review the discretionary 
decisions of a board of directors for any other reason. The measures of the State 
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supervisory authorities should be proportionate and all their decisions should be 
appealable in the courts. 
VII. Options for the Regulation of Economic Activities 
1. Economic Activities of the European Foundation 
As regards economic activities by the foundation itself, two main options are possible, 
which can be found in several Member States: 
– Generally no restriction; national rules of commercial law or co-determination 
may be applicable (e.g., the Netherlands). 
– Economic activities must be subordinated to the foundation’s public benefit 
purpose (e.g., Spain).320 
An argument for the first solution (no restriction) is that the European Foundation 
should overcome barriers for all cross-border activities, which also includes economic 
cross-border activities. Additionally, as the comparative legal view shows, strict 
prohibition is very uncommon because it ignores the consideration that it can be very 
helpful for a foundation to increase its assets not only by the raising of funds and the 
administration of investment assets, but also by carrying out economic activities. 
The main argument for a restriction of economic activities within the national law of the 
Member States seems to be that foundation law does not normally include rules to 
protect creditors, e.g., like those applicable to a company trading for profit. Thus, the 
foundation could be used as a vehicle to circumvent these mandatory rules (e.g., capital 
requirements, publicity, accounting standards). 
However, it can be debated whether this argument is convincing in the case of the 
European Foundation.  
– According to the recent rulings of the European Court of Justice in the cases of 
Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art, there are good reasons for believing that 
foundations of one Member State which carry out economic activities must be 
recognised in another Member State even if they do not have the same rules to 
protect creditors. 
– The European Foundation may have a comparatively high standard in matters of 
governance, transparency and accountability (as recommended), and there could 
be specific requirements for European Foundations which carry out economic 
activities. 
2. Subsidiary Trading Company 
As the comparative legal analysis shows, almost all Member States allow a foundation 
to have a subsidiary trading company.  
If the risks of direct trading by the European Foundation were regarded as too high 
because of the lack of national creditor protection rules, an alternative could be to allow 
                                                 
320 A general prohibition of economic activities of the foundation itself and a prohibition to implement a 
subsidiary company only exist for Czech foundations, but Czech public benefit institutions (which are 
comparable to a foundation) are allowed to perform subordinated economic activities. 
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a European Foundation to establish a subsidiary trading company (which may be a 
national company of one Member State or a European Private Company). 
C. Options for the Content of a Statute for a Tax-Exempt European Foundation 
The aims for a Statute for a Tax-Exempt European Foundation are (1) to find the lowest 
common denominator of the national tax laws of the member status, and (2) to put it 
into a statute in the least complex way possible. 
I. Research Task 
As regards the first aim, unfortunately, until now nobody has collated all the 
requirements of the tax laws of all 27 Member States. Thus, it would be necessary to 
start further comparative legal studies in order to develop a detailed statute with the 
lowest common denominator of all Member States. The task is challenging, because it 
will be necessary to find general rules, instead of cumulating rules, which seem to be 
different but are only sub-types of a general principle. However, as there has been a 
remarkable increase in comparative legal work in the field recently, there are good 
chances that such an approach will be successful. 
II. Need for Flexible Amendment Rules 
There should be amendment procedures which are flexible enough to react to further 
reforms of the national tax laws by one or several Member States – experience shows 
that tax law is changing fast.  
III. Options to Decrease Complexity 
There are several options to decrease complexity. 
First, instead of the “big” solution – the lowest common denominator of the tax laws of 
all 27 Member States –a “small” solution could be introduced: the lowest common 
denominator of a smaller number of Member States. The smaller the number is, the 
lower is the complexity, but also the advantage of the tax-exempt status. Such a “small” 
solution could be helpful in an introductory stage. 
Second, the Member States could decide to accept a “Tax-Exempt European Foundation 
Statute”, even if this statute does not fulfil any of the very specific requirements of the 
national tax law, but includes the fundamental rules. Of course, it is up to the national 
legislator whether a European Foundation which does not fulfil all but most tax law 
requirements should be accepted as a tax-exempt organization. 
However, some Member States already know such a distinction between “fundamental” 
tax law rules and “less important” tax law rules. For example, under German tax law a 
national tax-exempt organization may have the statutory purpose to make grants out of 
its assets to a foreign organization on condition that the foreign organization promotes a 
public benefit purpose which is also accepted under German tax law. The further 
requirements of German tax law are not necessary in such a case. Only in the case of a 
foreign organization that has no national tax-exempt organization status are the rules of 
the “Stauffer” decision applicable, requiring that the foreign organization meets all 
further requirements of German tax law. Other Member States also have comparable 
rules if there is a national representative office or a national “sponsoring” organization. 
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Thus, it seems that the purpose is a more important requirement than the other 
requirements of tax law. Consequently, a European Foundation which has an accepted 
public benefit purpose and meets additional fundamental tax law requirements should 
have the chance of being accepted even if its registered office is not in the Member 
State in question. 
D. Main Findings of Part 5 
I. Models to Overcome the Existing Legal Barriers 
We have debated the feasibility and desirability of five models to overcome the existing 
legal barriers: (1) Maintaining the status quo; (2) harmonization; (3) multilateral or 
bilateral treaties; and the European Foundation Statute (4) without tax-exempt status or 
(5) with tax-exempt status in all Member States (non-discrimination rule). It should be 
noted that each option has its own sub-options influencing the possibilities to overcome 
the barriers and to reduce the current costs.  
1. Status Quo Model 
The status quo-model does not necessarily mean total stagnation. The adjudication of 
the ECJ seems to establish general a non-discrimination rule in tax law which would 
overcome some of the existing barriers in tax law.321 The status quo model would imply 
that on the legal side nothing substantial would be changed. Additionally, attempts 
could be made to reduce the current legal uncertainties through information campaigns 
or soft law (code of conduct, accreditation procedure). Such means cannot facilities the 
barriers, but try to reduce the costs to overcome those barriers. Unfortunately, it seems 
unlikely that such measures can reduce the current costs significantly. The remaining 
costs (as far as they are calculable from our point of view) add up to at least 90m to 
101.7m euros per year. 
2. Harmonization Model and Treaty Model 
The other extreme to the implied ‘no direct legal action’ of the status quo model would 
be the harmonization of the various foundation laws and/or tax laws across the Member 
States.  
Although this would reduce the costs for cross-border activities substantially because 
foundations would find the same legal environment in all Member States, it seems 
completely unrealistic that such model could be implemented.322  
                                                 
321 The non-discrimination rule is only applicable for inbound constellations (a non-residential foundation 
wants tax benefits from the State of source), but not for outbound constellations (a residential foundation 
wants tax benefits although its activities are abroad). However, most Member States does not seem to 
have barriers for outbound constellations and some of the current barriers may infringe the EC Treaty 
because of other reasons (cf. the case Laboratoires Fournier supra C II 2 c). 
322 As regards the harmonization of foundation law, it would not be desirable to force the Member States 
to unify their different foundation types. 
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3. Treaties Model 
In the Treaties Model there are basically two kinds of treaties possible. Under a civil law 
treaty each Member State would mutually recognise the legal personality of foreign 
foundations. Under a tax law treaty each Member State would mutually accord tax-
exempt foundation status to foreign foundations, with the consequence that such foreign 
foundations would receive the same tax benefits as a national tax-exempt foundation. 
The costs effects of this model are very hard to evaluate because there are many 
different constellations of treaties possible between Member States. If there were 
treaties between all Member States the effect would be comparable to the 
Harmonization Model. Unfortunately, experience (almost no treaties between the 
Member States) shows that it seems to be unrealistic that the Member States will 
establish such treaties.  
4. European Foundation Model 
The European Foundation Model constitutes a somewhat different approach, since it is 
an additional legal form which would overcome civil law barriers completely.  
As regards the implementation of such a European Foundation Statute, the legal basis 
would be Art. 308 of the EC Treaty, combined with the fundamental freedoms (i.e., 
freedom of establishment and freedom of capital movement) which are applicable to 
cross-border activities of foundations: (1) purpose-related and non-purpose related 
economic activities of foundations seem to be protected by the freedom of 
establishment or by the freedom of services; (2) investment of assets is protected either 
by the freedom of establishment or by the freedom of capital movement; (3) donations 
seem to be protected by the freedom of capital movement. Existing national foundations 
will be entitled to take the form of a European Foundation, if such a transformation is in 
the line with the will of the founder as laid down in the foundation’s statutes. In many 
cases it may be quite a difficult task to decide whether the founder of an already existing 
national foundation would have preferred the European Foundation as an organizational 
form, as it did not exist when he made his endowment. One solution could be a specific 
procedure allowing a transformation under the condition that the foundation’s statutes 
can remain similar after the transformation. 
The cost effects are dependent on the scope of the European Foundation Statute. As 
regards civil law barriers, we estimate that a European Foundation Statute could lead to 
a cost reduction of 90m to 101.7m euros (138m to 178.7m euros if we also take 
minimum capital into account). Apart from this, there would also occur a cost reduction 
of incalculable costs (costs of transfer of the foundations’ seat, costs of reduplication, 
psychological costs, costs of failure).  
Apart from the cost effects, the European Foundation may have the following further 
effects: it may encourage foundations to become internationally active; it could be seen 
as a good example of governance, could encourage a larger amount of private giving in 
Europe trough much better visibility of the legal form, could be an incentive for more 
corporate giving and corporate social responsibility, could attract more international 
(and extra-European) giving to foundations in the EU, and it could serve as an adequate 
vehicle to foster the special needs of the growing European Research Area. 
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5. European Foundation Model with Additional Tax Exemption 
A European Foundation with a tax-exempt status in all Member States would need an 
additional implementation of tax law rules.  
As regards the scope of such tax benefits, there are various options. Instead of a 
harmonization, it seems to us that only a non-discriminatory solution is both realistic 
and reasonable. Thus, a European Foundation would receive the same tax benefit as a 
tax-exempt foundation in the same Member State. 
As regards implementation, there could be an implementation by the European 
Foundation Statute itself, by an additional treaty, or (automatically) by collecting the 
lowest common denominator of the national tax laws of the Member States.  
While the two first options do not seem very realistic, the third option may be 
considered: According to the adjudication by the European Court of Justice in the 
“Stauffer” case, it is unlawful to deny tax-exempt status to a foreign foundation if this 
foundation meets all the State’s other requirements of a national tax-exempt foundation. 
Thus, theoretically, the European Foundation would automatically be tax-exempt in all 
Member States, if the European Foundation Statute were to combine all requirements of 
the tax laws of the Member States (de facto lowest common denominator). 
Consequently for a European Foundation there would be allowed only such public 
benefit purposes as are allowed in all Member States. Aditionally there would be a 
prohibition of remuneration for the board of directors (as under Spanish tax law), a duty 
of timely disbursement and several formal statements in the foundation’s statute (as in 
German tax law), allowing only such purposes which are regarded as “public benefit” in 
every Member State, etc. The requirements of tax law could be mandatory for all 
European Foundations or be part of a “model statute”, leaving it open to the founder 
whether she/he wants the additional advantage of the status of a tax benefit foundation 
in all Member States.  
Such a European Foundation would mean the most expectable cost reduction effects 
(from the feasible models). The potential cost reduction could add up to 90m to 101.7m 
euros (138m to 178.7m euros, minimum capital included). The approach would create 
the most far-reaching incentive for funding trans-national European causes, and it would 
have the greatest potential to foster science and research funding as well as other causes 
of European interest. It would lead towards a shared concept of a European public good, 
even though such a concept may only be feasible for a limited list of purposes 
mentioned in European Treaties such as the goal to promote R&D and the 
competitiveness associated therewith. 
 
Table 27: Cost reduction by policy options 
Model Effected cost categories Cost reduction 
Status quo Generally none 
In case of information 
Generally none 
In case of information 
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policy and/or means of soft 
law: incalculable costs 
policy and means of soft 
law: up to 18m to 20m 
euros 323 and incalculable 
costs 
Harmonization Depending on the scope up to 138m-178.7m324 







91m – 101.7 (138m - 
178.7m) 






91m – 101.7 (138m - 
178.7m) 
 
II. Options for the Content of a European Foundation Statute 
If the European Foundation model was chosen, the next question would relate to the 
content of a European Foundation Statute. 
1. General Framework 
In order to develop such a Statute, the similarities and differences of the foundation 
laws of the Member State should be taken into account. In light of the legal comparative 
analysis, it seems feasible that a European Foundation should have the following five 
main characteristics: (1) a legal personality (with full capacity and limited liability), (2) 
promotion of a public benefit purpose, (3) no formal membership, (4) State supervision, 
and (5) establishment by registration (without discretion of the registrar). 
One important question is how detailed a Statute on the European Foundation should 
be. Generally, two models are possible: a comprehensive statute (like the draft of the 
SPE) where national law of Member States is applicable as regards other legal fields 
(e.g., tax law, insolvency law), or a statute with rudimentary rules (like the SE), which 
are supplemented by the national rules of every Member State in other legal fields as 
well as in company law. A comprehensive statute is preferable, because such a statute is 
less complex and more transparent and thus can better reduce the transaction costs. 
An important aim is to find adequate rules to ensure that the European Foundation will 
be seen as a trustworthy institution.  The Member States will probably not agree to the 
                                                 
323 This figure is estimated under the assumption that the costs for legal counselling would be reduced by 
20% compared to the current situation. 
324 Total harmonization of foundation law and tax law. 
325 Treaties between all Member States both in civil law and tax law. 
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introduction of a European Foundation Statute if they have concerns that this European 
legal form might not be trustworthy.  This could be, for example, because this form 
could be misused to circumvent Member State national foundation law, tax law or trade 
law. However, this does not necessarily mean that the European Foundation has to copy 
the most restrictive national foundation law among the Member States or combine the 
most restrictive provisions from every Member State.  
2. Details 
There are several possibilities in trying to define public benefit purpose (closed list, 
open list).  
It is questionable whether a European Foundation should have an obligatory 
“European” dimension. In order to avoid complicated questions of definition and to 
undesirable results, there are good reasons to follow the approach of the draft for the 
European Private Company and to require no European dimension. An alternative 
would be the necessity of a European dimension, which is defined in very generous 
terms.  
It is arguable whether a certain minimum amount of founding assets should be 
necessary, with the Member States having rather different solutions to this question. As 
there are examples where such an initial minimum endowment does not seem to be 
necessary for the public benefit function of the foundation, it is recommended either not 
to require a minimum capital, or to keep it rather modest (e.g., € 25,000 or 50,000) in 
order to allow smaller initiatives to use this legal form as well.  
As regards governance, there may be good arguments for choosing a “private 
supervision model”, which combines private supervisory mechanisms (e.g., rudimentary 
mandatory rules for the foundation’s organs, auditing, mandatory rules for the content 
and quality of annual reports and annual accounts, and requirements for 
transparency/disclosure) with state supervisory mechanisms (for a small list of key 
issues like fundamental changes). All or some of the private supervisory mechanisms 
could be introduced as mandatory requirements for all or for only “large” foundations, 
or they could be introduced as voluntary recommendations in a kind of “Foundation 
Governance Code” as a means of self-regulation. 
With respect to State supervision, there are two potential models: supervision by a 
central European State supervisory authority or supervision by the relevant national 
State supervisory authority or authorities. Both models have their pros and cons. A 
central European State supervisory authority may have the advantage of a better 
reputation and can develop a uniform standard in its supervisory policy and practice. 
Decentralised State supervision by national State supervisory authorities draws 
advantages from being able to avoid some of the bureaucracy and translation problems. 
If the second model is chosen, the following question arises as to which national State 
supervisory authority should be competent: the State supervisory authority of the 
Member State where the European Foundation has its statutory main office (registered 
office/home office), or the State supervisory authority of the Member State where the 
European Foundation has its actual administrative main office (operational 
headquarters/house office). The usual and more convincing solution seems to be the 
first option (registered office), since there could otherwise be legal uncertainty for 
cross-border activities. Whatever the case, a certain amount of cooperation between the 
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different national State supervisory authorities will be necessary. The State supervisory 
authority should have the following tasks and powers: (1) registration, (2) consent to 
fundamental decisions, (3) information rights, and (4) intervention rights in the event of 
any significant breach of the law or the statutes. The State supervisory authority should 
not have the right to review the discretionary decisions of the board of directors for any 
other reason. The measures of the State supervisory authorities should be proportionate 
and all their decisions should be appealable in the courts. 
As regards economic activities by the foundation itself, there are two main options in 
the Member States: (1) generally no restriction; national rules of commercial law or co-
determination may be applicable, or (2) economic activities must be subordinated to the 
foundation’s public benefit purpose. If the risks of direct trading by the European 
Foundation were regarded as too high because of the lack of national creditor protection 
rules, a further alternative could be to allow a European Foundation to establish a 
subsidiary trading company326 (which may be a national company of one Member State 
or a European Private Company). 
If the European Foundation should have an additional tax-exempt status, the first task 
will be to find the lowest common denominator of the national tax laws of the Member 
States. Until now nobody has collated all the requirements of the 27 Member States’ 
national tax laws, but there are good chances that such an approach will be successful 
due to the progress of comparative research in this field. The second task would be to 
enter the lowest common denominator into a statute in the least complex way possible. 
There should be amendment procedures which are flexible enough to react to further 
reforms of the national tax law of one or several Member States – experience shows that 
tax law changes fast. Several possibilities exist to decrease complexity (e.g., the “small” 
solution: the lowest common denominator of a smaller number of Member States, 
support by the Member States to exempt a Tax-Exempt European Foundation, if the 
fundamental requirements of the national tax law are fulfilled). 
 
326 Almost all Member States allow a foundation to be the major or only shareholder of a company. 
